The Process of Constitution-Making : a Law and Economics Analysis by Michel, S. (Stephan)
The Process of Constitution-Making:
A Law and Economics Analysis
Stephan Michel
The Process of Constitution-M
aking 
Stephan M
ichel
The Process of Constitution-Making:
A Law and Economics Analysis
Het vormgeven van een Grondwet:
Een Rechtseconomische analyse
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam op gezag van
de rector magnificus
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
donderdag 19 januari         om 15.30 uur
door
Stephan Michel
geboren te Gießen, Duitsland
2017
 
Promotiecommissie
 
Promotoren: Prof.dr. S. Voigt
Prof.dr. K. Heine
Overige leden: Prof.dr. R.J. Van den Bergh
Prof.dr. C.W. Engel
Dr. K. Metelska-Szaniawska
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as part of the European 
Doctorate in Law and Economics programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A collaboration between  
 
 
 
     
 
 

Acknowledgments
The time of writing a PhD thesis is often likened to a lonesome journey. I only partially
agree with that statement, namely that it is a journey. It was everything but lonesome.
Instead, I owe thanks to a whole mass of people without whom the thesis you are holding
in your hands right now would not have been possible.
First and foremost, my supervisors Stefan Voigt and Klaus Heine made sure that I
did not get lost on the journey throughout my PhD. They have been a tremendous
support and were always helpful and welcoming. I am really grateful for all the support.
Furthermore, I would like to thank all the academic staﬀ in Bologna, Rotterdam and
Hamburg that gave further directions to my journey. In particular, I would like to thank
Emanuela Carbonara, Marco Casari, Luigi Franzoni, Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe, Louis
Visscher, Michael Faure, Alessio Pacces, Franziska Weber and Thomas Eger. Last,
but not least, I would like to thank the members of my inner committee, Katarzyna
Metelska-Szaniawska, Christoph Engel and Roger van den Bergh, for their extremely
helpful feedback.
While the captains on bord have been a key to my journey, the ship would have wrecked
many times without the tremendous administrative support in Bologna, Rotterdam and
Hamburg. I would like to wholeheartedly thank Lisa Verniti, Anastassia Naboko, Silvia
Fiorentini, Marianne Breijer-de Man, Simone Rettig, Frauke Schmidt, Jennifer Brooks,
Christiane Ney-Schönig, Christina Junker and Lukas Böker.
Like every other journey in life, this journey was made worthwhile by my travel com-
panions. I am really grateful to be part of my EDLE batch and thank all of you for
making those three years really amazing. Maria Pia, Shilpi, Min, Alice, Enmanuel, Faiz,
Yugank, Diogo, Tobi, thanks for everything. A very special thanks goes to Miriam, Max
and Nico. I’ll always hold those nights in Bologna in a warm place in my heart.
Besides the EDLE family, the Institute of Law and Economics in Hamburg has been a
second home I could always call upon during my journey. Sina, Nora, Dagmar, Hashem,
I
Lukas, Konstantinos, Jerg, I could not think of better people to prepare coﬀee for :).
A good journey should never be based on work alone. I am really grateful to my
friends in Hamburg, who brought me back to earth and helped me to aim for the sky.
Anna, Sassi, Marie, Markus, I am extremely proud to call you my friends.
A special group of people has accompanied me (nearly) all along the way from a 25
people farmer town in the middle of nowhere until today and always made me a happier
person. Simone, Milan, Steﬀen, Chris, Kai, Alex, Moritz, I cannot put it into words
how glad I am to still have you around.
This whole journey through academic and personal oceans would have been impossible
without the abiding support of my family. They supported me on a journey which they
never experienced themselves and did so in such a remarkable way that I could not have
wished for anything better. Mama, Papa, Oma Marie, Oma Frieda, Corinna, ohne euch
wäre ich heute nicht hier. DANKE FÜR ALLES!
Finally, my life would be a darker and colder place without Franzi. You are the one
who makes me fall asleep with a smile on my face that is still there when I wake up next
to you. The journey with you is the one I am enjoying the most and which shall never
end.
II
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Key terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Scope of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Scientiﬁc Contribution and Societal Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.1 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5.2 Empirical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5.3 Analytic Narratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5.4 Legal Positivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6 Thesis Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2 Key Literature 19
2.1 Scope of Literature Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Why a Constitution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 The Economic Eﬀects of Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Explaining Constitutional Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Electoral Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Form of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Procedural Rules Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Constraints on Constitution Drafters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
III
2.5.2 Procedural Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.5.3 Public Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.4 Time Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 Assemblies Matter: Analyzing the Choice of Form of Government in
Unstable Democracies 37
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 What Explains the Choice of Form of Government? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Modeling the Choice of Form of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Solving the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Making Sense of the Main Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Ulysses’ Bonds: Are Drafters Constrained by Referendums? 69
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Constraints on Constitution Drafters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Bargaining and Constitution-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Three Types of Constraints in Constitution-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.1 Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4.2 Modeling the Process of Constitution-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5 Testing the Claims About Referendums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.1 Towards an Empirical Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.2 Data Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5.3 Estimation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5.5 Failed Referendums: Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5.6 Robustness I: Does a Referendum Aﬀect Domestic Conﬂict? . . . . . 100
4.5.7 Robustness II: Mandatory Referendums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
IV
5 Majority Rules in Constitutional Referendums 105
5.1 Introduction1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.2 Setting Majority Rules for Constitution-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.1 Choosing Under a Veil of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2.2 Utility Weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.3 Protecting Minorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2.4 Tyranny of the Minority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3 Choosing a Majority Rule for Constitutional Referendums . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 When to Use a Simple Majority Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.1 Swift Stability in Times of Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.2 High Decision-Making Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4.3 Uncertainty of Drafters about Citizens’ Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 When to Use a Qualiﬁed Majority Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.1 Sociological Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.2 Abuse of Power During Times of Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5.3 Additional Control of Politicians in the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.6.1 Evaluation Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.6.2 Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.6.3 Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.6.4 Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Commitment or Paternalism? The Case of Unamendability 133
6.1 Introduction 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2 Reasons for Constitutional Pre-Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
1This chapter is based on joint work with Ignacio N. Cofone, to whom I am very grateful for allowing
me to use this work as part of my dissertation.
2This chapter is based on joint work with Ignacio N. Cofone, to whom I am very grateful for allowing
me to use this work as part of my dissertation. Furthermore, this chapter is forthcoming in the edited
volume "An Unconstitutional Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies", which is
part of the "Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice" series published by Springer.
V
6.3 Constitutional Pre-Commitment and Unamendability . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Desirability of Unamendable Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.5 An Expressive Device with a Functional Eﬀect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7 Concluding Remarks 159
7.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2 Relevance of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.4 Opportunities for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Bibliography i
Executive Summary xv
Samenvating xviii
CV and Portfolio xx
VI
List of Tables
3.1 New Constitutions and Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Eﬀect of an Increase in Income Inequality on Presidential System . . . . 63
4.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (Frac. Logit) . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (Robust Regression) . . . . . 97
4.5 Robustness: Eﬀect of Lagged Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (OLS) . 101
4.6 Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Mandatory Referendums (OLS) . . . . . . 102
VII
List of Abbreviations
c2d Centre for Research on Direct Democracy
CC Constitutional Committee
CNTS Cross-National Times Series
xconst Executive Constraints
GDP Gross Domestic Product
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo
NCA National Constitutional Assembly
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
VIII

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Constitutions are the most basic layer of the legal system and deﬁne the constraints
within which judicial, political, and economic choices are made. Besides this functional
importance of constitutions, they are also seen as one of the cornerstones forming the
identity of a nation. Through the constitution, societies can establish a basis on which
they operate. Regime changes or independence struggles are often immediately followed
by a call for a new constitution. The waves of constitution-making following indepen-
dence of former colonies in Africa during the 1960s and after the breakdown of the Soviet
Union in the 1990s are good examples for this tendency with regard to newly founded
states. When talking about regime changes, the cases of constitution-making in North
Africa after the Arab Spring in 2011, which led to new constitutions in Tunisia and
Egypt, spring to mind.
Given the importance of constitutions, a better understanding of how constitutions
are made seems imminent. One key determinant of the content (and the success) of
a new constitution is the constitution-making process. To give an illustration of how
much the process can matter, one can consider the cases of South Africa in 1996 and
1
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Iraq in 2005 as illustrations of successful and unsuccessful constitution-making processes.
Both countries had experienced a drastic regime change which led to the demand for
a new constitution. While South Africa was hailed for the inclusiveness of the process,
the drafters in Iraq faced a short time frame to draft the constitution and considerable
external inﬂuences from the United States. South Africa was able to, at least partially,
lessen the strong divide between diﬀerent ethnicities. Iraq, however, stumbled into
ongoing conﬂict and domestic violence. The process of constitution-making can be seen
as one key issues to explain the diﬀerent pathways these two countries took.
To give another example, one can consider the two cases of constitution-making in
Egypt after the Arab Spring uprising. In the process that led to the 2012 constitution,
the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear majority in the constitutional assembly. They used
their inﬂuence to draft a constitution which gave strong powers to the President, who
was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since the constitution is a cornerstone of
society, a constitution that clearly favors one group often is an unstable constitution.
The breakdown of the 2012 Egyptian constitution is a good example for this tendency.
In the following process, the military was able to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood
entirely and select candidates of their own liking to the assembly which drafted the
constitution. The subsequent drift towards an authoritarian system in Egypt highlights
another risk of a lopsided constitution-making process. It becomes very clear that the
group of politicians with more inﬂuence during the constitution-making was able to
tweak the process in their favor and thereby led to an outcome that was biased towards
themselves.
These examples illustrate why the process of constitution-making matters in general.
From a legal perspective, the procedural rules of constitution-making can be seen as the
laws of the constitution-making process. How these rules aﬀect legitimacy and stability
of written constitutions are relevant questions for legal scholars. From an economic
perspective, the questions how personal motives of drafters aﬀect constitutional out-
comes and whether devices to constrain the drafters are able to fulﬁll their function are
2
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very close to questions that political economy scholars have asked for the behavior of
politicians in the executive and legislative bodies.
But before we can focus on the constitution-making process itself, it is important to
deﬁne what we have in mind when we argue about constitutions and other key terms of
this dissertation.
1.2 Key terms
Constitutions have been deﬁned in many diﬀerent ways, but no single deﬁnition has
received universal acceptance. Typically, constitutions are deﬁned either by form or by
function (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins, 2009, p. 38). The formal perspective argues
that the constitution is simply deﬁned as the document that is called the written consti-
tution. The functional view, however, deﬁnes constitutions through the functions that
constitutions typically have. Whether these functions are spelled out in the written
document or in adjunct legislation or interpretation does not matter for the functional
deﬁnition. This conceptualization is equivalent to the idea of a constitutional order as
deﬁned by Murphy (2007, p. 13).
Economists typically care about the functional dimension, especially when dealing
with the eﬀects of constitutional rules. Electoral rules in the seminal contribution of
Persson and Tabellini (2003) are an example for this claim. Persson and Tabellini (2003)
use electoral rules as one of the two key dimensions of constitutional rules in their large-
scale empirical study, whereas Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins (2009, p. 40) show that
only around one in ﬁve written constitutions since 1789 spelled out the electoral rules
for the lower house.
For the analysis of the process of constitution-making, a focus on the written con-
stitution is nevertheless adequate. The written constitution is a central part of the
constitutional order and is the document which is produced during the constitution-
making. Furthermore, referendums only deal with the written text and unamendability
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can only be included through (interpretation of) written text. For the purpose of this
dissertation, a deﬁnition based on the one provided by Voigt (2009) is used. He de-
ﬁnes constitutions as "...a formal and most basic layer of rules that contains the rules
according to which society can provide itself with public goods. It contains rules that
both constrain and enable the governing." (Voigt, 2009, p. 291). The advantages of
this deﬁnition are the focus on formal, i.e. written, rules and the explicit discussion of
the constraining function of a constitution. However, this deﬁnition would also include
other formal rules, as long as they are part of what Voigt calls the most basic layer
of rules. Given the arguments presented above about the importance of the written
constitution for the scope of research of this dissertation, the following modiﬁcation of
Voigt’s deﬁnition is proposed. Constitutions are deﬁned as the formal and most basic
layer of rules, spelled out in the written constitution, according to which society can
provide itself with public goods. It contains rules that both constrain and enable the
governing.
One has to distinguish the drafting of a constitution, which is the focus of this disser-
tation, from constitutional amendment. In constitution-making, the entire document is
(re-)written. Even if large parts might be taken from previous constitutions, all provi-
sions are up for discussion at the stage of constitution-making. In amendment proce-
dures, only the provisions to be changed are discussed, while the rest of the constitution
is maintained. One key diﬀerence between constitutional change (i.e. amendments) and
constitutional choice are the diﬀerent fallback options. A failed amendment process still
leaves a working constitution in most cases, whereas the decision to rewrite the entire
constitution is oftentimes caused by the malfunction of the status quo or a signiﬁcant
(expected) value added from a new constitution.
Furthermore, amendment procedures follow the rules spelled out in the constitution,
while constitutions are silent on the procedural rules for their replacement. However,
amendment might also be prohibited for certain provisions. An unamendable provision
is deﬁned as a constitutional provision that cannot be changed through the normal
4
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amendment procedure. An example for such provisions are Article 1 and 20 of the
German basic law. As speciﬁed in Article 79 (3), these two articles cannot be changed in
the same way other constitutional provisions can. From the perspective of constitution-
making, these provisions oﬀer a way for current drafters to constrain future generations.
After discussing the deﬁnition of constitutions for the purpose of this dissertation and
the demarcation of constitutional choice and constitutional change, it is important to
highlight the scope and research questions of this dissertation.
1.3 Scope of Research
The constitution and the rules spelled out within it can be seen as the cornerstone of a
society and the basis of the legal system of this society. The interpretation and analysis
of constitutional law from a doctrinal point of view is one of the most fruitful disciplines
within legal scholarship. The scope of this dissertation, however, is diﬀerent in nature.
Instead of focusing on constitutional laws themselves, this analysis looks towards the
process through which these laws are made. In the moment of constitutional choice,
constitutional laws still need to be made.3 The process of constitutional choice itself
can thus not be explained with constitutional law. Therefore, doctrinal constitutional
law is outside the scope of this dissertation despite its huge practical importance for
lawyers and legal scholars in other areas.
To understand the process of constitution-making, a diﬀerent approach is required.
One possible approach is using economic methods to analyze the process of constitution-
making. This research programme is also known as constitutional economics. Within
the ﬁeld of constitutional economics, we can distinguish two main branches. Norma-
tive constitutional economics, starting with the seminal contribution of Buchanan and
Tullock (1962), asks how constitutions and the constitution-making process should be
3This argument also holds for constitutional choice in situations where a society decides to rewrite
its entire constitution. This process is not regulated by the old constitution, but rather a break with
the old rules.
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set up. Positive constitutional economics has rather focused on the economic eﬀects of
constitution (see Voigt, 2011, for an overview). So far, the main focus of research in
constitutional economics has been either on broad normative questions (e.g. the general
majority requirements in constitution-making in Buchanan and Tullock (1962)) or on
the speciﬁc economic eﬀects of constitutional rules (the seminal contribution is Persson
and Tabellini, 2003).
Fewer articles have analyzed the reasons why certain constitutional rules are chosen
(cf. Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) and Robinson and Torvik (2016), which are discussed
in more detail in the next chapter). Those articles mainly focus on explanatory factors
such as political ideology, preferences for public goods or income inequality. The major
gap in this literature is the lack of attention paid to the procedural rules of constitution-
making. The overarching question of this dissertation is how the process of constitution-
making aﬀects the written constitution. To shed more light on this issue from a broad
perspective, positive and normative research questions are dealt with.
This dissertation proceeds by ﬁrst asking the basic question whether the process of
constitution-making really matters for the outcome. A rational-choice model of the
choice of form of government is a ﬁrst step to answer this question. The reason to focus
on one constitutional feature is to allow for a more speciﬁc analysis. After aﬃrming that
the process indeed matters in this case, the dissertation can proceed to look at the eﬀect
of diﬀerent procedural rules. Chapter 4 looks at the ratiﬁcation rules in more detail
and highlights how diﬀerent procedural rules can lead to very diﬀerent constitutional
setups. Constitutional referendums are identiﬁed as one of the key procedural rules
in the ratiﬁcation process. However, their eﬃcacy depends on the circumstances of
constitution-making. Chapter 5 follows up on this ﬁnding and discusses which majority
rules can strengthen the eﬀect of constitutional referendums on legitimacy and stability
of the constitution. When referring to constitutional stability, unamendable provisions
are another device that drafters often employ. Chapter 6 discusses unamendability rules
from a functional perspective to gain a better understanding for which reasons drafters
6
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use these rules. To be more speciﬁc, the chapter analyzes whether unamendability is
better understood as credible commitment to solve a time-inconsistency problem or as
paternalistic behavior of constitution-makers. To sum up, the four speciﬁc research
questions to be answered are:
1. Does the constitution-making process aﬀect the form of government?
2. Which procedural rules lead to constitutions that constrain future government
more?
3. Which majority requirement for constitutional referendums should be chosen?
4. Is unamendability better described as a credible commitment device or as pater-
nalistic behavior of drafters?
The ﬁrst and second question are clearly positive questions, whereas the third and
fourth questions also include normative elements. In a simpliﬁed way, this structure can
be conceptualized as shown in Figure 1.3.
Despite dealing with positive and normative issues, one assumption underlying all
chapters is the idea of self-interested drafters. In line with methodological individualism,
this dissertation aims to understand the behavior of individuals, even when dealing
with collective decision-making. Drafters of constitutions are not assumed to act in the
general interest, but rather to act in their self-interest given the constraints they face.
One main argument why drafters should be less selﬁsh in the case of constitution-making
relates to the personal relevance of their decisions for their own future beneﬁts. Given
that drafters enact more general rules, their personal interest should play a smaller role.
While many authors argue that drafters are less self-interested then politicians in normal
times (see for example Ackerman, 1991; Elster, 1995), this by no means implies that
constitutional drafters do not pursue their personal aims while drafting a constitution.
It can be assumed that drafters of constitutions are also, at least partially, motivated
by their private interests and thus cannot be expected to impose selﬂess clauses. While
7
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it is easy to see that this problem is more likely in non-democratic settings with an
unelected constitutional assembly, the case for selﬁsh drafters does not disappear in a
representative, elected assembly. Constitution-making is a rare event, which reduces
the possibility for citizens to hold drafters accountable, since there is no option to vote
them out of oﬃce.4 More generally, the notion that politicians are rational and self-
interested is not novel, it is the main foundation for the research ﬁeld of public choice
and political economy. From our perspective, there is no good reason to think that
drafters are diﬀerent. In most cases the drafters belong to the same group of politicians
who will subsequently hold the important political positions. In this case, drafters know
that their group will likely be in power once the constitution is ratiﬁed and can decide
upon rules that tweak the rules of the political game in their favor. The example of
Egypt in 2012 and 2013 can be seen as a good illustration of this argument. Neither of
the constitutional assemblies followed selﬂess motives. The constitutional outcomes are
better understood as tools to increase or fortify the power of the group dominating the
assembly.
1.4 Scientiﬁc Contribution and Societal Relevance
The questions raised in the last section are relevant for scholars from diﬀerent academic
disciplines as well as for policymakers. This section will discuss the contribution to
issues of economic and legal research and the societal relevance of the questions posed
in this dissertation.
The analysis of institutions as the rule of the game has been part of mainstream
economic research ever since the contributions of Nobel Laureate Douglas North (North
and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990). The constitution can be seen as the most basic set of
rules. Nevertheless, the institutions within which this set of rules is made also matter.
The focus of this dissertation on constitution-making highlights this argument.
4Referendums as part of the constitution-making process can be seen as one mitigation for this
problem. However, the use of simple majority referendums might not be suﬃcient to constrain drafters,
especially in times of crisis. This issue is extensively discussed in chapter 5.
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Chapter 3 uses an abstract model of choice of form of government and modiﬁes the
way in which the institutional framework of constitutional choice has been modeled
previously in the literature. It is shown that explicitly modeling the stage of constitution-
making changes the predictions of the established literature in this ﬁeld with regards
to the determinants of constitutional choice. This result is an example how a better
knowledge of the institutional details can improve economic models.
Not only the institutional details matter, but also the circumstances under which in-
stitutions operate. Chapter 4 models how exogenous uncertainty aﬀects the eﬀectiveness
of procedural rules. Referendums as an example for procedural rules in constitution-
making are shown to be less eﬀective in establishing government constraints when un-
certainty is high. This ﬁnding highlights why similar institution might lead to diverging
(economic) performances in diﬀerent countries.
Finally, property rights are among the most important legal rules from an economic
perspective. The model in chapter 4 highlights how the conﬂict between citizens and
government can be changed by institutional rules such as the rules guiding the process of
constitution-making. A democratically elected constitutional assembly is less likely to be
dominated by a single group and more likely to promote a constitution that establishes
secure property rights.
The general focus on procedural rules improves the understanding of the constitution-
making process. A better understanding of this process is important for legal scholars
because it can help to increase the legitimacy and stability of constitutions. To give a
more speciﬁc example, this dissertation analyzes constitutional referendums from diﬀer-
ent perspectives. The conditions under which referendums can increase the constraints
placed on drafters as well as the normative analysis of majority rules for these referen-
dums contribute to the more general aims of increasing legitimacy and stability of the
constitution. Chapter 5 highlights for example that a higher majority requirement for
constitutional referendums can improve the legitimacy of the constitution.
More generally, the economic analysis of law is one of the most important method-
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ological developments for legal scholars in the second half of the 20th century. The
seminal textbook of Posner (1973) has been cited more than 12,000 times. The research
in this area started from typical areas of private law such as tort law or intellectual
property law, but has spread across all areas of law. One of the key underpinnings of
the economic analysis of law is methodological individualism. This methodology allows
to discuss how legal rules shape individual incentives and furthermore how lawmaking is
shaped by individual incentives. This dissertation uses this methodological foundation
to analyze constitution-making. Instead of focusing on constitutional moments and self-
less drafters (Ackerman, 1991), this dissertation shows that self-interested drafters need
to be taken into account to understand constitution-making. Once the veil of uncer-
tainty for drafters is lifted, they are more likely to install constitutions that serve their
own interest.
The issue of self-interested drafters can be directly linked to the contribution of this
dissertation with regards to popular participation. A better understanding how and
when referendums can constrain drafters is particularly important in situations when
the self-interest of drafters is at cross with the interest of the general public. Chapter 4
discusses the interaction of the decisions of drafters and the requirement of a referendum
to ratify the constitution.
Chapter 6 shows how economic rationale can contribute to a better understanding of
legal phenomena such as unamendable provisions. The concepts of credible commitment,
which plays a key role in game theory, and paternalism are used here to analyze how
unamendable provisions can be understood from a functional perspective. This combi-
nation of the two disciplines can help to get a deeper understanding of unamendable
provisions.
Policymakers might wonder why they should consider results from research on the
process of constitution-making. However, the rules of this process do not fall from
heaven and policymakers can use some of the ﬁndings from this dissertation. Chapter
4 discusses the eﬀect of diﬀerent ratiﬁcation procedures on executive constraints in
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the constitution. This research informs policymakers who need to design the rules of
constitution-making. Chapter 5 delves deeper into one speciﬁc procedural rule, namely
the majority requirement in constitutional referendums. Especially for policymakers
concerned with the issues of legitimacy and stability of the new constitution, the toolkit
provided in this section can be useful. Finally, chapter 6 provides a discussion whether
the use of unamendable provisions as a commitment device is desirable.
With regards to potential takeaways for policymakers, a more cynical approach high-
lights that this dissertation identiﬁes the situations in which drafters can get away with
pursuing their self-interest. The ﬁnding that referendums work least well when most
needed is an example for this claim. However, NGOs and international organizations
can also use this results to improve popular participation in these very situations.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 Rational Choice Theory
One important feature of this dissertation is the strict focus on methodological indi-
vidualism. Even if groups, parties or governments make decisions, those can always be
broken down to the individual level. This methodology is inherent to rational choice
theory and game theory, where strategic behavior of individuals is modeled.5 Since the
situations in which constitutions are drafted are often full of strategic considerations,
game theoretic modeling has been the typical choice in the constitutional economics
literature and will also be used in this dissertation. These strategic considerations in-
clude for example bargaining in the constitutional assembly, the voting behavior for
ratiﬁcation or the use of unamendable provisions for self-interested purposes.
Furthermore, the focus on individual actions of drafters and citizens emphasizes the
incentive eﬀects of procedural rules. Opposed to the idea of constitutional moments and
5As opposed to for example general equilibrium models, where actors don’t show strategic behavior.
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selﬂess drafters, we aim to explain constitutional outcomes by understanding the motives
and rationales of the involved actors. The typical arguments for less self-interested
drafters are due to the more general level of the rules in constitutions compared to normal
legislation and the closer attention citizens pay to constitution-making as compared to
normal politics, thereby providing another check on drafters (Ackerman, 1991). We
argue that drafters are nevertheless able to form expectations whether or not they will be
part of the future political elite of the country. Especially in emerging democracies, few
societies have the resources to prevent drafters from taking up governmental positions
after the constitution has been ratiﬁed. Therefore, politicians do have an own interest
when drafting the new constitution. With regards to the closer attention citizens pay,
chapter 4 analyzes the example of referendums and whether citizens really pay more
attention to political issued during constitution-making in more detail.
From the perspective of rational choice, the situation of constitution-making is no
diﬀerent from other cases of rule-making. When making decisions about constitutions,
individuals are assumed to compare the costs and beneﬁts of their alternative decisions
and decide for the most favorable one. The results from the rational choice models
can be seen as a kind of benchmark result. Once the results of this kind of model are
established, it is still possible to check whether ﬁndings from behavioral economics might
be included or would be necessary to substitute for assumptions made in the process.
However, the scope of this dissertation is limited to rational choice modeling. While
taking this potential drawback into account, it is possible to go a step further and take
a look how the theoretical results could be empirically supported.
1.5.2 Empirical Methods
Following the set of guiding questions for empiric analysis posed by Angrist and Pischke
(2008), the starting point is to clearly state the causal relation of interest. In the case
of this dissertation, the key empirical question is which factors are driving a societies’
choice of constitutional features. More speciﬁcally, does the process of constitution-
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making matter for the chosen form of government? Do referendums constrain drafters
and thereby aﬀect the written constitution?
After deﬁning the causal relation of interest, the next step in the agenda is to think
of the perfect (hypothetical) experiment to test for this causal relation. If we would be
able to design such an experiment, we would like to test the eﬀects of random changes
in the dimensions of interest. This experiment would test in which way modiﬁcations
to the constitution-making process aﬀect the ﬁnal constitution. For example, we would
like to randomly assign processes with and without referendums for ratiﬁcation to test
how this procedural rule inﬂuences the written constitution.
However, the real world does not allow for this kind of controlled experiments and
natural experiments are rare. The next step is the deﬁnition of an identiﬁcation strategy
for the relations of interest. The main aim is to exploit diﬀerences in procedural rules
to test the theories developed in the formal model. Nevertheless, identifying stable
measures of the variables of interest can be problematic. For example, when dealing
with referendums, they can be initiated by diﬀerent actors and might be mandatory
or not. The question whether all referendums that were used for ratiﬁcation should be
considered part of the procedural rules is an example for these identiﬁcation issues.
The mode of statistical interference for the research question posed is not an obvious
choice. After the issue of properly identifying the relation of interest is resolved, this
fourth and ﬁnal of the guiding questions posed by Angrist and Pischke (2008) leads to
further complications.
Starting with the most straightforward approach, a cross-sectional analysis at one
given point in time, suﬀers from two problems. First, only a small amount of countries
change their constitutions at any given point in time. Second, even if such a point could
be identiﬁed (e.g. wave of new constitutions after world war II), the analysis would suﬀer
from omitted variable bias. It would be very hard to control for all relevant diﬀerences
between countries of interest.
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Another possibility would be a time series analysis of one country of interest. The
problem here is the slow rate of change in constitutional features. Due to this problem,
the approach suﬀers from a too large amount of null values and cannot solve the inference
problems.
Finally, a panel data approach might oﬀer some consolation to the problems with the
other two approaches. Omitted variable bias can be more easily prevented in a panel
setting through country ﬁxed eﬀects, while a large number of countries increases the
number of relevant events signiﬁcantly. Nevertheless, especially when including country
and time ﬁxed eﬀects, the small number of observations would become an obstacle due
to the low number of degrees of freedom.
Following the problems in the identiﬁcation strategy as well as the mode of inference,
large scale quantitative methods suﬀer from problems for the questions posed in this
thesis. In light of this methodological problems, case studies oﬀer some interesting
possibilities (Gerring, 2006). He deﬁnes case studies as "...an intensive study of a single
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units." (Gerring, 2004,
p. 342). As he further argues, it is important to be aware that temporal and/or spatial
variations within the unit are necessary for a case study.
Compared to large cross-case studies, case studies are equipped to take heterogeneity
into account, since a more detailed analysis of the case is conducted compared to cross-
case procedures (Gerring, 2006). Additionally, case studies are a good option to generate
hypotheses about the causal mechanisms and in general useful for theory generating
purposes. When looking at a small number of cases in great detail, the direction of
the causality might become more obvious. Nevertheless, one should be aware that the
set-up of a case study as compared to cross-case studies has limited power to actually
test these hypotheses.
The combination of large-scale quantitative methods with case studies can be seen
as a promising venue to overcome the diﬃculties when dealing with constitutions as
dependent variables. Case studies can add further support to large-n empirical methods,
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as for example in chapter 4. In this analysis, the problem of a very small number of failed
referendums can be mitigated by closely analyzing those few cases of failed referendums.
1.5.3 Analytic Narratives
Bates et al. (1998) have promoted a new research program for the social sciences. In
their own words, "[w]hat is distinctive is their use of a particular methodology, analytic
narrative, to blend rational choice analysis and narration into the study of institutions"
(Bates et al., 1998, p. 8). Taking into account the considerations above regarding usual
econometric techniques, this approach oﬀers a fruitful way to merge formal, theoretical
consideration with empirical ﬁndings from real-world examples. Typical examples for
the use of narrative elements in constitutional economics are the Glorious Revolution
and the American constitution from the time of drafting until the civil war (cf. North
and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1995).
As another example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) used the analytic narratives
approach to model and explain the decision between democracy and autocracy. The
formal model in the ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation is inspired by the design presented
in their contribution, hence a detailed discussion of their model will be conducted in
chapter 3.
1.5.4 Legal Positivism
In a sense, this dissertation addresses an insuﬃciency of legal positivism by focusing on
the process in which constitutional laws are made.6 From this perspective, constitutional
provisions are the legitimate basic layer of formal rules because they were made following
the procedural rules of constitution-making. Whether these provisions are considered
just or fair does not make them any more or less constitutional. However, analyzing the
6A detailed discussion of legal positivism goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Two of the
seminal contributions are Kelsen (1945) and Hart (1961). Simplifying heavily, one can think of legal
positivism as the idea that the legitimacy of a rule depends on whether it was made in a lawful way and
not on its outcomes, i.e. whether it is just or fair.
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procedural rules themselves goes a step further. Instead of taking the process for granted
as a base to evaluate the lawfulness of the constitution, this dissertation analyzes how
diﬀerent procedural requirements aﬀect the constitution.
1.6 Thesis Outlook
This dissertation starts by giving an overview of the key literature in chapter 2. Chapter
3 deals with the question whether the process of constitution-making aﬀects the choice
of constitutional features. A rational-choice model shows how the introduction of a
stage of constitution-making inﬂuences the constitutional choice of form of government.
The set of assumptions used for this model ﬁts particularly well for new and unstable
democracies, which are at the same time the kind of countries that often change their
constitution. So far, income inequality has been argued to be a key determinant for
the choice of form of government (Robinson and Torvik, 2016). This chapter arrives at
a diﬀerent conclusion and shows that the eﬀect of income inequality is determined by
the composition of the constitutional assembly. Chapter 4 looks further into the details
of the constitution-making process and discusses which procedural rules can eﬀectively
constrain the drafters. To analyze this question, we use a theoretical model as well
as a regression analysis. The model highlights that drafters are willing to constrain
themselves even without external rules when long-term rents are important to them. In
situations with high uncertainty, these rents become less important and procedural rules
are needed to constrain drafters. Ironically, the model shows that referendums work best
as a tool to constrain drafters when uncertainty is low and worst when uncertainty is
high. Thus, referendums alone are insuﬃcient to properly constrain drafters.
Following this positive analysis, chapter 5 and chapter 6 deal with more normative
issues. Chapter 5 follows up on the issue referendums for the ratiﬁcation of constitu-
tions and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of simple and qualiﬁed majority
requirements. We argue that the nearly universal use of simple majority requirements
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cannot be normatively justiﬁed, especially given that most ratiﬁcation procedures in
constitutional assemblies require a qualiﬁed majority. We argue that path dependency
and self-interest of drafters are the likely reasons for this double-standard of ratiﬁcation.
Chapter 6 focuses on one speciﬁc channel through which drafters can inﬂuence the con-
stitutional development in the future, namely unamendable provisions. The function of
these provisions is often described as a commitment device. We argue that a better way
to understand their use is the view of paternalism, while their desirability for commit-
ment purposes is questionable. A ﬁnal chapter summarizes the ﬁndings in light of the
limitations of this dissertation and discusses paths for future research.
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Key Literature
2.1 Scope of Literature Overview
The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the key literature relevant for this
dissertation. The main focus is on the strands of literature generated by constitutional
economics and the legal and political research on the process of constitution-making.
This rather narrow approach is taken in light of the scope of this dissertation. This dis-
sertation does not deal with constitutional law or the political process per se, but rather
focuses on the (political) process through which constitutional law is made. However,
to motivate why dealing with this question matters in the ﬁrst place, a short overview
on the literature why a constitution is created and on the literature dealing with the
economic eﬀects of constitutions is necessary.
2.2 Why a Constitution?
It is useful to discuss why a constitution is created in the ﬁrst place and what dis-
tinguishes it from ordinary laws. The deﬁnition of a constitution provided in the last
chapter highlights two main functions of a constitution, namely enabling and constrain-
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ing the government. With regards to the enabling function, the constitution can be
used to set up the basic mechanisms for preference aggregation in society to allow for
political decisions. Furthermore, the judicial system and thereby the ability to provide
jurisprudence to society is enabled through the constitution. However, the main focus
of this dissertation lies on the ability of constitutions to constrain the governing.
Assume that a society is willing to create a government with a monopoly of force
to provide secure property rights for all citizens. As soon as the government is strong
enough to enforce sanctions against property right violations, it is also strong enough
to transgress on the citizens and expropriate their property (cf. Weingast, 1993, 1995).
This situation can be coined the dilemma of the strong state (Dreher and Voigt, 2011).
Hence, an important question is how a government can credibly commit itself not to
abuse the power delegated to it without losing its ability to enforce sanctions. One
possible solution to mitigate the dilemma of the strong state is the use of a constitution,
which clearly deﬁnes the boundaries of the government and thereby protects citizens
from unjustiﬁed expropriation.
This solution relies on the credibility of the commitment that is captured in the
constitution. A written constitution which de jure guarantees a high level of property
rights and puts strict boundaries on the government does only help if the government is
also de facto bound by the constitution. De jure can here be deﬁned as the constitutional
constraints "in the book", while de facto in this context refers to the real constitutional
constraints faced by the government. If for example basic human rights are guaranteed
by the constitution, but in practice governments can ignore these rights without facing
any consequences, these rights would be described as only de jure, but not de facto
existent. Sham constitutions, which oﬀer high levels of de jure promises but fail to obtain
those promise in practice, are surprisingly common. Law and Versteeg (2012) compare
an indicator of constitutionally promised rights with actual human rights performance
indicators. For South Asia, on average more than 50% of the promised rights in the
constitution are not upheld (Law and Versteeg, 2012, p. 908). Except Western Europe
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and North America, all regions show a signiﬁcant gap between the rights promised
and the rights upheld. This ﬁnding is important to understand why issues such as
majority requirements play an important role for constitution-making. When more
people voluntarily agree to a constitution ex ante, the enforcement of these rules in later
stages becomes more likely.
The enforcement of constitutional rules is one key diﬀerence from ordinary laws. While
ordinary laws require external enforcement through a third player (i.e. the state), the
constitution cannot rely on this kind of enforcement and must hence be self-enforcing (cf.
Hardin, 1989; Ordeshook, 1992). There is no international actor who would be able to
enforce these rules. Levinson (2011) takes up the question of self-enforcing constitutions
and analyzes how constitutional rules can function as credible commitment devices.
His main distinction is between rules dealing with substantive outcomes and decision-
making mechanisms. The decision-making mechanisms spelled out in the constitution
are better suited for this purpose according to Levinson, since they deal with a broad
array of future decisions and are able to attract speciﬁc investment by politicians (i.e.
it becomes more diﬃcult for politicians to switch to another decision-making rule).
In this light, it is also interesting to discuss the unanimity requirement raised by
Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Following their argument, the legitimacy of a constitution
hinges critically on unanimous consent from citizens. This reasoning is in line with the
idea of a constitution as a social contract (cf. Brennan and Buchanan, 2008). However,
it has been argued that the main elements of a constitution are of coordinative nature.
In such a situation, a set of conventions is a better description of the constitution
than a contract (cf. Hardin, 1989; Ordeshook, 1992). This argument also sheds some
doubts on the unanimity requirement. If players only need to coordinate, it is highly
likely that some players prefer one and others prefer another constitution. However, as
long as they acquiesce to the solution spelled out in the constitution, there is no need
for an unanimity (cf. Hardin 1989). The diﬀerence from acquiescence to consent is
that acquiescence requires the chosen constitution to be better than the status quo of
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no constitution at all, while consent might trigger strategic considerations in the voting
process. Using a qualiﬁed majority requirement can be seen as a middle ground between
these two concepts.
The analysis of constitutions with the economic toolkit has received increasing atten-
tion ever since the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). While the normative
quest for the design of optimal constitutions has dominated the literature in the direct
aftermath of Buchanan and Tullock’s contribution, the closely related positive analysis
of constitutions entered the mainstream stage in the past 20 years. The two main re-
search areas in the ﬁeld of positive constitutional economics deal with (i) the analysis of
the economic eﬀect of constitutional features and (ii) the explanation for the emergence
of certain constitutional features in a given country; i.e. the choice of constitutional
rules. The next sections review those areas in turn.
2.3 The Economic Eﬀects of Constitutions
Do countries, from an economic perspective, perform diﬀerently according to their con-
stitutional set-up? The research into the link between constitutions and economic policy
has received a strong boost following the seminal contribution by Persson and Tabellini
(2003). In their book, the authors provide empirical evidence for the economic eﬀects
of constitutions and aim to show that the causal chain runs from constitutions to eco-
nomic outcomes. They focus on two constitutional features, namely electoral rules and
the form of government.
The electoral rule describes the way a society elects their legislature. This includes
the electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure. Following Persson and
Tabellini (2003, p. 75), most of the combinations of these three elements observed in
the real world can be clustered in two main categories. On the one hand, majoritarian
systems are described by small electoral districts, plurality rule and voting with regard to
alternative candidates. On the other hand, proportional systems combine large electoral
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districts,7 proportional representation and voting on diﬀerent party lists.
When talking about governmental systems, two main categories can be distinguished.
In a presidential system, the chief of the executive (i.e. the president) does not rely
on the constant support of the legislative, while a parliamentarian system includes the
option of a non-conﬁdence vote, which replaces the chief of the executive (i.e. the
prime minister) (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, pp. 28-29). Following Persson, a second
key diﬀerence is the greater separation of power in a presidential system, conditional
on veto power allocated to the president. However, if the president is allocated with
substantial power which does not require legislative control, this argument might be
turning around and a presidential system could lead to a larger concentration of power
(cf. Aghion et al., 2004). Note that a mix of the two systems is also possible and often
referred to as semi-presidentialism. For the purpose of this dissertation, we will only
focus at the two polar cases.
Instead of going into a detailed review of Persson and Tabellini (2003), only some of
the main results and criticisms will be presented here. For a more detailed discussion
on the economic eﬀects of constitutions and also a survey of other empirical results, see
Voigt (2011).
Persson and Tabellini (2003) ﬁnd that the form of government has economically (and
statistically) signiﬁcant eﬀects on several indicators of economic performance. The cen-
tral government spending in a presidential system is roughly 6% of GDP lower compared
to parliamentarian systems, while the welfare state is also between 2 and 3 % smaller.
Additionally, presidential systems show a lower level of corruption.
Regarding the electoral rules, the ﬁndings also indicate economic and statistic signiﬁ-
cance. Majoritarian rules reduce central government spending by 3% of GDP compared
to proportional rules and the welfare state is found to be 2-3% smaller in majoritarian
systems. When looking at the ﬁner details of the rules, a higher number of individually
elected candidates induces lower levels of corruption, while smaller electoral districts
7In the extreme case, the whole country constitutes a single electoral district
23
CHAPTER 2. KEY LITERATURE
actually lead to higher levels of corruption. These details show that the absolute eﬀect
of the diﬀerence between the systems with regard to corruption is rather unclear.
Through the use of econometric techniques, Persson and Tabellini (2003) try to argue
that the reported eﬀects are not mere correlations, but actually causal eﬀects. If this
result would be true, they would have uncovered a mechanism for countries which are
currently using a proportional electoral rule and a parliamentarian system to reduce
their government spending by 10% of GDP as well as the welfare state by around 5%
through a simultaneous switch to majoritarian electoral rule and a presidential system.
Three main arguments can be brought forward against this line of reasoning.8 First,
it is relevant to ask whether the results also hold for slight modiﬁcations and extensions
of the data set. This has been done by Blume et al. (2009), who increase the number
of countries in the data set, use more recent data and change the deﬁnition of the
government spending slightly from central government spending to total government
spending. In their replication of the study, the form of government loses its statistical
signiﬁcance. However, electoral rules maintain a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the economic policy
outcomes. Interestingly, it is mainly the ﬁner details of the electoral rules that shape
this result. Despite qualifying the original results, the replication study is yet another
argument for a better understanding of the mechanisms of constitutional features and
also supports the argument that there is indeed an economic eﬀect of constitutional
features.
Second, as argued by Acemoglu (2005), the observed links might not be causal rela-
tionships after all. One key criticism is the argument of omitted variable bias. There
might be underlying factors which inﬂuence the choice of constitutional rules as well as
the economic policy outcome. Acemoglu argues that the instrumental variable approach
used by Persson and Tabellini (2003) is not suﬃciently working to mitigate this concern.
Third, it can be doubted that constitutional features can be easily changed. It takes
8Note that Persson and Tabellini do not use their ﬁndings to bring forward strong normative recom-
mendations themselves, but this argument follows closely from their result.
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more eﬀort to change the constitution than to change an ordinary law and it is highly
likely that other considerations than the pure economic eﬀects play a role in the choice
of the constitutional features. If one gains a better understanding of the underlying
determinants of constitutional features, omitted variable bias can be more easily avoided.
Additionally, a better knowledge of these determinants might also provide new tools to
understand the transmission channels from constitutions to economic policy and thereby
allow to give better policy recommendations.
Around the world and across societies, a multitude of diﬀerent constitutional features
and combinations thereof exist. Taken the ﬁndings on the economic eﬀects of consti-
tutions as given, these diﬀerences in constitutional choice are puzzling. Similar to the
argument made by Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins (2009, pp. 2-3) for constitutional
stability, we can think in the two broad categories of environment versus design when
explaining constitutional choice. Environmental factors would include heterogeneity of
the society (e.g. ethnic fractionalization), ideological diﬀerences and income inequality.
Design factors are related to the rules of the constitution-making process. So far, most
explanations for constitutional choice are based on environmental factors. An overview
of this literature will be presented in the next section. To structure the overview, an
organization along constitutional features is useful.
2.4 Explaining Constitutional Choice
2.4.1 Electoral Rule
Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) set up a model motivated by the ﬁndings of Persson and
Tabellini (2003) with regard to diﬀerent ﬁscal policy outcomes of electoral rules. In their
model, they are using a situation where three classes of citizens diﬀer in size and income
and have to ﬁrst decide on the electoral rule in a constitutional stage and afterwards
elect the government, which thereafter implements its preferred ﬁscal policy.
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The main result in the model relates the degree of income inequality within a society
to the choice of electoral rule. The richer citizens prefer less taxation, while the poor
citizens prefer a higher level of taxation. The larger the income inequality, the higher is
the tax burden for the rich.
The interesting results appear when political rents from being in oﬃce are also taken
into account. In a majoritarian system, the elected representative is not bound by any
coalition considerations and only provides the public good his group prefers. As long
as no group has an absolute majority, the rich will always want to provide the smallest
amount of public goods and are always elected (since other players prefer lower taxes if
they do not proﬁt from any public good provision).
In a proportional system, a coalition will decide upon public goods provision. Hence,
two public goods will be provided. Possible coalitions are poor and middle class as well
as middle class and rich class. The link to income inequality comes through the price
of "buying" a coalition partner for the middle class in the majoritarian setting. The
higher income inequality, the more expensive is it to convince the poor to join in the
ruling coalition. Hence, assuming a high level of income inequality, the authors expect
to see a ruling coalition of middle class and rich. This actually leads to a preference for
a majoritarian system of the poor in case of high inequality. The favored public good of
the poor will not be provided under either system in this case, but the taxes are lower
in a majoritarian system.
In light of these results, the actual chain of causality might run another way than
expected in light of the hypotheses from Persson and Tabellini (2003). If the level of
inequality is high, societies choose the majoritarian rule as a kind of self-selection since
they prefer lower ﬁscal spending. At the same time, a more equal society chooses the
proportional system in the ﬁrst stage and is also willing to have higher taxes. Therefore,
it is not due to the inherent eﬀects of the electoral rule, but rather due to the underlying
structure of the society that the observed diﬀerences in ﬁscal policies are explained.
One additional argument not covered by the simple model presented by Ticchi and
26
2.4. EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Vindigni (2010) is the incorporation of utility from having the own group in power. How
political ideology can be incorporated in this type of model can be readily seen in the
next section, where models of the choice of the governmental system will be discussed.
2.4.2 Form of Government
Only a handful of papers have explicitly tried to model the constitutional choice of
the form of government. The ﬁrst contribution is Aghion et al. (2004), which asks
how insulated the leader in a political system should be, where insulation is used to
measure unchecked power. While a high level of insulation allows the leader to undertake
beneﬁcial reform policies more easily, it also allows him to expropriate citizens. This
dilemma is central to answering the question of how insulated a leader should be. Their
main result indicates that a low risk aversion will lead to a high insulation and vice
versa. If one lifts the veil of ignorance and assumes that a minority group is able to
write the constitution and will come into power once the constitution comes into force,
this should also lead to higher insulation. This can typically be found in an autocracy,
where the ruling class is setting up a constitution with the aim to further strengthen its
power.
Nevertheless, there is a case for doubting the strength of the direct link from the
form of government to the insulation of a leader. Insulation can be achieved not only
through the form of government, but also through other political institutions such as
federalism or an independent judiciary. Therefore, the eﬀects of insulation might be
combining multiple constitutional features at the same time and not exclusively the
form of government.
Clearly, looking at the form of government from diﬀerent angles might oﬀer valuable
insights. Robinson and Torvik (2016) set up a model based on a society divided into two
main groups, out of which one forms a majority. Both groups diﬀer in their appreciation
of public goods and in their ideological perspective.9 Some citizens of these groups run
9Therefore, they get a higher utility simply from having a member of their group in power if the
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(exogenously motivated) for oﬃce and are elected under the rules of either a presidential
or a parliamentarian setting. The politicians decide upon the public good provision and
the political rents extracted by voting in parliament after the election. However, voting
procedures diﬀer between the two systems. While the president is the residual claimant
of the rents and has full agenda setting power, the prime minister can only determine
the absolute amount of rents (through his public goods provision proposal), but cannot
aﬀect the distribution. Hence, a presidential system should see a lower level of public
goods and a higher level of political rents. They also ﬁnd that a strong ideological
preference or large conﬂict with regards to public goods (e.g., high income inequality)
makes a change from a parliamentarian to a presidential system more likely.
The model presented above oﬀers valuable insights into the decision-making process
of parliamentary versus presidential systems. Nevertheless, some weaknesses can be
identiﬁed. The timing of the model begins with elections under the current system.
Using this starting point overlooks the scenario of a civil conﬂict or war, when the old
constitutional rules have broken down. Therefore, the model is a good ﬁt for explaining
constitutional change, but is less eﬀective for explaining constitutional choice. This
drawback highlights the need to include the constitutional choice as the ﬁrst stage in a
model of constitutional choice.
2.5 Procedural Rules Matter
Despite the ﬁndings provided in the last subsection, it is unlikely that all diﬀerences in
constitutional features can be attributed to environmental factors. Another approach
would be to focus on diﬀerences in procedural rules as an explanation. From an empirical
perspective, only few contributions have explicitly dealt with the question whether the
process of constitution-making matters.
ideological preference is stronger.
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Carey (2009) focuses on measures of inclusiveness of the constitution-making process
and their eﬀects on the success of the constitution. As measures of constitutional success,
he focuses on democracy, government constraints and longevity of the constitution. The
main ﬁnding is that multiple, democratically elected actors in the constitution-making
process lead to constitutions that are more democratic and contain more government
constraints. Interestingly, referendums by themselves do not lead to more democratic
constitution or more government constraints. The methodology employed by Carey
requires to be cautious about interpreting the results. First, he relies on a low number
of cases. Furthermore, the results represent correlations and should only be taken as
indicative evidence. Second and more important, his measures of constitutional success
are based on de facto indicators. Whether or not a country is more democratic according
to the Polity IV measure and whether the executive faces more constraints is not only
aﬀected by the written constitution, but also by other political and legal developments.
This issue makes the identiﬁcation strategy of the article and thereby its ﬁndings less
convincing.
Another empirical approach is taken by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009), who use
their data gathered through the Comparative Constitutions Project as a measure of con-
stitutional outcomes. Through this approach, the measurement problem of Carey (2009)
is avoided. The authors ﬁnd that public referendums increase the number of rights in the
written constitution. A later study highlights further that inclusive processes (including
referendums) are able to increase the longevity of a constitution (Ginsburg, Melton,
and Elkins, 2009, p. 139). These ﬁndings, despite also being correlations, indicate that
referendums do actually have an important eﬀect on the written constitution.
Widner (2008) analyzes the eﬀect of constitution writing on violence and constitu-
tional stability in cases of post-conﬂict constitution-making. The outcome measures
are reductions in violence over a 5-year time period, whether the new constitution is
suspended within the ﬁrst 5 years and whether rights are protected by the constitution.
With regard to procedural rules, the main ﬁnding is that more consultative process do
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not lead to a stronger rights protection. In other words, "[b]ased on this evidence, one
might say that that the choice of procedure does not really matter much."(Widner, 2008,
p. 1532).
Altogether, the empirical evidence on the eﬀects of procedural rules is rather mixed.
Furthermore, none of the three articles has clearly focused on single constitutional fea-
tures as discussed above when analyzing the eﬀect of procedural rules. All of the articles
have some methodological limitations and further research into the workings of proce-
dural rules is required to get a clearer picture. In the words of Ginsburg, Elkins, and
Blount (2009, p. 219), "[a] key normative question is whether aspects of process can be
manipulated to reduce the probability of failures, but this question requires much more
positive work on the complex relationships among process, content, and outcomes."
2.5.1 Constraints on Constitution Drafters
A larger part of the literature on procedural rules focuses on constraints faced by the
drafters in the process of constitution-making. This research was spawned by the break-
down of the Soviet Union and the following process of constitution-making in 15 newly
established countries and in the former satellite states of the Warsaw Pact. One can
distinguish constraints due to procedural rules of constitution-making, constraints due
to popular participation, and time constraints. The literature on these three sets of
constraints will be reviewed in sequence.
2.5.2 Procedural Rules
The process of constitution-making is organized according to a set of procedural rules.
These rules are one of the key factors in constraining the drafters of the constitution.
Landau (2012) has argued that the design of the process determines the outcome of the
process. The rules include, among others, the selection of members of the constitution-
making body, the voting rules within the constitution-making body, and the mode of
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ratiﬁcation.
How the members of the constitution-making body are selected directly inﬂuences the
composition of the constitution-making body and has thereby strong eﬀects on the ﬁnal
outcome. The main selection methods are members drawn from existing executive or
legislative bodies or a speciﬁcally elected constitutional assembly. It has been argued
that a constitution-making body created from members of the existing legislative or ex-
ecutive branches of government will be biased in favor of their own branch and generally
more inclined towards short-term interest considerations (cf. Elster, 1995; Voigt, 2004).
These considerations led Elster to the belief that a speciﬁcally elected constitutional
assembly would be beneﬁcial, since the drafters would not be driven by the future in-
terest of their own position in one of the branches.10 Electing an assembly takes time,
however, and time is often scarce in moments of constitution-making. It has also been
argued that a better knowledge of the preferences and ideologies of other members of the
constitution-making body allows the members to reach a more stable agreement (and
a more stable constitution) (cf. Mnookin, 2003). This knowledge is generally higher
among members of an existing body than in a speciﬁcally elected one.
Empirical evidence only partially supports the claim that constitution-making bodies
created from members of the executive or legislative branches tend to behave in a self-
serving manner. While Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009) conﬁrm this self-serving
hypothesis for executive-centered processes, they do not ﬁnd support for this hypoth-
esis with regard to legislative-centered processes. This ﬁnding seems to indicate that
executive-centered processes are more self-serving. Another possible explanation for this
ﬁnding lies in the empirical method. Since Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009) com-
pare executive- and legislative-centered processes to the ones with speciﬁcally elected
assemblies, a bias within these elected assemblies can also drive the results. Individ-
uals involved in a speciﬁcally elected assembly recognize that it is unlikely that they
10This claim would only hold if the drafters are taken from a diﬀerent pool of politicians than the
future government. Given the large number of constitution-making bodies which consist of executive or
legislative bodies, this claim appears doubtful.
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will obtain executive branch oﬃces after the ratiﬁcation of a new constitution and are,
therefore, unlikely to give additional power to the executive. Conversely, these drafters
are more likely to obtain a position within the legislative body after ratiﬁcation and,
therefore, are more likely to pursue provisions that are biased towards the legislative.
Unfortunately, the analysis of Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009) does not allow to
evaluate this explanation.
The literature altogether indicates that the case for opting for a certain selection mech-
anism is not as clear-cut as suggested by Elster. Both mechanisms have advantages and
drawbacks and the decision involves a trade-oﬀ between a more democratic speciﬁcally
elected assembly and the lower costs in terms of time and information oﬀered by an
assembly based on members of the legislative or executive.
While voting rules play a certain role in the process of selecting the drafters of a con-
stitution, they play a more important role during the drafting and ratiﬁcation process.
Voting rules governing the constitution-making body that require a simple majority are
the polar opposite of voting rules that require unanimous consent. These two cases suﬀer
from diﬀerent drawbacks. A simple majority rule increases the risk of a unilateral actor
dominating the constitution-making process (for a detailed discussion of the risk of a
single dominating actors, see Landau, 2013). The unanimity requirement creates oppor-
tunities for strategic bargaining and increases the risk of a holdout problem (Mnookin,
2003).
Between the two polar cases, there is a large set of other possible voting rules. Qualiﬁed
majorities are the typical example and aim to overcome the holdout problem while still
maintaining some veto power for minority actors. The decision for choosing a particular
set of voting rules needs to weigh the costs and beneﬁts between a fast, yet potentially
one-sided process, and a more inclusive, yet more time-consuming and risky process. In
practice, some form of a qualiﬁed majority requirement has dominated the picture in
recent years (Democracy Reporting International, 2011).
The manner in which a constitution is ratiﬁed adds further constraints for the constitution-
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makers. A constitutional bargain that fails to be ratiﬁed is worthless for the drafters.
Hence, the expected interests of the actors ratifying the constitution are already relevant
for the process of constitution-making itself. Ratiﬁcation through the executive or leg-
islative requires taking the preferences and interests of these bodies into account when
drafting the constitution. The more interesting case, however is the direct participation
of the public through a referendum. This case will be considered in the next subsection,
which discusses public participation in general.
2.5.3 Public Participation
Public participation has been of growing importance in constitution making in the past
50 years. Using data from 480 constitutions adopted between 1789 and 2005, Gins-
burg, Elkins, and Blount (2009) found that around 44% of all constitutions require a
popular referendum as a mean of ratiﬁcation. Examples such as the extremely partici-
pative process in South Africa in the 1990s further indicate the relevance of constraints
through direct involvement of the general public. Public participation could also take
place indirectly. One example of this would be the involvement of democratically elected
veto players into the process of constitution-making (cf. Carey, 2009). Ackerman (1991)
argued, although based on the debatable argument of the particular attentiveness of cit-
izens, that a broad public involvement is beneﬁcial for the constitution-making process.
In general, the theoretical literature is very fond of public participation in constitution-
making.
However, the empirical evidence, at least on the eﬀect of referendums for ratiﬁcation,
is mixed. Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009) have found a positive eﬀect of referenda
on the longevity of constitutions, while Carey (2009) found that the mere existence of a
referendum does not increase the constraints placed on the future government.11 Carey
puts the emphasis on the importance of legitimized institutional actors and thereby
11With regards to policy implications, one might consider adopting the majority requirements of
referendums. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the arguments for and against qualiﬁed majorities in
constitutional referendums.
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indirect participation. One of the problems with referendums is an increased uncertainty
for constitution-makers causing the greater risk of failure of the negotiations (cf. Banks,
2008; Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, 2009).
To sum up, public participation is theoretically one of the main constraints faced by
the drafters. However, despite the fact that public referendums are the most common
form of participation, the evidence on their impact remains mixed.
2.5.4 Time Constraints
Timing is an essential part of the constitution-making process. The bargaining power
of speciﬁc members or groups in the constitution-making body is based on their relative
political strength at the moment in time when the process starts. The same consideration
applies for the relative (im)patience of the drafters. These considerations are especially
relevant after a drastic regime change or a violent conﬂict. Jackson (2008, p. 1291)
writes "[...] the moment for constitution-drafting is not always, or even usually, an
entirely autochthonous choice in post-conﬂict settings.". She further argues that time
pressure was one of the key factors leading to the failure of the Iraqi constitution-making
process in 2005.
Assuming that constitution-making actually suﬀers from time pressure, three main
problems arise. First, complete negotiations become more costly and actors might ac-
cept incomplete bargaining, leaving important issues unresolved in the constitution (cf.
Brown, 2008). Second, if the actors in the constitution-making body face diﬀerent dis-
count rates, the bargaining result might be unstable in the long run (cf. Vanberg and
Buchanan, 1989; Negretto, 1999). Third, if the citizens also face time pressure, they
might agree in the referendum to a constitution that is unstable in the long run due to
the high costs of saying no and waiting for a new constitution to be drafted. To sum
up, time pressures can force the ratiﬁcation of a constitution that otherwise would not
have been chosen. This issue will be more explicitly dealt with in chapter 4.
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To sum up, the literature stresses several constraints faced by the constitutional
drafters. While public participation and procedural rules can substantially limit the
options available to drafters, these constraints themselves might falter under certain con-
ditions. Drafting a new constitution under severe time pressure is one typical example
for these "unconstraining" conditions. While procedural rules have received attention in
the literature, they have so far not been formally used as determinants of constitutional
choice. The next chapter sets up a formal model of the choice of form of government
similar to established models and adds a constitutional assembly to ﬁll this gap.
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Chapter 3
Assemblies Matter: Analyzing
the Choice of Form of
Government in Unstable
Democracies
3.1 Introduction
One consequence of the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt was the popular demand to draft
a new constitution. This process was seen as one of the key steps to ensure stable demo-
cratic rule in Egypt. The constitutional assembly, however, failed to include minorities
in the process, which led to a lop-sided constitution. This development contributed to
a popular uprising in 2013, followed by the military leadership taking power and sus-
pending the constitution. In the subsequent drafting of a new constitution, the Muslim
Brotherhood was completely excluded from the process, despite still having strong sup-
port among the population. This constitution has been criticized for giving too much
power to the military. Looking at this case of two assemblies, it appears that the com-
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position of the constitutional assembly is an important factor for the shape and the
success of the ﬁnal constitution.
Several questions arise from the situation in Egypt. Why does a society choose a
particular constitution? Which factors contribute to this choice and what role do the
constitutional assembly and civil society play? To keep the analysis tractable, it can be
useful to start by looking at only one constitutional feature at a time and see whether it
is possible to draw conclusions of general relevance from the analysis of each feature.12
One logical starting point for this research question is the form of government. The
reason for this claim is that the form of government is one of the two constitutional
features that has been analyzed by Persson and Tabellini (2003). Many researchers have
contributed to the examination of the economic eﬀects of constitutions since this seminal
contribution.13 However, the question of why societies choose a form of government in
the ﬁrst place remains open and is the key motivation for this research.
Using a rational-choice model, this chapter ﬁnds that the composition of the consti-
tutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of form of government. Especially
when the policy conﬂict within the society (measured by income inequality in the model
presented here) is strong, a change in the majorities in the constitutional assembly has
an eﬀect on the choice of form of government. The basic intuition behind this ﬁnding
is that the group dominating the constitutional assembly will choose the constitutional
rules that serve their interests best. Further inﬂuence factors are the cost of taxation,
the obtainable rents for politicians and the sensitivity of citizens to policy changes. The
main ﬁnding is in contrast to the existing theoretical literature on choice of form of
government, which established a positive relationship between higher income inequality
and a presidential form of government.
Before starting with the analysis itself, it is important to be clear on the distinction
between the diﬀerent forms of government. Two main forms of government can be
12It has to be noted that a downside of this approach is the lack of attention paid to eﬀects of logrolling
in the process of constitution-making.
13For a detailed overview of this more recent literature see Voigt (2011).
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distinguished, namely presidential and parliamentarian systems.14 Following Lijphart
(1999), three main elements which diﬀerentiate the two systems can be identiﬁed. First,
while the head of government in a presidential system (president) is elected for a given
period and cannot be removed from his position under normal circumstances, the head
of a government in a parliamentarian system (prime minister) requires the constant
support of the legislative assembly due to the possibility of a vote of no conﬁdence.
Second, the election of the president is either direct (e.g. in France) or indirect (e.g. in
the US) through a popular vote, whereas the election of a prime minister is through a
vote in the legislative assembly. Third, there is a diﬀerence between the two systems
with respect to the person in the executive. Parliamentarian systems have collegial or
collective executives, whereas presidential systems have non-collegial executives. This
distinction refers to the power that the president or prime minister have with respect
to their cabinet. While the cabinet is directly accountable to the president, the prime
minister does not wield the same level of power over his cabinet and has to consult them
for the most important decisions.
In the course of this chapter, the main distinction between the presidential system
and the parliamentarian system lies in the diﬀerent levels of political power held by
the head of government. This distinction is in line with the three elements from the
deﬁnition of Lijphart (1999), but is diﬀerent from the deﬁnition used in Persson et al.
(1997).15 The additional checks and balances from the stricter horizontal separation of
powers in a presidential system are not modeled here. The reason for this diﬀerence is
the diverging levels of power presidents wield across the world. Many presidents in Latin
America or Africa do not contribute as a check on power, but concentrate most of the
political power in their oﬃce (cf. Robinson and Torvik, 2016). From this perspective,
this chapter resembles the contribution by Robinson and Torvik.
As highlighted by the initial example of Egypt, constitution-making often occurs fol-
lowing times of crises and instability. Widner (2008) found that more than 200 consti-
14A mix of these two, namely semi-presidentialism, is excluded from the analysis.
15The deﬁnition of Persson et al. (1997) resembles an US-type of presidential system instead.
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tutions in the last forty years have been drafted under the threat of internal violence,
highlighting that the risk of an uprising is a common situation during constitutional
choice. In these scenarios, the assumption that presidential systems give unchecked
power rather than checks and balances seems more realistic than in established democ-
racies. To lend further support to the argument that political instability is common in
constitution-making, Table 3.1 shows the new constitutions written from 2005 to 2013
and the countries ranking in the Failed State Index (Fund for Peace, 2015) and the Po-
litical Stability Index (World Bank, 2014) in the year of constitution-making. A higher
ranking means that the country is less stable and it can be seen that most countries
in the table are in the upper regions of the ranking. Exceptions like Montenegro in
2009 (after the country gained independence) and Hungary in 2011 (after a populist
right-wing party gained a suﬃcient supermajority to rewrite the constitution) exist, but
cases such as Iraq and Somalia are more common and motivate the focus on unstable
countries.
With regards to the policy relevance of this analysis, policy recommendations for con-
stitutional drafters require two steps. First, it is necessary to understand why societies
opt for a certain governmental system and what underlying factors inﬂuence this deci-
sion. This knowledge helps the individuals who hold the policy makers accountable to
better judge their motives, especially in the case of legal transplants. Second, once the
evolution and the economic eﬀects of the form of government are better understood,
normative constitutional economics can provide policy makers with recommendations
for the most beneﬁcial form of government in a given situation. This research attempts
to contribute to the ﬁrst step.
The next section presents a short overview of the relevant literature. This is followed
by the setup of the model. After solving the model and discussing the results, a ﬁnal
section concludes.
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Table 3.1: New Constitutions and Political Stability
Country Year Failed State Indexa Political Stability Indexb
Iraq 2005 4 2
DR Congo 2005 2 4
Burundi 2005 18 15
Swaziland 2005 . 73
Kyrgyz Republic 2006 28 24
Serbia 2006 . .
Thailand 2007 86 28
Kyrgyz Republic 2007 42 36
Montenegro 2007 135 97
Myanmar 2008 13 29
Ecuador 2008 69 43
Maldives 2008 67 81
Turkmenistan 2008 46 124
Bhutan 2008 51 140
Kosovo 2008 . .
Niger 2009 23 31
Bolivia 2009 52 58
Guinea 2010 9 10
Niger 2010 20 27
Kenya 2010 13 28
Madagascar 2010 63 31
Kyrgyz Republic 2010 45 32
Angola 2010 58 77
Dominican Republic 2010 92 89
Morocco 2011 86 70
Hungary 2011 140 140
Somalia 2012 1 1
Syria 2012 24 2
Egypt 2012 32 15
Zimbabwe 2013 9 .
Fiji 2013 66 .
aSince 2014, this index is called the Fragile State Index. The number of countries
covered for the Failed State Index is 75 in 2005, 145 in 2006 and 175 thereafter.
bThe number of countries covered for the Political Stability Index is 191 in 2005
and 192 thereafter.
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3.2 What Explains the Choice of Form of Government?
Only a handful of papers have explicitly tried to model the constitutional choice of
the form of government. The ﬁrst contribution is Aghion et al. (2004), which asks
how insulated the leader in a political system should be, where insulation is used to
measure unchecked power. While a high level of insulation allows the leader to undertake
beneﬁcial reform policies more easily, it also allows him to expropriate citizens. This
dilemma is central to answering the question of how insulated a leader should be. Their
main result indicates that a low risk aversion will lead to a high insulation and vice
versa. If one lifts the veil of ignorance and assumes that a minority group is able to
write the constitution and will come into power once the constitution comes into force,
this should also lead to higher insulation. This can typically be found in an autocracy,
where the ruling class is setting up a constitution with the aim to further strengthen its
power.
Nevertheless, there is a case for doubting the strength of the direct link from the
form of government to the insulation of a leader. Insulation can be achieved not only
through the form of government, but also through other political institutions such as
federalism or an independent judiciary. Therefore, the eﬀects of insulation might be
combining multiple constitutional features at the same time and not exclusively the
form of government.
Clearly, looking at the form of government from diﬀerent angles might oﬀer valuable
insights. Robinson and Torvik (2016) set up a model based on a society divided into two
main groups, out of which one forms a majority. Both groups diﬀer in their appreciation
of public goods and in their ideological perspective.16 Some citizens of these groups run
(exogenously motivated) for oﬃce and are elected under the rules of either a presidential
or a parliamentarian setting. The politicians decide upon the public good provision and
the political rents extracted by voting in parliament after the election. However, voting
16Therefore, they get a higher utility simply from having a member of their group in power if the
ideological preference is stronger.
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procedures diﬀer between the two systems. While the president is the residual claimant
of the rents and has full agenda setting power, the prime minister can only determine
the absolute amount of rents (through his public goods provision proposal), but cannot
aﬀect the distribution. Hence, a presidential system should see a lower level of public
goods and a higher level of political rents. They also ﬁnd that a strong ideological
preference or large conﬂict with regards to public goods (e.g., high income inequality)
makes a change from a parliamentarian to a presidential system more likely.
The model of Robinson and Torvik (2016) oﬀers valuable insights into the decision-
making process of parliamentary versus presidential systems. Nevertheless, some weak-
nesses can be identiﬁed. The timing of the model begins with elections under the current
system. Using this starting point overlooks the scenario of a civil conﬂict or war, when
the old constitutional rules have broken down. Therefore, the model is a good ﬁt for
explaining constitutional change, but is less eﬀective for explaining constitutional choice.
This drawback highlights the need to include the constitutional choice as the ﬁrst stage
in a model of constitutional choice.
To date, the empirical literature on the determinants of the form of government has
focused on explaining constitutional change and the determinants of changes from pres-
idential to parliamentary systems and vice versa.17 Hayo and Voigt (2010) use a pro-
portional hazard model to show that geographical factors and former colonial status are
the main contributing factors to changes in the form of government. In a further study,
Hayo and Voigt (2013) employ a panel design to test which underlying factors are the
main drivers for the observed changes in the form of government. They ﬁnd that po-
litical factors are signiﬁcant, while socio-economic factors, including income inequality,
do not show statistical signiﬁcance. This result, whicht is at odds with the theoretical
conjectures of Robinson and Torvik (2016), provides additional motivation for the model
presented in the next section.
17Since changes in the form of government are more frequent than initial choices of the form of
government, empirical strategies to identify the factors of the initial choice are harder to ﬁnd and so far,
to the best of my knowledge, no paper has rigorously tried to test for the factors.
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Research on the relationship between income inequality and taxation is another strand
of related literature. The seminal papers to analyze this link are Meltzer and Richard
(1981) and Romer (1975). Meltzer and Richard (1981) model a situation where produc-
tivity, and thus income, are unevenly distributed within a society. When the distribution
is skewed to the right, the median voter earns less than the mean income and he will
favor a positive tax rate to redistribution. A median voter above mean income will
prefer no redistributive taxes. Romer (1975) has a similar ﬁnding in the sense that a
low-earner will prefer a higher marginal tax rate, whereas high earners will prefer a lower
marginal tax rate. Following the rationale of these papers, a more unequal distribution
will increase the conﬂict between rich and poor.
It is useful to brieﬂy discuss what the literature in other ﬁelds has contributed to the
discussion. Political scientists, like economists, have dealt mainly with the question of
the (political) eﬀects of presidentialism and parliamentarism and not given a lot of at-
tention to the underlying factors motviating a particular choice of form of government.18
One exception is Cheibub (2007, p. 152), who argues that historical coincidences and
institutional stickiness are the main reason for the initial choice and prevalence of presi-
dentialism in Latin America. This contribution shows that path dependency might play
an important role in the choice of form of government.
For legal scholars, the main interest in the discussion about the choice of form of
government appears to be the underlying procedural rules followed in the process of
constitutional choice and not the explanation of the outcome of this constitutional choice
conditional on these procedural rules (cf. Klein and Sajo, 2012). In short, it can be
argued that the question of what drives the choice of form of government has not been
satisfyingly answered in other disciplines either. However, the process of constitution-
making might be one of the key determinants of the choice of form of government. This
institutional element is combined with the existing economic models in the next section.
18The main debate in political science has been concerned with the question of the inherent political
stability of presidential and parliamentarian systems as well as their main advantages and drawbacks,
see for example Linz (1990); Horowitz (1990).
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3.3 Modeling the Choice of Form of Government
The multi-stage model of constitutional choice in this section draws its main inspiration
from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Aghion et al. (2004) and Robinson and Torvik
(2016). The ﬁrst contribution endogenises the choice of democracy versus dictatorship
oﬀering a tractable framework. The second contribution includes a model starting at the
constitutional stage. The third contribution was the ﬁrst to include an explicit choice of
the form of government as well as a focus on political rents. None of the three models
are, by themselves, not suﬃciently comprehensive to give a complete picture of the
choice of form of government. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), while providing a neat
analytical framework, focus on a diﬀerent topic. Aghion et al. (2004) measure multiple
constitutional features at the same time rather than isolating speciﬁc aspects of the
process. Despite being closest in approach to the model in this chapter, the contribution
of Robinson and Torvik (2016) does not model the constitutional assembly explicitly
and thereby cannot capture the potential eﬀects of diﬀerences in the composition of the
constitutional assembly.
Before setting up the model, a ﬁnal note of caution is required. One of the main
ﬁndings in Robinson and Torvik (2016) is that higher political rents can be obtained
in a presidential system. In order to make a comparison of the results simpler, the
model presented here assumes this ﬁnding is correct. Therefore, the diﬀerences in rent
are not endogenously derived in this model to strengthen the focus on the role of the
constitutional assembly. A more in-depth discussion of this assumption and of other
simplifying assumptions of the model is carried out in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Setup
The players in the game are distinguished by two characteristics. First, individuals
diﬀer in terms of their income and are either rich or poor.19 The incomes of the rich
19Other models, such as Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), are based on three income classes and include
a middle class. Since the focus is on unconsolidated democracies, it can be argued that these societies
45
CHAPTER 3. ASSEMBLIES MATTER
and the poor are Yr > Yp, respectively. The average income for all n individuals is
therefore Y¯ = 1n ·
n∑
j=1
Yj . The total population can be normalized to 1, with a share
(1 − δ) > 0.5 being poor with the ﬁxed income Yp. Using this notation, we can deﬁne
income inequality (θ) as following:
Yp
Y¯
= (1 − θ)(1 − δ) and
Yr
Y¯
= θ
δ
(3.1)
Note that an increase in θ is equivalent to an increase in income inequality. Income
inequality plays a key role in the model. It can be interpreted as a proxy for the political
conﬂict within the society. Several political economy models use income inequality or
similar conﬂicts to explain the form of government (Robinson and Torvik, 2016), electoral
rules (Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010) and democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
Second, each individual belongs to an exogenously determined class, namely either
the political class (Z) or the citizen class (X). Individuals in the political class have the
ability to draft the constitution as well as run for oﬃce. Individuals in the citizen class
can contribute to the political game by participating in the general election. Politicians
who hold oﬃce are the only players in the game with the ability to extract political
rent. Political rent is simply the ability to use resources from the government budget
for private beneﬁt. These private beneﬁts can be either the direct extraction of funds
or in more indirect forms such as, for example, nepotism.20
The policy options for the political class in this game require further elaboration.
The only policy option available to the government in power is redistributive politics.
This assumption excludes the provision of public goods such as national defense, which
might be mutually beneﬁcial for all individuals. Assuming that eﬃciency-increasing
policies and redistributive policies can be clearly separated, the model subsumes from
all eﬃciency-increasing policies given the focus on modeling the policy conﬂict between
typically lack a strong middle class. Furthermore, the decision to not include a middle class increases
the focus on the conﬂict between rich and poor, following the baseline model in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006).
20This model formally assumes only direct extraction of government funds.
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poor and rich (cf. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The results would not change if public
good provision was included.21
The model assumes that the members of the political class with an initially low income
Yp (hereafter left-wing politicians) view redistributive policies more favorably then the
members of the political class with an initially high income Yr (hereafter right-wing
politicians). Furthermore, politicians are not able to credibly commit to a tax rate at
the election stage.22
Hence, a total of four diﬀerent types of players exist: rich citizen, poor citizen, right-
wing politician, and left-wing politician. The model also assumes that citizens are more
numerous than politicians and that there are more poor citizens than rich citizens. No
assumption is made for the number of left-wing and right-wing politicians.
Utility Functions
The utility of each individual is derived from the income tax rate τ , the rate of extraction
of political rents λ as well as their initial income Yj . For simplicity, two diﬀerent indirect
utility functions are introduced. The ﬁrst indirect utility function is characterized as
follows:
VX(Yj |τ, λi) = (1 − τ)Yj + (1 − λi)(τ − c(τ))Y¯ (3.2)
This function applies to all citizens and the subset of politicians who do not hold
a position in the government. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents an
21Even assuming that the Pareto optimal level of public good provision is known to all players, there
would still be conﬂict about the amount of public goods provided. This conﬂict is due to the fact that
with proportional taxation the rich pay a larger part of the costs of public goods than the poor. Using
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion to assess these diﬀerent preferences, the preferred level of the poor would lead
to an oversupply of the public good, while the preferred level of the rich would lead to an undersupply of
the public good (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Therefore, the poor would prefer a higher level of public
good provision than the rich. Hence, the assumption that only redistributive taxation is a policy option
is used to highlight the conﬂict concerning the amount of public spending.
22This assumption is in the spirit of the contribution by Acemoglu (2003), who argues that the lack
of a political Coase theorem is exactly due to the lack of commitment devices in politics.
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individual’s income after taxation. The second term represents the lump-sum transfer
made from the government budget.23 The size of the redistribution is negatively aﬀected
by the magnitude of political rents(λi ∈ [0−1]) where the superscript i indicates the two
diﬀerent forms of government) extracted by the government and by the cost of taxation
(c(τ)).
The cost of taxation refers to the increasing marginal costs of tax collection. This
marginally increasing cost has been called the "leaky bucket" of taxation by Okun
(1975). Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), this cost includes the cost of cre-
ating a bureacuracy to administer the process of tax collection as well as the costs of the
actual collection of taxes. Furthermore, the tax resistance of citizens can be assumed
to increase with the tax rate. In the remainder of this model, the functional form of
c(τ) = k ∗ τ2 will be adopted. In this representation, k is between 0 and 1 and measures
the eﬀectiveness of the tax system. The lower the value of k, the more eﬀective the tax
system. This setup is used to allow for diﬀerences in bureaucratic eﬃciency and tax
enforcement across countries. For a value of k = 0.5, the formulation of the quadratic
tax distortion is identical to the one used by Bolton and Roland (1997).
The second utility function allows the model to distinguish between politicians who
hold an oﬃce and politicians who do not hold an oﬃce. The utility function of politicians
who do not hold oﬃce is identical to the utility function of citizens.
Politicians who are in oﬃce can proﬁt from the opportunities of political rent extrac-
tion. This distinction is shown in the following indirect utility function:
VZ(Yj |τ, λi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
VX(Yj |τ, λi) if not in government
VX(Yj |τ, λi) + (1 − π) nmλi(τ − c(τ))Y¯ if in government
(3.3)
23The net redistribution (tax - transfer) is always negative for the rich and positive for the poor, given
that the costs of taxation and the expropriation are not prohibitively high. The functional form is used
following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).
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in the second function, π stands for the risk of a citizen uprising and is bound between 0
and 1.24 This risk increases when the tax rate is further from the citizens preferences.25
Since politicians "choose" the amount of rents available to them by setting the tax
rate and the choice of tax rates is the only policy variable, the citizens will base their
decision whether or not to stage an uprising upon this variable. Indirectly, this risk
is also linked to the rate of extraction, λi, through the eﬀect of rent extraction on tax
rates. An increase in the amount of extracted tax revenue aﬀects the diﬀerences between
the desired tax rates of politicians and citizens. The desired tax rate of poor citizens
decreases with rent extraction, whereas the desired tax rates of politicians goes up. The
uprising constraint is not explicitly modeled here to keep the model tractable. The
important element is that it is increasing in tax rates and thus can be seen as serving
as an upper bound on tax rates from the citizens’ perspective.
Furthermore, m is the number of politicians that end up in oﬃce and among whom
the political rents are divided. Politicians are assumed to be risk neutral.
Strategy Spaces
Politicians have two distinct choices as events unfold. First, they choose which form
of government to establish under the constitution. In terms of the formal model, this
decision is the choice of λi. Their two options are either a presidential system (p) or a
parliamentarian system (w).26 The main diﬀerence between the two systems is that the
president has more power at digression than the prime minister.27 To keep the model
tractable, the political processes of each form of government are not explicitly modeled.
Instead, the result from Robinson and Torvik (2016), namely that the extractable po-
litical rents are higher in a presidential system, is assumed to hold.28 In this way, the
24π is used as a simpliﬁcation of notation and always refers to π(τ)).
25In a setting with political rent extraction, it is unlikely that the politicians choose a tax rate that
will be too low from the citizens perspective. Thus, it is hereafter assumed that π increases in τ .
26The index w is chosen since the parliamentarian form of government is often directly associated
with British parliamentarism and the Westminster.
27Thereby following Robinson and Torvik (2016).
28A more in-depth discussion of this assumption is carried out in section 3.4.
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choice of form of government can also be seen as a choice of the extraction technology
for the politicians. Second, conditional on being in government, they can set the tax
rate τ , which can take values from 0 to 1. Citizens have one distinct choice, namely the
vote that they cast in the general elections.
Timing
The timing of the diﬀerent stages of the model is as follows:
1. The political class decides upon the constitution; i.e. the form of government
2. All citizens cast their vote in the general election 29
3. The new government constitutes itself and sets the tax rate τ
When citizens cast their vote in the second stage, their considerations take into account
that more redistribution, i.e. higher tax rates, always comes at the cost of more rent
extraction. This trade-oﬀ makes the choice for poor citizens non-trivial and will be one
of the key features of the model. The choice of form of government can be described
as the choice of extraction technology (which is one key constraint for the extraction of
political rents), whereas the risk of an uprising acts as another constraint on political
rents through its eﬀect on chosen tax rates.
The key structural diﬀerence of this model when compared to Robinson and Torvik
(2016) is the timing of the ﬁrst stage. Robinson and Torvik (2016) start their model
with general elections, introducing the option of constitutional change only at a later
stage of the game. By moving the stage of constitutional choice to the beginning in
this model, the importance of the constitutional assembly and its composition can be
highlighted. A key assumption here is the idea that the composition of the assembly is
exogenously given. This important assumption is motivated by the idea that, especially
29Since there are a lot more citizens than politicians, the votes of politicians are left out as a simpli-
ﬁcation. The median voter is assumed to be decisive. There are no further assumptions on the details
of the electoral rule.
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following a period of internal violence or crisis, the winning faction will often be able to
dominate the constitution-making process.30 Additionally, the model is able to address
situations that start without a constitution in place, while the model of Robinson and
Torvik (2016) requires a form of government in the beginning under which the elections
are held.
3.3.2 Solving the Model
Following the timing of the stages of the model presented above, it can be solved using
backward induction. Therefore, we start with the last stage of the game, i.e. the taxation
decision of the government.
Stage 3: Choice of Tax Rate
To analyze the choice of the tax rate, one needs to look at the utility of the politician
in oﬃce with respect to the tax rate. The indirect utility function of the politician in
oﬃce is as follows:
VZ(Yj |τ, λi) = (1 − τ)Yj + (1 − λi)(τ − c(τ))Y¯ + (1 − π) n
m
λi(τ − c(τ))Y¯ (3.4)
Instead of deriving a speciﬁc tax rate, the interesting question is how the chosen
tax rate is aﬀected by changes in the type of politician (as measured by his initial
income, Yj) or extractive capacities (λi). The extractive capacities depend on the form
of government, assuming that more political rents can be extracted in a presidential
system. In this way, the choice of form of government (modeled below in stage 1) can
be seen as the choice of an extraction technology by the politicians. In this way, the
30We assume democratic policies for the later stages throughout the paper. This assumption can be
seen as a limitation when a majority in the assembly expects to not emerge as the winning party in a
general election, since a group dominating the assembly could try to rig future elections to ensure that
they remain in power.
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decision about the tax rate is (partially) driven by the choice of form of government.
For the two parameters Yj and λi, the hypotheses are: (1) a right-wing politician in
oﬃce (i.e. Yj = Yr) reduces the chosen tax rate and (2) a higher extractive capacity (λi)
reduces the tax rate. The reasoning behind the counter-intuitive second hypothesis is
that citizens will gain less from redistribution if a larger part is used for political rent
extraction. In this case, they are more inclined to start a protest at a given realized tax
rate (since their preferred tax rate decreases if the gains from redistribution decrease).
Thus, a utility maximizing politician will reduce the tax rate to balance the gains from
higher political rents and the increased risks of an uprising.31 This hypothesis depends
on the ability of citizens to respond with an uprising to a tax choice they dislike. One
could also argue that politicians can set a lower τ to achieve a given rent in cases where
λi is higher.
Proposition 1. With regard to the tax rate, the following two conditions hold:
1. The tax rate will be lower if a right-wing politician is in oﬃce.
2. The tax rate will be lower under presidentialism, given that citizens are suﬃciently
attentive to tax rates (i.e. (1 − 2kτ)Y¯ [1 − nm(1 − π)] + nm Y¯ [(τ − kτ2)∂π∂τ ] > 0)
Proof. To formally check whether these conditions hold true, monotone comparative
statics will be used. The general idea behind this method is to inform about the eﬀect of
changes in parameters on an optimization decision. Here, we are interested in the eﬀect
of changes in income or extraction capacity on the taxation decision. If the diﬀerences
of the utility function with respect to a parameter and the choice variable are strictly
increasing, then we know that an increase in the parameter will also lead to an increase
in the optimal value of the choice variable. If we want to show that an increase in the
parameter will decrease the optimal choice variable, it is required that the diﬀerences
with respect to the negative of the utility function are strictly increasing. Therefore, we
31This ﬁnding, although arrived at through a very diﬀerent theoretical model, can be empirically
supported by the ﬁnding of Persson et al. (2000) that parliamentarian systems have larger governments
(and thus higher taxes).
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will analyze the behavior of −VZ below. For a more detailed description of monotone
comparative statics, see Milgrom and Shannon (1994). With regard to our question of
interest, the following conditions need to hold:
(a)∂
2(−VZ)
∂τ∂Yj
> 0 and (b)∂
2(−VZ)
∂τ∂λ
> 0 (3.5)
Solving these equations using (3.4) leads to
(a) ∂
2(−VZ)
∂τ∂Yj
= 1 > 0 (3.6)
(b) ∂
2(−VZ)
∂τ∂λ
= (1 − 2kτ)Y¯ [1 − n
m
(1 − π)] + n
m
Y¯ [(τ − kτ2)∂π
∂τ
] (3.7)
While (a) is always holding and thereby conﬁrms the earlier stated conjecture, (b)
requires further analysis. To see under which circumstances the conjecture holds, it is
useful to rewrite equation (3.7).
∂2(−VZ)
∂τ∂λ
= n
m
Y¯ [(1 − 2kτ)(π + 1n
m
− 1) + (τ − kτ2)∂π
∂τ
] (3.8)
To ﬁnd out whether the right-hand side is positive or negative, it is useful to look at
its components step by step. For 1 − 2kτ , a very high tax rate would be required to
make the expression negative. However, since this would also assume a very high cost of
taxation, these tax rates are not chosen by the politicians and hence it can be assumed
that (1 − 2kτ) > 0. 32
Given this assumption, the sign of the ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side depends
on (π + 1n
m
− 1). If the risk of an uprising does not approach 1, the sign of (π + 1n
m
− 1)
32Even if the sole aim of the politicians would be tax revenue maximization, they would choose τ = 12k .
This is the extreme case and it can safely be assumed that τ < 12k .
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will be negative. However, the overall sign of the right-hand side can still be positive.
The crucial element here is the change in the risk of an uprising (∂π∂τ ). One can interpret
an overall positive sign as follows: if citizens are reactive enough, politicians will choose
a lower tax rate to accommodate the citizens.
To illustrate the conditions with regard to π, we can use equation (3.5) and equation
(3.8) to state:
n
m
Y¯ [(1 − 2kτ)(π + 1n
m
− 1) + (τ − kτ2)∂π
∂τ
] > 0 (3.9)
Solving this inequality for π highlights the importance of the uprising constraint for
the ﬁnding that tax rates will be lower with a presidential system.
π > 1 − m
n
− τ − kτ
2
1 − 2kτ ·
∂π
∂τ
(3.10)
One can easily see that a higher risk of an uprising (π) and a higher responsiveness of
this risk to changes in the tax rate ((∂π∂τ )) both make the inequality more likely to hold.
Recall that the inequality is the condition under which a presidential system will have
a lower tax rate.
Situations with citizens who are relatively more attentive to tax decisions can be
thought of as cases where π and ∂π∂τ are higher. Both of these cases make the conjecture
more likely to hold. In other words, this model is better suited for scenarios that allow
for a moderate to high likelihood of a citizen uprising than for scenarios where the
risk of an uprising approaches zero. This ﬁnding ﬁts well with our focus on unstable
democracies.
Before moving on to the next stage, a check on how a change in income inequality
aﬀects the model is in order. When income inequality increases, taxation becomes
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more attractive for the poor and less attractive for the rich (due to the part of the
tax burden they are sharing). Hence, increasing income inequalities will lead left-wing
politicians to prefer an increasingly higher tax rate under both systems, while the right-
wing politicians favor lower tax rates, ceteris paribus.
Stage 2: Election of Government
Taking into account the results of the last section, it is now possible to analyze the voting
behavior in the election of the government. Recall that left-wing politicians will set a
higher tax rate than right-wing politicians. Citizens are aware of this diﬀerence when
they are casting their vote in the election. In the model with two classes of citizens,
the median voter will always be a poor citizen (recall the assumption that there is a
greater number of poor than rich citizens). Unlike the rich citizens, poor citizens favor a
positive tax rate as long as their beneﬁts from redistribution are larger than their share
of the burden of taxation.
Proposition 2. A left-wing government will be elected if the following condition holds:
(1 − θ)
(1 − λi)(1 − δ) < 1 −
k(τ2l − τ2r )
τl − τr
Otherwise, a right-wing government is elected.
Proof. The maximization problem for the poor citizens is as follows:
vote =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
right-wing if VX(Yp|τr, λi) > VX(Yp|τl, λi)
left-wing if VX(Yp|τr, λi) < VX(Yp|τl, λi)
(3.11)
Here, τr represents the tax rate a right-wing politician would choose and τl the tax
rate a left-wing candidate would choose. To express this situation more formally, the
utility functions as spelled out above can be employed. Hence, the poor citizens choose
the right-wing politician if
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(1 − τr)Yp + (1 − λi)(τr − k · τ2r )Y¯ > (1 − τl)Yp + (1 − λi)(τl − k · τ2l )Y¯ (3.12)
Rewriting equation (3.12) and using 1−θ1−δ :=
Yp
Y¯
, where δ is the relative share of rich
citizens in the society and θ is the relative income inequality, one arrives at
(1 − θ)
(1 − λi)(1 − δ) > 1 −
k(τ2l − τ2r )
τl − τr (3.13)
Hence, an increase in the possible rent extraction (λi) or the share of rich citizens as
part of the total population (δ) increase the likelihood that the poor citizens vote for
the right-wing candidates. If there is more possible rent to extract (which can happen
through both of these variables), poor citizens are more inclined to prefer the lower
tax rates of the right-wing politicians. At the same time, an increase in relative income
inequality (θ) makes the election of a right-wing politician less likely, since redistributive
policies are now more attractive for poor citizens.
The eﬀect of the anticipated tax rates depends on two elements, namely on how
eﬃcient the tax system works (k) and on income inequality. The less eﬃcient the
tax system becomes, the more likely it is that a right-wing politician will be elected.
This eﬀect can be explained by a right-wing politician’s preference for lower tax rates.
However, similar to the direct eﬀect of income inequality, more inequality will also
increase the diﬀerences in anticipated tax rates between the politicians. In other words,
more inequality will increase the gap between poor and rich in terms of income as well
as in terms of preferred tax rates of their politicians. The larger this diﬀerence, the
lower is the likelihood of a right-wing politician being elected.
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Stage 1: Choice of Form of Government
Having used backward induction to solve the stages 3 and 2, it is now possible to look at
the constitutional stage and derive the form of government chosen by politicians. Recall
the assumption that the composition of the assembly is exogenously given. Note that it
is assumed that the constitutional assemblies use a simple majority decision-rule, which
will be further discussed in section 3.4. Two cases can be distinguished, namely one
where the right-wing politicians have the majority in the constitutional assembly and
another where the left-wing politicians have the majority. Since the last section showed
that poor voters might prefer the right-wing politicians, it is necessary to look at both
possible outcomes for each case. The composition of the assembly is supposed to be
exogenous. This is an important assumption and has signiﬁcant impact on the outcome
of the model. The reasoning for this argument is that the political circumstances which
lead to a demand for a new constitution are often driven by internal crisis or conﬂict and
it is the result of this crisis or conﬂict that determines the composition of the assembly.33
One could also relate this argument to the concept of constitutional moments (Ackerman,
1991). Recall the example of the two very diﬀerent assemblies in Egypt in 2012 and
2013 as an example for this situation. A more detailed discussion of this assumption
can be found in section 3.4. This stage will be analyzed by looking at the two cases
of exogenously given compositions of the assembly in turn: First, what happens if the
ring-wing politicians have a majority in the assembly and second, what happens if the
left-wing politicians have a majority in the assembly.
Case 1: right-wing politicians have the majority in the constitutional as-
sembly
To analyze the situation with a majority for the right-wing politicians, we can make
use of the analysis of the (expected) election result (stage 2). Here, we assume that
33Citizens are assumed to be unable to change the constitution throughout the model, except through
an uprising. This assumption builds on the idea that the constitution cannot be easily changed in the
short-run. While the long-term dynamics would be interesting, they are outside the scope of the model
presented here.
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politicians are perfectly able to predict whether or not they will end up in government.
Nevertheless, releasing this strong assumption would not change the key results of this
analysis. If right-wing politicians know that they will be in government after the election,
they choose the form of government that oﬀers the higher payoﬀ to the politicians in
government. This decision is conditional on the respective tax rates which are optimal
for the politicians under each system. Hence, a presidential system will be chosen if the
following condition holds.
(1 − τp)Yr + (1 − λp)(τp − c(τp))Y¯ + [(1 − πp) n
m
λpY¯ )](τp − c(τp)) >
(1 − τw)Yr + (1 − λw)(τw − c(τw))Y¯ + [(1 − πw) n
m
λwY¯ )](τw − c(τw))
(3.14)
Using θδ :=
Yr
Y¯
and rearranging both sides of the equation gives the following condition
for the choice of a presidential system
θ
δ
>
(1 − λw + (1 − πw) nmλw)(τw − kτ2w) − (1 − λp − (1 − πp) nmλp)(τp − kτ2p )
τw − τp (3.15)
The choice depends on the level of income inequality on the left-hand side of the
equation and the diﬀerences in gains from redistribution and political rent extraction
between the two forms of government, weighted by the tax rate diﬀerences, on the right-
hand side. If the gains are larger under a presidential system, then the presidential
system is always preferred. This eﬀect relies on the result that the tax rate is lower
under a presidential system and thus the right-hand side would always have a negative
sign.
However, if the gains from redistribution and political rent extraction are higher under
a parliamentarian system, then a trade-oﬀ exists between the larger gains under this
system and the larger costs in terms of taxation. Given this trade-oﬀ, a parliamentarian
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system will be chosen only if the diﬀerence in gains (weighted by the diﬀerence in tax
rates) is larger than the level of income inequality. Thus, a large income inequality
makes a presidential system more likely.
This leads to the question how the diﬀerences in tax rates aﬀect this condition. At this
point, it is useful to mention that politicians are assumed to have no means to credibly
commit to a diﬀerent tax rate than the one that maximizes their utility in a given form
of government. Ceteris paribus, if the diﬀerence between τw and τp increases, the risk of
a popular uprising as well as the amount of redistribution and political rents obtainable
in a parliamentarian system increase. When the costs in terms of an increased risk of
an uprising are already high with the initial tax rates (i.e. citizens are reactive to tax
changes), a marginal increase in the diﬀerence makes a presidential system more likely.
If it is anticipated that left-wing politicians will end up in government after the elec-
tion, one can see that right-wing politicians have the same indirect utility functions as
rich citizens (cf. equation (3.3)).34 In this case, they choose the governmental system
which delivers the higher utility for them as citizens. Using equation (3.2), it can be
seen that the presidential system is preferred if:
(1 − τp)Yr + (1 − λp)(τp − c(τp))Y¯ > (1 − τw)Yr + (1 − λw)(τw − c(τw))Y¯ (3.16)
Using θδ :=
Yr
Y¯
and rearranging both sides of the equation gives the following condition
for the choice of a presidential system
θ
δ
>
(1 − λw)(τw − kτ2w) − (1 − λp)(τp − kτ2p )
τw − τp (3.17)
The interpretation is similar to the case presented above, but note that the politicians
34This observation holds in non-repeated games, while a more complex version might include future
stages and the eﬀect of expectations about future oﬃce holders.
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do not care about political rents if they know that they will not end up in government.
Thus, the right-hand side is composed of the diﬀerence in gains from redistribution,
which are again weighted by the diﬀerence in tax rates. An increase in the level of
income inequality increases the portion of the tax burden for rich citizens. This eﬀect
makes a presidential system more likely, since the rich citizens face a larger cost in a
parliamentarian system.
Since the rich citizens in this model have no interest in redistribution in the ﬁrst place
(recall that they would favor a tax rate of zero) and politicians who know they will
not end up in oﬃce share an indirect utility function with rich citizens, the right-wing
politicians favor lower taxes when they anticipate they the will not hold oﬃce. Thus, a
larger diﬀerence in tax rates increases the likelihood of a presidential system.
Case 2: left-wing politicians have the majority in the constitutional assem-
bly
Following the procedures in case 1, it is useful to ﬁrst check what will happen if
the left-wing majority in the assembly anticipates to end up in government after the
election and thereafter look at the situation when they anticipate that they will lose
the upcoming election. If left-wing politicians expect that they will be in government
after the election, then they choose the system with the higher political payoﬀ to the
politicians in oﬃce. This choice leads to a presidential system if the following condition
holds:
(1 − τp)Yp + (1 − λp)(τp − c(τp))Y¯ + [(1 − πp) n
m
λpY¯ ](τp − c(τp)) >
(1 − τw)Yp + (1 − λw)(τw − c(τw))Y¯ ) + [(1 − πw) n
m
λwY¯ ](τw − c(τw))
(3.18)
Using 1−θ1−δ :=
Yp
Y¯
and rearranging both sides of the equation gives the following condi-
tion for the choice of a presidential system
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1 − θ
1 − δ >
(1 − λw + (1 − πw) nmλw)(τw − kτ2w) − (1 − λp − (1 − πp) nmλp)(τp − kτ2p )
τw − τp
(3.19)
The right-hand side of this equation is identical to equation (3.17) and thus the in-
terpretation also remains the same. The key diﬀerence is that the impact of income
inequality changes the sign because of the diﬀerent preferences with regard to redistri-
bution. From a cost perspective, a larger income inequality means that the part of the
tax base that is paid for by the rich is larger. Thus, the part of the costs of redistribution
and rent extraction increase with income inequality. This cost eﬀect is another expla-
nation of why a left-wing assembly will favor a parliamentarian system (which leads to
higher taxes) when income inequality increases.
When the left-wing majority in the assembly anticipates that the right-wing politicians
end up in government after the election, they prefer the system where the tax rate
realized by the right-wing politicians is closer to their own preferred tax rate. Recall
that if left-wing politicians are not in government, their indirect utility functions are the
same as those of poor citizens (cf. (3.4)). They choose the governmental system which
delivers the highest utility for them under this condition. Hence, a presidential system
will be chosen if the following condition holds.
(1 − τp)Yp + (1 − λp)(τp − c(τp))Y¯ > (1 − τw)Yp + (1 − λw)(τw − c(τw))Y¯ (3.20)
Using again 1−θ1−δ :=
Yp
Y¯
and rearranging both sides of the equation gives the following
condition for the choice of a presidential system
1 − θ
1 − δ >
(1 − λw)(τw − kτ2w) − (1 − λp)(τp − kτ2p )
τw − τp (3.21)
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Again, only the left-hand side changed compared to the situation where right-wing
politicians have the majority and know that they will not end up in government. Income
inequality enters in the same way for left-wing politicians and left-wing citizens, given
the cost argument as well as the preference for redistribution.
The ﬁnding from the two cases can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. When income is equally distributed (i.e. θ = 0.5), the composition of
the constitutional assembly has no eﬀect since there is no policy conﬂict. A higher level
of income inequality makes a presidential system more likely if right-wing politicians
have a majority. If left-wing politicians hold the majority in the constitutional assembly,
a higher level of income inequality makes a presidential system less likely.
Proof. One can easily see that equations (3.15) and (3.19) as well as equations (3.17
and (3.21) are the same when θ = 0.5. Thus, the ﬁrst part of the proposition holds.
In equations (3.15) and (3.17), income inequality enters with a positive sign. Those
two conditions apply if right-wing politicians have the majority in the constitutional
assembly. Thus, a presidential system becomes more likely in these constellations when
income inequality increases. For equations (3.19) and (3.21), income inequality enters
with a negative sign. Since these two conditions apply if left-wing politicians have the
majority, it becomes clear that a higher income inequality makes a presidential system
less likely in this case.
These results are graphically shown in Table 3.2 and are the key diﬀerences with the
results of Robinson and Torvik (2016) and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) and show how
the composition of the constitutional assembly aﬀects the choice of form of government.
One interpretation of the diﬀering eﬀect of income inequality lies in the diﬀerent pref-
erences for redistribution that both groups face. While right-wing politicians favor the
lower taxes of a presidential system (especially with a high income inequality), left-wing
politicians know that high income inequality makes the higher tax rates of a parliamen-
tarian system more attractive. The other interpretation given above is the diﬀerence in
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the proportion of the costs of redistribution and rent extraction borne by rich and poor
citizens, respectively.
Table 3.2: Eﬀect of an Increase in Income Inequality on Presidential System
Left-wing drafters Right-wing drafters
Left-wing government - +
Right-wing government - +
3.4 Making Sense of the Main Assumptions
A discussion of the main assumptions of the model will help assess these results. The
most relevant assumptions of the model refer to political rents under diﬀerent forms of
government, uprising of citizens and the constitutional assembly.
First, the assumption that political rents are higher in a presidential system is in
contrast to the ﬁndings of Persson et al. (1997, 2000), who conclude that the highest
rents are obtainable in parliamentarian systems. These authors attribute their result
to the higher degree of separation of powers in a presidential system. The degree to
which a presidential system is contrained by a separation of powers is not part of the
model presented here. Nevertheless, it can be argued that in countries with very strong
presidents (e.g. in Africa or Latin America) the presidential system does not have
inherent checks and balances, but rather allows the president to have unchecked powers.
Additionally, in unstable democracies the balancing eﬀect of a strong separation of
powers can be doubted. As argued in the introduction, constitution-making happens
oftentimes in countries which lack political stability. The diﬀerences in political rents
for cases in Africa, which often ﬁt the description of unstable democracies, has been
attributed to the argument of Robinson and Torvik (2016) regarding the threat of a vote
of no conﬁdence in parliamentarian systems. Since our model also focuses on unstable
democracies, the result from Robinson and Torvik has been assumed throughout this
chapter. A further argument in favor of the explanation of a vote of no conﬁdence threat
in a parliamentarian system can be found in Carlson (1999), who argues that this threat
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increases the bargaining power of the members of the parliament with their leader and
thereby provides a check to power only available in parliamentarian systems.
Second, it is assumed throughout the chapter that citizens are attentive to the policy
choices of the ruling politicians and will react to a higher tax rate with an increased
probability of an uprising. This assumption is based on the observation that many
constitutions are made in times when there is a threat of internal violence (cf. Widner,
2008) and further assumes that the citizens are able to solve the collective action problem
inherent in fomenting an uprising. As criticized by Apolte (2012), this assumption
does not necessarily hold true, as can be seen in the case of North Korea. Apolte
highlights that policy choices that are opposed to the preferences of citizens are not a
suﬃcient criterion for an uprising. If the government succeeds in undermining citizen’s
coordination and instilling a climate of fear, an uprising will not take place. Therefore,
the model is more appropriate for situations where the citizens are able to solve the
collective action problem.
Third, it is assumed that the composition of the constitutional assembly is exogenous
to income inequality. In normal times, this assumption seems very strong, especially
for a simple model with income diﬀerences as the main driver. However, keep in mind
that most constitutions are made during "abnormal" times. Typically, crises or conﬂicts
pre-date the decision to draft a new constitution. The assemblies which are (s)elected
in those times are mainly inﬂuenced by the events that led to the need for a new con-
stitution in the ﬁrst place. The case of a Muslim Brotherhood dominated assembly in
Egypt after the Arab Spring and the assembly completely lacking the Muslim Brother-
hood just one year later serve as a powerful example how the political circumstances of
the conﬂict/crisis drive the composition of the assembly. In addition to the Egyptian
example, the process of constitution-making in Thailand in 2007 provides a good case.
After a military-led coup, the junta was able to select a candidate pool of 2,000 eligible
candidates for the constitutional assembly. This group of 2,000 potential drafters then
held an internal vote and after determining the 200 candidates with the most votes, the
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junta selected 100 based on their own preferences. The composition of the assembly in
this situation can be seen as purely driven by the winners of the prior conﬂict, namely
the military junta.
For the stage of constitutional choice it is also assumed that the simple majority of the
politicians can decide the outcome. This assumption opposes the unanimity criterion,
which has often been proposed for constitutional choice (cf. Buchanan and Tullock,
1962). However, this normative ideal is never observed in real-life situations due to the
high decision-making costs involved. Most constitutional assemblies in practice use a
qualiﬁed majority criterion, but as soon as one group has a suﬃciently large majority
and is able to dominate the assembly, this rule is eﬀectively the same as an assembly with
two groups and a simple majority rule. Especially after a conﬂict, the victorious side is
often in a position where it can dominate the assembly, as was the case with the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt directly after the Arab Spring and the military government in the
subsequent Egyptian constitution. If both parties would have veto power, a bargaining
situation with regards to the choice of form of government would arise. While being
beyond the scope of this chapter, the general issues of bargaining in constitution-making
will be explored in chapter 4.
Having discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the major assumptions of our model,
we turn our attention to the ﬁve main diﬀerences in modelling choice with regard to the
contribution of Robinson and Torvik (2016). First, the stage of constitutional choice is
explicitly modelled. In the contribution of Robinson and Torvik, constitutional change
is only possible at a later stage of the model. This setup does not allow for an analysis
of constitutional choice at the time of a new constitution’s introduction, which is why
the model presented here follows a diﬀerent approach. Second, in the model of Robinson
and Torvik, the citizens are only able to constrain the politicians through their vote.
To allow for an explicit constraint outside of the formal political system, i.e. the threat
of a violent uprising, an uprising constraint is included. Third, instead of focusing
on diﬀerent preferences for public good provision, this model focuses on diﬀerences in
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initial income inequality. This choice is more in line with Ticchi and Vindigni (2010).
Fourth, the political process within the two diﬀerent systems is more ﬁne-grained in the
contribution of Robinson and Torvik. These elements are left aside in this model to focus
on the eﬀect of the constitutional assembly. Fifth, the distinction between politicians
and political leaders made by Robinson and Torvik is dropped in the model presented
here for analytic simplicity.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter an argument has been presented that the inﬂuence of initial income
inequality on the choice of the form of government can be better understood if the timing
of the model begins with the stage of constitutional choice. Overall, an increase in income
inequality has eﬀects across all stages and most importantly directly aﬀects the choice of
form of government. However, the sign of the eﬀect on the form of government depends
on the composition of the constitutional assembly. Hence, a high income inequality can
lead to a preference for a presidential system or to a preference for a parliamentarian
system, conditional on who has the majority in the constitutional assembly.
This ﬁndings shows the relevance of the composition of the constitutional assembly,
especially in cases of unstable democracies. This eﬀect is driven by the (inherently)
diﬀerent preferences of the two groups when it comes to redistribution. When the policy
conﬂict (i.e. income inequality) is low, the rent extraction of politicians (motivated
by their personal interests) dominates. As income inequality increases, the ideological
diﬀerences between the groups gain importance.
Furthermore, the result that poor citizens might vote for right-wing politicians is quite
counter-intuitive. However, taking the cost of political rents and tax distortions into
account, this result might explain why right-wing politicians occasionally ﬁnd support
among the poor. This result is similar to the ﬁnding of Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), who
also ﬁnd a case where the poor might support the rich. The key diﬀerence between the
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two models is that the model in this chapter arrives at this result without the inclusion
of a middle class. In the model of Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), the poor have no chance
to bring representatives of their own group into the government. In the model presented
here, they consciously vote against representatives of their own group, thereby making
the ﬁnding even stronger.
Having established that the constitutional assembly does aﬀect the outcome of the
constitution-making process, it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the ways in
which the drafting process can aﬀect the outcome. As discussed in the introduction to
this dissertation, the two main functions of a constitution are to enable and to constrain
the governing. With regard to the constraining function, drafters might face diﬀerent
incentives to include constraints on future governments conditional on the procedural
rules for ratiﬁcation of the draft. The procedural rules can add additional veto players
to the process, which in turn will have an eﬀect on the outcome. This issue will be dealt
with in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Ulysses’ Bonds: Are Drafters
Constrained by Referendums?
4.1 Introduction
Drafting a constitution is one of the cornerstones of state building. The new constitution
has important symbolic value, it provides the basic set of rules for the legal regime in
power, and also has important economic implications. There has been a great deal of
research in recent years on the economic eﬀects of constitutions,35 but less focus has been
given to the actual drafting process. In the literature, agreeing on a set of basic rules
has been described as being similar to a bargaining process (Heckathorn and Maser,
1987; Elster, 1995, 2000a; Voigt, 1999). While legal scholarship has recently started
to focus on the process of constitution-making (see for example Banks, 2008; Jackson,
2008; Tushnet, 2008; Barnett, 2009; Partlett, 2012; Landau, 2012, 2013), the literature
concerned with constitutional economics has been remarkably quiet on the topic. To
my knowledge, no attempt has been made to formalize the constitution-making process
while incorporating the institutional details that constrain the process. In this vein, the
attempt of this chapter is closely related to the research program of law & economics.
35See Voigt (2011) for an overview
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This program often relies on three pillars to organize the method of research. The ﬁrst
pillar is the selection of a legal topic as the subject of interest, the second pillar is the use
of an economic methodology, and the third pillar is drawing on institutional knowledge
to strengthen the analysis. Following this approach, this chapter uses the ﬁndings of
legal and political scholars with regards to the constraints involved in the process of
drafting a new constitution to inform the formal model’s setup.
For this venture, it is important to recapitualte how constitutions and their functions
are viewed in this chapter. According to Buchanan (1975), one of the key functions
of a constitution is to establish what he calls a protective state. The protective state
functions as an impartial arbiter to enforce contractual relationships between the citi-
zens. However, the ability to enforce contracts (or employ sanctions due to breaches of
contracts) requires a government powerful enough to accomplish this task. As soon as
the government is strong enough to enforce sanctions against property right violations,
it is also strong enough to transgress on the citizens and expropriate their property
(cf. Weingast, 1993, 1995). This situation highlights a potential conﬂict between the
enabling and the constraining functions of a constitution. Citizens might reconsider in-
vesting their income if they are aware that the government can expropriate them at any
given time. Therefore, politicians have an incentive to bind themselves to the constitu-
tion’s rules and a constitution can be argued to be a two-sided mechanism, enabling and
constraining the government at the same time. It enables the government by deﬁning
the basic government structure, setting up the necessary institutions and laying out the
legal system’s most basic layer. The constraining function is based on the idea that
the rule of law should also apply to the government and citizens can beneﬁt from a
constitution that provides checks and balances as well as focal points to react when the
government transgresses against them (Weingast, 1993). This chapter focuses mainly
on the constraining function of constitutions.
One can argue that the key conﬂict in the process of constitution-making is between
the drafters and the citizens. This conﬂict relates directly to the constraining function
70
4.1. INTRODUCTION
of the constitution. Citizens would prefer a government that is not able to expropriate
them, while politicians have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of binding themselves.36
The beneﬁts are the improved long-term growth prospects of the society, which in turn
increase the politicians’ future income. It can be argued that the costs are the lost
beneﬁts of extracting short-term rents, e.g. from expropriation. If the prospects of
long-term growth beneﬁts outweigh the lost short-term rent collections, politicians might
voluntarily bind themselves.
The idea that a government might be willing to constrain itself due to long-term
beneﬁts is similar in nature to the idea of "stationary bandits" of Mancur Olson (1993).
An autocratic ruler might enjoy more beneﬁts if he can convince his citizens that their
property will not be taken from them. If he maintains some property protection and
thus increases long-term investment by the citizens, he is better oﬀ due to the growth
generated by this behavior. While the autocrat receives a smaller percentage of the pie
when compared to his percentage received from expropriations and takings, he is still
better oﬀ because the pie is much bigger. One mechanism for an autocrat to credibly
commit to a long-term perspective is a new constitution.37
Another reason why politicians draft a new constitution is regime change. More
than 200 constitutions in the past 40 years have been drafted under a threat of violence
(Widner, 2008); furthermore several countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya recently
started drafting new constitutions after the Arab Spring transitions. The conditions
under which these countries are working on their new constitutions are characterized
by uncertainty about future developments and a need for the constitution to be quickly
enacted, thereby marking a step on the way back to normal times. Nevertheless, the
drafters and citizens still face the same conﬂict of interest as discussed above.
The key question for this chapter is how the constitution-making process aﬀects the
creation of the drafted constitution, especially the constraints this constitution places
36With regards to expropriation, it is assumed that politicians are not able to utilize targeted transfers
to citizens as a policy tool. Thus, citizens will always oppose expropriations in general.
37Nevertheless, even autocrats not interested in committing themselves might use a sham constitution.
Thus, precedent in following the constitution is a key element to make the commitment credible.
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on future governments. For instance, do the procedural rules of requiring democrati-
cally elected assemblies or public referendums lead to more constrained governments?
How do the circumstances of constitution-making aﬀect the working of these procedural
rules? The transmission channel proposed here is that these procedures place additional
constraints on the drafters, but are themselves also aﬀected by uncertainty. The analy-
sis highlights that eﬀective constraints on the drafters increase with intra-elite conﬂicts
and a required referendum, but decrease with uncertainty. These variables also interact
with each other, where uncertainty mitigates the impact of referendums and intra-elite
conﬂicts. In other words, in situations fraught with uncertainty, which is often the case
for constitution-making, drafters are least constrained by procedural rules.
The next section provides a short overview of the literature discussing the constraints
faced by the drafters. Following this step, a constitutional choice model is presented
based on insights gleaned from the literature review and then applied to the decision
problem of constitutional drafters. To support the assumptions made in the model
section, the subsequent section presents some regression analyses to test the relation-
ship between uncertainty and yes-votes in referendums. Finally, a short discussion and
concluding remarks are given.
4.2 Constraints on Constitution Drafters
An extensive theoretical discussion, which focused on moments of constitution-making
and the process itself, began two decades ago with the seminal contributions of Acker-
man (1991) and Elster (1993, 1995, 2000a).38 Ackerman draws a distinction between
times of normal politics and constitutional moments. While times of normal politics are
characterized by the short-term interests of politicians left unchecked by citizens who
pay little attention to the political process, constitutional moments feature politicians
mainly concerned with the greater good and citizens attentively following the political
38Beard (1913) was the ﬁrst to look at the economic motives of constitutional drafters, but did not
focus on the process itself.
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developments. Elster argues for a similar point and distinguishes two modes of consti-
tution making, namely arguing and bargaining. Bargaining is driven by self-interest,
while arguing allows for deliberative reasoning without the constraints of self-interest.
In a sense, both authors see deliberation as the ﬁtting mode for constitution-making as
compared to bargaining. However, it appears doubtful that self-interest miraculously
evaporates in constitution-making. As argued above, it is often the case that drafters
know that they are part of the political elite and have good chances to obtain a political
oﬃce once the constitution is ratiﬁed. This expectation will lead them to take their
future interest in account. Furthermore, if drafters are not constrained by their own
interests, it can be questioned why they would spend a lot of eﬀort on drafting a good
constitution (cf. Voigt, 2004). This dissertation will rather employ a rational-choice
perspective of self-interested drafters, who act under constraints.
The strand of literature generated by Ackerman and Elster’s contributions discusses
two diﬀerent kinds of constraints, namely upstream and downstream constraints (El-
ster, 1995, p. 373). Upstream constrains are those related to the creation of the
constitution-making body, as for example a president calling a constitutional assembly
and through the selection of the assembly’s delegates constrains their actions. Down-
stream constraints are related to the ratiﬁcation of the constitution. A referendum,
which constrains the set of constitutional drafts that would be ratiﬁed, is an exam-
ple for a downstream constraint. The categories provided by these two constraints do
not, however, oﬀer a complete description of relevant constraints that apply to the
constitution-making process. Consider how the voting rules within the constitutional
assembly, or time constraints brought to bear in times of crisis, might also constrain
constitution-making. Therefore, a diﬀerent taxonomy of constraints will be used for
the purposes of this dissertation. One can distinguish constraints due to procedural
rules of constitution-making (including what Elster deﬁned as upstream constraints),
constraints due to popular participation, and time constraints. The literature on these
three sets of constraints is extensively reviewed in chapter 2. Before we focus on these
constraints and their eﬀect on the conﬂict between drafters and citizens, it is useful to
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shortly discuss the bargaining situation among politicians in the drafting body. The
reason for this digression is that the conﬂict among drafters can also aﬀect the way
in which the constitutional assembly interacts with the citizens. Therefore, the next
section will highlight the key determinants of bargaining power within the constitution
assembly based on economic theory and the constraints faced by the drafters.
4.3 Bargaining and Constitution-Making
Whereas the formal model of this chapter focuses on the conﬂict between drafters and
citizens, the conﬂict among drafters with regards to the distribution of rents is the focus
of this short digression. As soon as multiple factions are involved in reaching a decision,
one can look at the process itself as a bargaining situation. The conceptualization of
the constitution-making process as a bargaining game is well established within the
literature (Heckathorn and Maser, 1987; Elster, 1995, 2000a; Voigt, 1999). However,
so far no attempt has been made to include procedural constraints as a variable which
might inﬂuence the bargaining process. Game theory, and especially bargaining theory,
is appealing to model this scenario, since "[...] context can be incorporated within
formal models as part of the constraints that the actors are subject to." (Voigt, 2004, p.
33). This section uses bargaining theory and the literature on the constitution-making
process to provide a theoretical overview in which constraints are relevant for a model
of constitutional bargaining. Throughout this section, a two-player bargaining scenario
is used for simpliﬁcation.39 It is assumed that both players enjoy veto power for the
division of the rents. Given the typical voting rules in assemblies, a qualiﬁed majority
requirement makes it likely that (at least) two groups with veto power emerge.
It is useful to delineate the most important features in bargaining models and high-
light the link to the constitution-making process. Bargaining situations are generally
characterized by two players who both beneﬁt from reaching an agreement, but face
conﬂict over which outcome will be chosen from the set of possible beneﬁcial outcomes.
39An n-player setting can converge into a two-player setting if coalitions are allowed to form.
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Bargaining theory aims to explain the rational outcome in this kind of situation. For
simultaneous bargaining, Nash (1950, 1953) has proposed his famous bargaining solu-
tion, which can be, with some simpliﬁcation, summarized to the rule "share the proﬁts
proportionally to the bargaining power of the players".
Rubinstein (1982) popularized sequential move games in bargaining theory. In his
model, the ﬁrst player (the proposer) oﬀers the second player (the responder) a surplus
division, which the responder can accept or reject. If he rejects, the roles switch and
the second player acts in the next round as the proposer. It has been argued that
procedural rules can be modelled using sequential games (Shepsle, 1989), which makes
this bargaining protocol better suited to model negotiations in a political assembly.
However, if one faction has a clear majority, it is unlikely that both sides will take turns
in proposing. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) have used a random-proposer model to discuss
bargaining in ordinary legislatures. The diﬀerence between the Rubinstein model and the
random-proposer model is that in each round, the proposer is drawn randomly instead
of sequentially changing roles. Using the seats obtained in the constitutional assembly
as the probabilities for the draw, one can easily model the choice of the proposer in the
constitutional assembly in a more realistic way.
Whether or not the bargaining game features repeated opportunities for bargaining is
an important determinant of outcomes. If games are played more regularly, factors like
reputation start to play a role. However, constitutional bargaining can be considered a
one-shot game. Constitutions are generally made to achieve longevity and the average
life expectancy of a constitution is 19 years (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, 2009, p.
2). Taking this evidence into account, it seems unlikely that the same drafters will
face each other again, justifying the notion that constitutional bargaining is a one-shot
game. Once the bargaining game’s rules are spelled out, we can focus on the potential
determinants of the bargaining outcome.
Discount factors are an important feature to determine the outcome. If one player
discounts future beneﬁts less heavily than the other player, he is able to use this patience
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to increase his bargaining power. For constitutional assemblies, the discount factors of
all actors are inﬂuenced by the general political situation in the country. In times of
crisis, players are more uncertain about the future and thus will discount possible future
beneﬁts more heavily. This eﬀect is driven by the risk that a successful constitutional
bargaining can become obsolete if the crisis turns into violence. However, it is possible
that the players are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by these developments and thus have
diverging discount factors. In this case, discount rates can have a substantial eﬀect on
the bargaining outcome.
The players’ outside options are another important determinant in bargaining the-
ory. A player who has better options if negotiations break down can increase his bar-
gaining power by using this option as leverage during the negotiations. However, for
constitution-making, outside options lose importance. It is diﬃcult to imagine a situa-
tion where the drafters decide not to write a constitution and employ a diﬀerent solution
for all the tasks the constitution is made for. This view relates to Hardin (1989) and
Ordeshook (1992) and their conceptualization of constitution-making as a coordination
game. Having any constitution is superior to a state of no constitution and thus the
drafters have no incentives to revert to an outside option.
One might argue that the status quo, e.g. the old or interim constitution that is in place
during the negotiations, could be seen as an outside option. However, this argument
fails to recognize that this rather resembles an inside option. In bargaining theory, inside
options describe the utility derived during the negotiations while the players are still
in disagreement. This description ﬁts well with the status quo during the constitution-
making process and highlights the importance it has on the outcome. If one player has
a better inside option, his costs to disagree and continue the negotiations are lower. He
can use this advantage as increased bargaining power and thereby obtain a larger share.
Another impact factor to the bargaining outcome is an external risk of breakdown in
negotiations. When a party has to decide whether or not to accept an oﬀer, the party
is more likely to accept if the risk of breakdown seems imminent. Thereby, a high risk
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of breakdown favors the ﬁrst proposer’s position. The risk of breakdown can stem from
two sources. One is within the negotiations, namely one player becoming angry and
leaving the table as an impulsive action. The other risk is through external causes, such
as third parties intervening in the process or the rules of the game changing. While the
ﬁrst case is relatively unlikely in constitution-making due to the large stakes that are
involved, the second case is possible. The Polish case, where the constitutional assembly
changed following a general election, is an example for this. Another risk could be citizen
protests or an uprising during the negotiations.
A mandatory referendum for ratiﬁcation is not a factor directly inﬂuencing either
side’s bargaining power. A referendum occurs after ratiﬁcation by the assembly and
no side can credibly commit to campaign against a constitutional draft which provides
mutual gains. As long as the new constitution provides an improvement compared to
the status quo, the referendum does not aﬀect the bargaining outcome.
To sum up, the relevant elements are the probability of being the proposer, the
drafters’ inside options, the discount factors and the risk of breakdown. The ﬁrst three
elements combined are measuring the respective group’s power. A group with better
inside options, more seats in the assembly and a lower discount factor has a much bet-
ter bargaining position. The risk of breakdown can increase this power, given that the
strong party is most likely the ﬁrst proposer.
4.4 Three Types of Constraints in Constitution-Making
4.4.1 Foundations
Having discussed the constraints faced by constitution-makers and the conﬂict within
the constitutional assembly from a bargaining theory perspective, we are now ready to
set up the formal model. There are three types of actors in this setting, two types of
politicians from diﬀerent groups in the constitution-making body and the voters. The
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politicians are the new constitution’s drafters and derive their utility from the political
beneﬁts available to the political class. In the light of the empirical literature on the
self-interest of drafters discussed above and following rational-choice theory, the model
assumes that politicians are motivated by their own self-interests. The citizens act only
if there is a procedural rule requiring a referendum. Citizens derive utility from having
a new constitution that forms the basis of a protective state and from a constrained
government that is unable to expropriate them. These constraints on the government do
not mean that redistribution should be prohibited, but rather that the use of government
funds for the private beneﬁt of government members is not allowed. Thus, a law allowing
eminent domain with full compensation could be in the interest of the citizens if they
favor an active government. These redistributional considerations, albeit interesting,
are not modeled. The main conﬂict of interest here is political rent creation, where both
political factions have a joint interest in rent maximization and citizens are generally
opposed to those rents. In cases where referendums (and thus citizen input) are not
required, the drafters might nevertheless be constrained by motives of self-binding or an
intra-elite conﬂict regarding the division of the rents.
An important assumption throughout this model is the binding force of constitutional
provisions. Drafters and voters alike are assumed to expect the constitution to bind
future governments, given that constraints are put in place. The issue of enforcing a
constitution has been extensively discussed in the literature emphasizing the crucial
problem related to the lack of external enforcement of a constitution. Thus, a constitu-
tion needs to be self-enforcing if it is to eﬀectively bind future rulers (see for example:
Hardin, 1989; Ordeshook, 1992; Voigt, 2004; Weingast, 2005; Mittal and Weingast, 2013).
Weingast (1995) provides a possible illustration of how a constitution might work in this
way. He argues that transgressions by the government are easier to identify and punish
when the citizens use the constitution as a focal point to create a joint understanding
of a government action that is a violation of the rules spelled out by the constitution.
In this way, it can be argued that a government that breaks the rules established by the
constitution increases the risk of an uprising by the citizens, which can be seen as one
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reason why the politicians ex ante assume that they are bound by the constitution.40
4.4.2 Modeling the Process of Constitution-Making
The model’s timing is as follows. First, the drafters decide on the constitution. The
decision on the constitutional rules determines the political rents for the drafters. In a
second step, the citizens have to ratify the constitution if the procedural rules require
this step.
The drafters draw utility from two types of political rent, one short-term and one
long-term. While the short-term rent can be seen as the extraction of government
funds, the long-term rent is derived from the beneﬁts of staying in oﬃce and increasing
compensation due to a higher growth rate.41 While these rents are framed in a temporal
fashion, the model does only feature one point in time when drafters can act, namely
the stage of constitution-making.
The constitution’s key function being analyzed in this model is its ability to constrain
the government from abusing power. The better the constitution works in this dimen-
sion, the more long-term rents for the government increase based on better protection
for property rights. When property rights are fully protected, however, limits are placed
on the ability of politicians to extract (short-term) rents. Diﬀerent constitutional rules
increase either short-term or long-term rents, but never both at the same time.
Using the language of game-theory, the short-term rents can be seen as a zero-sum
game. Each unit of rents the politicians gain is lost by the citizens. Long-term rents,
however, represent a positive-sum game. Both citizens and politicians proﬁt from eco-
nomic growth. The link from a constitution that constrains the future government
to economic growth works through the incentives to invest. If citizens know that the
government will be unable to steal their property in the future, investment becomes
40It is nevertheless possible that the costs of breaking the constitution are lower at some future moment
in time than adhering to the document. In this paper, it is assumed that this special case does not aﬀect
the decisions of the drafters.
41These beneﬁts include the regular salaries of the government members.
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more attractive. Since investment is a key driver of growth, more constraints on the
government are assumed to lead to higher growth in the long-run.
This model attempts to link the constraints on the drafters to the constraints in the
draft they produce. In the following subsections, the constraints on drafters discussed
in the literature review are introduced step by step.
Constitution-Making in an Autocracy
The baseline model is that typically found in autocracies. Speciﬁcally, we model a
constitution-making process without public participation and veto players in the assem-
bly. Here, we assume that the drafters know that they will be the government after the
constitution has entered into force and expect to remain in power as long as the con-
stitution is in force. This model is similar to the stationary bandit’s scenario discussed
by Olson (1993). In terms of timing, the drafters (knowing that they will end up in
government) decide on their preferred level of constraints in the constitution, given an
exogenous risk of constitutional breakdown. This model does not attempt to model the
long-term developments by having multiple stages, but includes them directly in the
choice of the drafters.
The politicians’ maximization problem is as follows:
max
c
Up(c) = rs(c) + ρ · rl(c) (4.1)
where rs(c) and rl(c) are the rents politicians can obtain from the chosen constitu-
tion (c). Formally, the constitution-making body chooses a constitution along a single
dimension which can take values from 0− 1.42 A situation where c = 0 is a constitution
which does not constrain the government at all. For the citizens, this case provides the
42It is important to note that the model presented here highly simpliﬁes the situation of constitutional
choice. Reducing the complex construct of a constitution to a single dimension is a daring venture. The
reason for this decision is to highlight the conﬂict between politicians’ ability to (ab-)use their power in
the short run and the positive long-term eﬀects of binding their hands.
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same level of protection for their property as if there was no constitution at all. This
situation oﬀers no incentives for long-term investment and no long-term political rents.
At the other extreme, c = 1, the constitution binds the government completely with
regard to the extraction of funds. Therefore, short-term political rents are zero in this
case. The draft of the constitution can take any value between 0 and 1. Thus, both
rents are functions of the constitutional choice.
ρ is used to incorporate the risk of a constitutional breakdown. The idea behind this
modelling choice is that the long-term beneﬁts of a given constitution depend on the
constitution staying in force. This parameter captures the uncertainty in the model and
is considered exogenous.43
It is further assumed that both functions have a concave shape, which is represented by
the negative second order derivative. The conditions faced by the drafters with respect
to the utility from long-term and short-term rents can be formally written as follows:
rs(1) = 0,
∂rs
∂c
< 0, ∂
2rs
∂c2
< 0 (4.2)
rl(0) = 0,
∂rl
∂c
> 0, ∂
2rl
∂c2
< 0 (4.3)
If the members of the constitutional assembly are unconstrained in their constitutional
choice, they simply set c to maximize their utility. To solve this maximization problem,
the ﬁrst order condition needs to be derived.
∂U(c)
∂c
= ∂rs(c)
∂c
+ ρ · ∂rl(c)
∂c
(4.4)
Setting this equal to zero and using some algebraic manipulations gives the following
equation
43Since constitution-making is often triggered by a crisis or conﬂict, uncertainty can be assumed to
be derived from the general situation and not from the constitution-making process itself, thus making
uncertainty an exogenous variable. See Widner (2008) for a more detailed discussion of post-conﬂict
constitution-making.
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ρ = −
∂rs(c)
∂c
∂rl(c)
∂c
(4.5)
In a baseline situation without uncertainty, ρ = 1, and with only one dominating
faction,44 the marginal changes of long-term and short-term rents must be equal for
this condition to hold. Thus, based on the countries’ characteristics, the drafters must
balance the beneﬁts of committing to property rights in the long-run with the loss of
discretionary power in the short-run. An autocrat with a ﬁrm grip on power would be
an example for such a setting without uncertainty.
It is also possible that the marginal change in long-term beneﬁts is always larger
when compared to the change of short-term beneﬁts if the of both kinds of rents is
suﬃciently large. In a situation like this, the drafters will, out of pure self-interest,
choose a constitution that completely binds them. However, in all but the extreme
cases, drafters choose a constitution that is located somewhere between full constraints
and no constraints at all to satisfy the optimization condition spelled out in (4.5).
When an autocrat faces uncertainty about his future position, the results of the anal-
ysis change. Formally, for a value of ρ lower than 1, long-term beneﬁts are traded-oﬀ
against short-term rents. When compared to a situation without the shock, an external
shock leading to more uncertainty (i.e. a decrease in ρ) prior to the drafting will cause a
decrease in c.45 This relation represents the conjecture that constitution-making during
a crisis leads to constitutions which are less eﬀective at binding the government. Since
citizens prefer a constitution that binds the government, it is useful to consider proce-
dural rules that lead the drafters to choose more binding constitutions especially during
times of crisis. One example for such a procedural rule is a democratically elected con-
stitutional assembly combined with a qualiﬁed majority requirement. This combination
is very likely to produce a process that has multiple factions with veto power.
44The same result holds for two factions of equal bargaining power
45As long as the long-term beneﬁts are large enough, a change in p may not aﬀect the choice of c = 1.
However, the focus here is on the more interesting case where the choice of constitution is conditional
on the risk factor.
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Constitution-Making by a Democratically Elected Assembly
A key change in the analysis occurs when one considers an assembly with multiple veto
players. For simplicity, we discuss the case with exactly two veto players. A speciﬁcally
and democratically elected assembly would be an example of this, given that no party has
enough votes to dominate the assembly. Both groups of politicians have a shared interest,
namely maximizing the amount of political rents available for distribution. However,
the minority group is, generally speaking, less interested in short-term rents, since they
are aware that they are less likely to end up in government and enjoy these short-term
beneﬁts. Their interest in short-term rents will decrease in accordance with the weakness
of their bargaining power.46 It is assumed that all factions that are strong enough to
be veto players for the constitution-making process act behind a veil of uncertainty as
to which faction will end up in government in the long-run. Furthermore, the growth-
enhancing eﬀects of a strong constitution creates a positive-sum game for both groups
in the long-run. For the short-run, both factions expect that their share of seats in the
assembly is a good approximation of their probability of ending up in government in the
short-run. The maximization problem of a politician from the majority group is:
max
c
Up(c) = α · rs(c) + ρ · rl(c) (4.6)
where α is the minority faction’s relative strength (i.e. the seat share of the minority
faction divided by the majority faction’s seat share) and takes values between 0 − 1. A
higher α means that the minority faction is relatively stronger, i.e. that the factions
have more equal bargaining power. Recalling the assumption that the smaller party
is strong enough to have veto power, one can see that a lower seat share will make
them less interested in short-term rents. As a simplifying assumption, the bargaining
outcome between the two groups is assumed to be relative to their strength and directly
incorporated in the maximization problem of the majority group.
46A more detailed analysis of bargaining within the constitutional assembly would go beyond the aim
of the model presented here. A general discussion of this bargaining is provided in section 4.3.
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Setting the ﬁrst order condition equal zero, and using some algebraic manipulations
gives the following equation:
ρ
α
= −
∂rs(c)
∂c
∂rl(c)
∂c
(4.7)
While the results with regard to the degree of uncertainty remain the same, the
multiple veto players have an eﬀect on the valuation of short-term beneﬁts. Short-term
beneﬁts are valued less since the minority faction (by deﬁnition) expects to obtain them
in less than 50% of the cases. As the inequality of the two factions increases, less
weight is put on short-term rents. This assumption can be explained by the minority
party recognizing their weakness in the given situation encouraging them to take a more
long-term oriented view. The left-hand side shows the relationship between uncertainty
and bargaining power. Uncertainty leads to a stronger emphasis on short-term rents
in situations with relatively equal assemblies, while unbalanced assemblies which yet
still have at least two groups with veto power are better able to focus on the long-
term perspective even in times of uncertainty. As soon as a single party dominates the
assembly and there are no other veto players, the analysis becomes the same as in an
autocracy.
As discussed in the literature review, many democracies further constrain their drafters
through a referendum for ratiﬁcation. Whether the referendum is able to fulﬁll this task
is discussed in the next section.
Constitution-Making with a Required Referendum
Another potential way of placing further constraints on drafters and achieve constitu-
tions that actually bind the government are mandatory referendums for ratiﬁcation of
the constitution. Recall the ﬁnding that 44% of all constitutions required a referendum
for ratiﬁcation (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, 2009). It is necessary to introduce the
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maximization problem for the citizens in the referendum stage.47 We begin by modeling
the citizens’ utility function as follows:
Uv(c) = − p
n
· rs(c) + ρ · bl(c) (4.8)
Again, the only variable of interest is the degree of government constraints in the
constitution. This setup is used to focus on the conﬂict between citizens and drafters and
show how popular participation can aﬀect the choice of drafters in constitution-making.
The citizens proﬁt, similar to the drafters, from the prospects of long-term growth
discounted by the risk of constitutional failure, ρ · bl(c). We assume that the beneﬁts
for long-term growth for citizens increase in c like the long-term rents for politicians
and that both groups expect the same risk of constitutional failure. However, even
a constitution without any government constraints does provide some beneﬁt to the
citizens. Therefore, bl(o) ≥ 0, where bl(o) describes the beneﬁt of having a constitution
that provides the basic functions of society compared to the current status quo.
However, since the citizens will be the potential victims of future expropriations, they
receive negative utility from a constitution that allows the government to abuse their
power. The term pn gives the proportion of politicians to citizens. While this ratio aﬀects
the levels of the rents, it leaves the results otherwise unchanged. The expropriations
are modeled as a zero-sum game between politicians and citizens for analytic simplicity,
whereas the long-term beneﬁts are modeled as a positive-sum game. The intuition
behind the positive-sum game is that both sides can proﬁt from enhanced long-term
growth.
The timing of the constitution-making in this setting is as follows: The drafters ﬁrst
decide about the level of c, just as in the two settings discussed above. Afterwards, the
citizens are asked in a referendum whether or not they want to ratify this constitution.
In case they agree, the constitution enters into force. In case they reject the draft, the
47Citizens are assumed to fully know the constraints to the government that the draft is providing.
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whole process has to start again and the citizens will have to be consulted again. Thus, a
rejection leads to a second period of constitution-making, which can be considered time-
consuming. In case of a failed referendum, we assume that the constitutional assembly
will change its composition and current drafters expect to no longer be drafters in this
new process.
The citizens will vote yes if the utility from accepting the draft now is larger or equal
compared to the expected utility from waiting for another draft. It is assumed that the
referendum requires a simple majority to succeed, thus the median voter decides. Given
this setting, heterogeneity within the population does not matter for the referendum as
long as one group has a majority. The citizens will vote yes if the following condition
holds:
Uv(c) ≥ δv · Uv(c¯) (4.9)
Here, Uv(c) represents the citizens’ utility from the proposed level of constraints in
the draft. This function increases in c, since citizens prefer a constitution that binds
the politicians. c¯ stands for the expectations of the citizens with regard to the average
proposal of a constitutional assembly, whereas δc is the discount factor of the citizens
that occurs if they reject the draft and the process of constitution-making has to start
anew. This discount factor catches the duration of redrafting the constitution in case of
a failed referendum.
As in the case for politicians, higher uncertainty reduces the discount factor. The
reason behind this assumption is that in times of crisis, citizens will be less willing
to wait for a new constitution compared to regular times. One could argue that the
discount factor implicitly incorporates the costs of maintaining the status quo. The two
discount factors are allowed to diﬀer, but it is assumed that they move in the same
direction when uncertainty changes.
The introduction of this constraint changes the maximization problem of the drafters.
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max
c
U = α · rs(c) + ρ · bl(c) s.t. Uv(c)
Uv(c¯)
≥ δv (4.10)
It is assumed that a negative vote leads to a zero pay-oﬀ for the drafters, which can
be thought of as a change in the constitutional assembly’s composition after a failed
constitutional referendum. Thus, the drafters dare not risk a failed referendum and are
constrained by the citizens’ vote.48
The referendum constraint is only meaningful if the citizens’ voting decision is aﬀected
by the choice of c. One can derive the threshold point at which even a draft with no
constraints on the government (i.e. c = 0) will be accepted. The utility for citizens in
this case, Uv(0) , can be spelled out as − pn · rs(0) + ρ · bl(o). In this situation, citizens
can only obtain beneﬁts from the basic functions of government (bl(o)) and face the
maximum risk of the government using expropriation. If
Uv(0)
Uv(c¯)
≥ δv (4.11)
holds, citizens will prefer to ratify the constitution even if it provides no constraints on
the drafters.
On the one hand, this case becomes more likely when uncertainty about the future is
high (i.e. a low δv), the value of having a constitution (bl(o)) goes up, or citizens expect
that the proposal in the next period will feature weak constraints (low c¯).49 The ﬁrst
two of these conditions can be typically found in times of crisis and especially during
domestic conﬂict. When facing an ongoing conﬂict, the focus is on immediate concerns
and uncertainty about the beneﬁt of future developments is high. Looking at the value
of having a constitution, it can be argued that constitutions are devices to mitigate or
48In this chapter, it is assumed that politicians can perfectly predict the outcome of a referendum
conditional on their chosen level of c. Cases like the failed referendum on the EU constitution highlight
that this assumption does not necessarily hold in practice. Releasing this assumption is an opportunity
for future research, but not dealt with in this chapter.
49ρ does not play a role for the one period diﬀerence between ratifying now and ratifying next term,
assuming that constitutional breakdown does not occur immediately.
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end conﬂicts and as such they entail a larger beneﬁt in times of crisis.50
On the other hand, the condition never holds if there is no uncertainty (δv = 1) or if
constraining the government is the only thing that matters for the citizens (i.e. bl(o) =
0). Thus, a referendum works particularly well if citizens care about the constraints on
the government and if uncertainty is low. Ironically, these are the same settings where
drafters experience low levels uncertainty, are generally attracted to long-term beneﬁts
and more amenable to drafting a binding constitution.
To sum up, referendums provide the strongest eﬀect in situations where citizens face a
relatively stable setting and put a lot of emphasis on government constraints. Arguably,
constitution-making often happens in more turbulent times and it appears likely that
the constraint of a referendum loses power when constitution-making occurs after crisis
or during transitions. The model presented in this section hinges critically on the eﬀect
of a crisis on property rights and the voting behavior of citizens. To test these links, the
next section will present some regression models based on cross-country evidence.
4.5 Testing the Claims About Referendums
4.5.1 Towards an Empirical Test
The model in the previous section has shown that in times of conﬂict, citizens are
theoretically less likely to reject a draft constitution. This argument highlights that
referendums might be less eﬀective in times when they are most needed. The aim of
this section is to attempt an empirical test of the predictions of the model about the
conditions under which referendums will constrain drafters. For this venture, we need a
measure of conﬂict at the times of the referendum and a measure of the voting behavior
of citizens. The simple idea behind the test is to check whether the yes-votes in the
referendum are correlated with the level of conﬂict at the time of the referendum. A
50For a detailed discussion of the conditions for constitutions to act as conﬂict-resolution tools, see
Grossman (2004).
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positive relationship between yes-votes and the level of conﬂict would support the results
of the theoretical model above.
4.5.2 Data Overview
The data on constitutional referendums includes the results of all constitutional referen-
dums from 1945 until 2012 (Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d), 2015). The
dataset contains not only whether or not the referendum was successful, but also the ex-
act date, the vote shares, whether the referendum was mandatory or not, and the topical
areas of the referendums. This detailed coverage allows us to focus on new constitutions
and exclude amendments. It would have been preferable to have individual-level data,
but given the time span from 1945 to 2012, only aggregated data is available.
To measure domestic conﬂict, the aggregated domestic conﬂict variable from the Cross-
National Times Series (CNTS) dataset is employed (Databanks International, 2011). It
aggregates information on assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government
crises, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations into a weighted
indicator. This indicator is created from reports published in The New York Times. As
such, this indicator is not purely objective because it is dependent on what is reported.
It is possible that articles published in The New York Times may have a bias against
certain regions. However, the depth and breadth of the coverage in The New York
Times alleviates potential issues that may arise from gathering data based on newspaper
reports. This variable is used as a proxy for the level of uncertainty caused by domestic
violence among the citizens.
To control for the political system, the democracy dummy variable from Cheibub et al.
(2010) is used. Education is measured by average years of schooling in a country and
is taken from Barro and Lee (2013). The GDP per capita data is taken from the Penn
World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2015). The analysis incorporates the ethno-linguistic
fractionalization data from Roeder (2001))51 As an additional control, the transition
51This indicator oﬀers a broader coverage compared to the more popular one constructed by East-
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data from Cheibub et al. (2010) is used to see whether or not a transition prior to the
new constitution has an eﬀect on the outcome. The transition dummy takes a value of
1 if a transition has taken place in the same year or the 3 years prior to the referendum.
Furthermore, to control for changes over time, a time trend is used. This variable is
normalized to 0 for the year 1944.
According to the theoretical model, the results of the referendum should depend on
the constraints oﬀered by the constitution. Data on executive constraints is taken from
the xconst variable of the Polity IV dataset created by Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
However, one could argue that this variable measures the de facto constraints on the
government and not the constraints in the constitution on which citizens cast a vote.
To take care of this issue, an indicator of government constraints in the constitutional
text is required. As a proxy for these constraints, a de jure property rights index from
Voigt and Gutmann (2013) can be used. However, the indiciator of Voigt and Gutmann
has much fewer observations than the Polity IV variable. To mitigate this problem,
another property rights indicator has been constructed for this chapter from the dataset
of Goderis and Versteeg (2014). Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the data
used in the subsequent analysis. It is interesting to see that most referendums do succeed
with a high average share of yes-votes. This result is not surprising, since drafters are
expected to take the referendum into account when preparing the draft. Nevertheless,
there is some variation which allows for an econometric analysis. In terms of domestic
conﬂict, there is a lot of variation to draw from.
4.5.3 Estimation Approach
Following the reasoning of the theoretical model presented above, the empirical model
aims to test whether domestic conﬂict has a positive eﬀect on the percentage of yes-votes
in constitutional referendums. In brief, the argument here is that domestic conﬂict fuels
uncertainty and the need for a new constitution, thereby making voters agree to a larger
erly and Levine. The use of the indicator by Easterly and Levine would not change the results, but
signiﬁcantly reduce the number of observations.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Yes-votes [%] 83.036 18.343 4.78 99.990 136
Mandatory 0.243 0.43 0 1 136
Domestic conﬂict indicator 914.245 1974.239 0 51625 8950
Democracy 0.437 0.496 0 1 9032
Fractionalization 0.443 0.279 0 0.984 9076
ln GDP per capita 8.353 1.182 5.219 11.806 8125
Education 5.436 1.512 3.669 8.152 13444
Democracy 0.437 0.496 0 1 9032
Transition 0.092 0.289 0 1 8197
Executive constraints 4.116 2.351 1 7 8544
De jure property rights (Voigt/Gutmann) 0.437 0.17 0.048 0.976 5798
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) 0.452 0.194 0 1 8513
set of constitutional drafts.
Hypothesis 1: Domestic conﬂict has a positive eﬀect on approval in constitutional
referendums.
To control for diﬀerences in the content of the draft, executive constraints are included.
One would expect that voters are more likely to say yes to a draft that oﬀers more
constraints.
To this date, only a few articles have looked at the determinants of the outcomes
of constitutional referendums. One contribution, analyzing the Kenyan constitutional
referendum of 2005, argues that ethnic fractionalization is one of the key determinants
(Kimenyi and Shughart II, 2010). Based on their ﬁndings, one would expect the share
of yes-votes to decline with increased fractionalization.
It can also be argued that more democratic countries are less likely to hold sham
elections and/or rig the results. Thus, a higher degree of democracy should also lead
to fewer yes-votes compared to a less democratic system. Another reasons for this
hypothesis is the argument that following a transition from an autocracy, citizens will
be more willing to accept a new constitution as long as it breaks with the authoritarian
past. Furthermore, it can be argued that education and per capita income can be used
as proxies of the development of the given country. The level of development can be
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seen as a standard control variable in this regression.
To test the hypothesis, we use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation with
robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the percentage of yes-votes in the
constitutional referendum, whereas domestic conﬂict, fractionalization and the other
control variables serves as independent variables. The baseline model includes only the
referendum results, the domestic conﬂict index, ethnic fractionalization and democracy
as well as a linear time trend. To take care of the eﬀect of mandatory referendums
and potential transition eﬀects, dummies for a mandatory referendum and for a recent
transition are added in the second speciﬁcation. Finally, the content of the draft is
incorporated through a measure of executive constraints in the ﬁnal three speciﬁcations.
The diﬀerence between these speciﬁcations are diﬀerent proxies for executive constraints
in the constitution.
We are aware that the OLS approach suﬀers from several problems. First, since the
yes-percentage is bound between 0 and 100, an OLS estimation might be problematic. As
a robustness check, a fractional logit model is estimated using the same speciﬁcations
as the OLS.52 Second, the result might be driven by outliers. A robust regression
estimation automatically gives lower weighs to outliers and thereby mitigates this issue.
Huber (1973) on the theoretical underpinnings and Li (1985) on the details of the method
are the seminal articles for this method. As another robustness check, this estimation
technique is employed by using the stata command rreg. Third, it is possible that the
result of the referendum would also aﬀect the level of domestic conﬂict in a given year,
i.e. a problem of reversed causality. To mitigate this problem, the lagged domestic
conﬂict variable is used as a robustness check.
In a perfect world, one could randomly assign constitutional referendums to countries
with and without crisis which would otherwise be identical. This randomization would
allow for a test of the causal relationship between crises and referendum results. How-
ever, especially when dealing with constitutions as dependent variables, the data often
52Only one of the three speciﬁcations for executive constraints is used for the robustness checks. The
results would not have been diﬀerent if another of the three measures had been used.
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does not allow for stringent causal analysis. The reason for this claim is the stylized
fact that constitutions have an average lifetime of 19 years. Thus, on average there will
be nearly two decades of missing data between two observations. Another problem with
the data used for the analysis here is that one would like to focus on mandatory referen-
dums. However, due to the low number of mandatory referendums, all referendums used
to ratify new constitutions are included in the analysis. Whether or not a referendum
was mandatory is added as a control variable and the results for a regression with only
mandatory referendums are reported for reasons of transparency.
4.5.4 Results
We are interested in whether conﬂicts aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome of a referendum, i.e. the
percentage of yes-votes.53 The results indicate that the degree of domestic crisis has
a positive eﬀect on the yes-votes, but this eﬀect is not robust to diﬀerent estimation
techniques and models.
The coeﬃcient of the conﬂict variable is positive across estimations, thus following
the expected path. However, statistical signiﬁcance can only be found in one of the
OLS speciﬁcations. The statistical signiﬁcance of domestic conﬂict vanishes particularly
when government constraints in the draft are taken explicitly into account. This eﬀect
could be a ﬁrst indication that failed referendums play a key role for the signiﬁcant
result in the ﬁrst speciﬁcations, since they need to be excluded when property rights
indicators are taken into account.54
Fractionalization is insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁcations, thereby putting some doubt
on the general applicability of the results of Kimenyi and Shughart II (2010). Income
per capita and education (indicators of the development of a country) are signiﬁcantly
negative across most speciﬁcations. While this result could be a sign that people in
53While it would be interesting to use a success dummy variable as the dependent variable, the
extremely low number of failed referendums weakens the explanatory power of such an approach due to
low variation.
54A failed referendum would not change government constraints in the future.
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more developed countries are less likely to vote yes, it might simply be an artifact of
rigged elections in less developed countries. The issue of rigged election results is a
serious concern for this analysis and might explain why the coeﬃcient on democracy is
statistically insigniﬁcant across speciﬁcations, but a pure focus on countries that have
been coded as democratic by Cheibub would leave the analysis with 18 observations
making any meaningful regression impossible. The time trend coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
and positive across all speciﬁcations. Surprisingly, whether there was a transition prior
to the referendum and whether a constitutional referendum was mandatory does not
have any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Finally, the most surprising result is the negative and signiﬁcant sign of government
constraints. One would assume that citizens prefer their government to be constrained,
thus the result is striking. One reason could lie in the nature of the proxy, namely that it
measures de facto constraints. The additional control of de jure property rights hints at
this explanation, since the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant for both property rights measures.
With regards to our main variable of interest, namely domestic violence, the results
have highlighted that outliers might be a main driver for the signiﬁcant results in the
OLS speciﬁcations. This ﬁnding and the small number of failed referendums make a
closer look at these failed referendums in light of the theory proposed in the main part
of this paper a viable option.
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Table 4.2: Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%]
Domestic conﬂict indicator 0.000869 0.00105∗ 0.000985 0.000553 0.0000191
(1.61) (1.94) (1.35) (1.11) (0.03)
Fractionalization -0.952 1.374 -2.945 -1.955 2.433
(-0.17) (0.22) (-0.53) (-0.34) (0.31)
ln GDP per capita -5.616∗∗ -5.829∗ -4.523∗ -3.713 -3.830
(-2.03) (-1.86) (-1.84) (-1.34) (-1.28)
Education -17.94∗∗∗ -16.22∗∗ -14.83∗∗ -18.20∗∗∗ -37.33
(-2.78) (-2.37) (-2.21) (-2.74) (-1.36)
Democracy -7.087 -8.475 0.896 -2.981 -1.269
(-1.33) (-1.46) (0.18) (-0.56) (-0.22)
Time Dummy 1.532∗∗ 1.320∗∗ 1.345∗∗ 1.586∗∗ 3.771
(2.54) (2.13) (2.14) (2.59) (1.25)
Mandatory 3.022 -0.838 -1.210 -3.479
(0.72) (-0.22) (-0.28) (-0.77)
Transition -0.0320 1.108 -2.336 -1.557
(-0.01) (0.27) (-0.58) (-0.29)
Executive constraints in t+1 -2.762∗∗∗
(-3.31)
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) in t+1 -12.86
(-1.15)
De jure property rights (Voigt/Gutmann) in t+1 -8.799
(-0.62)
Constant 169.2∗∗∗ 167.4∗∗∗ 160.4∗∗∗ 162.9∗∗∗ 178.8∗∗∗
(6.38) (5.34) (6.60) (6.08) (4.12)
Observations 88 79 72 74 49
R2 0.289 0.304 0.375 0.318 0.262
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (Frac. Logit)
(1) (2) (3)
yes yes yes
Domestic conﬂict indicator 0.0000566 0.0000780 0.0000388
(1.15) (1.43) (0.85)
Fractionalization -0.0555 0.141 -0.0532
(-0.12) (0.30) (-0.11)
ln GDP per capita -0.372∗∗ -0.385∗ -0.248
(-2.04) (-1.92) (-1.36)
Education -1.273∗∗∗ -1.145∗∗ -1.409∗∗∗
(-2.72) (-2.33) (-2.95)
Democracy -0.459 -0.516 -0.161
(-1.44) (-1.59) (-0.51)
Time Dummy 0.105∗∗ 0.0899∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(2.57) (2.21) (2.97)
Mandatory 0.219 -0.0317
(0.79) (-0.10)
Transition -0.121 -0.349
(-0.45) (-1.26)
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) in t+1 -1.411
(-1.62)
Constant 7.773∗∗∗ 7.612∗∗∗ 8.103∗∗∗
(4.18) (3.50) (4.14)
Observations 88 79 74
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (Robust Regression)
(1) (2) (3)
Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%]
Domestic conﬂict indicator 0.000897 0.00110 0.000133
(1.40) (1.59) (0.27)
Fractionalization -1.369 -0.926 -0.691
(-0.23) (-0.14) (-0.14)
ln GDP per capita -6.918∗∗∗ -7.454∗∗∗ -0.590
(-3.93) (-3.87) (-0.39)
Education -19.02∗∗∗ -18.97∗∗ -16.16∗∗∗
(-2.77) (-2.38) (-2.91)
Democracy -5.978 -6.505 -7.841∗∗
(-1.43) (-1.29) (-2.07)
Time Dummy 1.587∗∗ 1.560∗∗ 1.504∗∗∗
(2.44) (2.02) (2.81)
Mandatory 2.051 -7.272∗∗
(0.44) (-2.13)
Transition 0.00279 0.291
(0.00) (0.09)
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) in t+1 -2.591
(-0.30)
Constant 184.4∗∗∗ 187.4∗∗∗ 130.9∗∗∗
(9.19) (8.32) (8.28)
Observations 88 79 74
R2 0.340 0.348 0.391
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.5.5 Failed Referendums: Case Studies
Only four of the referendums covered by the data of our analysis failed. The four cases
are Uruguay in 1980, Albania in 1994, Zimbabwe in 2000 and Kenya in 2005. It is useful
to analyze the background against which the referendums took place to check whether
some common factors leading to the failure of the referendums can be found.
After a military coup in 1973 and stabilizing their rule, the military leadership in
Uruguay aimed to institutionalize their executive powers through a new constitution
in 1980. Despite a heavy media campaign, linking a no-vote in the referendum to
communism, the citizens voted against the constitutional draft (Gonzalez, 1983). While
it remains uncertain why exactly citizens said no, it can be argued that they opposed
the strong powers of the military. Those powers would have been formalized by the new
constitution.
Albania is one of the typical cases where countries need a new constitution in the
aftermath of a regime change. After the breakdown of communism in Eastern and
Central Europe, Albania ﬁrst introduced an interim constitution in 1991. This document
was temporary in nature and the constitution-making process started directly. In 1994,
the Constitutional Commission presented a draft which did provide broad powers to
the president without establishing strong checks and balances (Center for the Study of
Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, 1995, p. 2). The president tried to circumvent
parliament for ratiﬁcation of the draft constitution since his ruling party did not have
the required two-thirds majority there. For this reason, a public referendum was used
as a method of ratiﬁcation. The opposition attacked the draft vigorously, arguing that
it was a president constitution (Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern
Europe, 1995, p. 3). The citizens mirrored those concerns in the referendum and the
draft was rejected by 59% of the voters.
The starting point for the constitutional debate in Zimbabwe was the foundation of
the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a collaboration of opposition groups and
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NGOs, in 1997. As a reaction to this movement, the government installed an own
Constitutional Commission (CC) in 1999. While the CC also had inclusive elements
and allowed citizens to be heard, its members were selected by the ruling government
of President Mugabe. To gain further legitimacy, the government decided that the
citizens would be allowed to vote on the new constitution in a referendum. One of
the key issues of the oﬃcial draft has been land reform. In a last-minute attempt to
gain support amongst the veterans from the independence war, the president added
provisions which would make land redistribution easier to accomplish (Dorman, 2003).
Ultimately, the referendum was considered a vote on the land issue as much as a general
vote on President Mugabe. Surprisingly, the draft was rejected with 54% of the voters
saying no. Thereafter, the government lost interest in drafting a new constitution and
decided to maintain the old constitution.
The movement towards a new constitution in Kenya started in 2002. A new govern-
ment under President Kibaki was elected, ending a forty-year long rule of the Kenya
African National Union. One of the ﬁrst promises made by the new president was draft-
ing a new constitution. Although one of the key issues for constitutional change was
the high degree of executive power in the old constitution, the draft did not succeed
in reducing this powers suﬃciently, at least from the perspective of the voters. (Ki-
menyi and Shughart II, 2010, p. 5) highlight that executive powers were the key issue
for voters who rejected the proposed constitution. Altogether, only 38% of the voters
opted in favor of the draft. This clear result led to the failure of the constitutional draft
and it took ﬁve more years until a new constitutional referendum, which was eventually
successful, took place.
What is common across all four cases is that the referendums took place in "normal"
times. None of the countries was in a deep crisis or internal conﬂict that made the old
constitutional solution unacceptable for its citizens. This claim can also be supported
drawing on the domestic conﬂict indicator. Prior to the referendums, all four cases
displayed a low degree of domestic conﬂict. Albania, Zimbabwe and Uruguay saw no
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domestic conﬂict prior to the referendum according to the Banks database.55 The
indicator for Kenya in the year of the referendum shows some conﬂict, but in the two
years leading to the referendum value was very low or zero. Low levels of uncertainty,
combined with drafts that grant signiﬁcant powers to the executive, appear to be the
most likely case for failed referendums from our theoretical perspective. The stylized
fact that all four failed referendums ﬁt this description reasonably well provides further
support for the formal model presented in this chapter.
4.5.6 Robustness I: Does a Referendum Aﬀect Domestic Conﬂict?
As discussed above, the very act of requiring a ratiﬁcation referendum might result in
increased domestic violence in the year the referendum is held. Thus, a lagged domestic
conﬂict variable can be used as a robustness check. The drawback of this check is
missing out on domestic conﬂict which intensiﬁes in the same year as the referendum.
The results of this test, which can be seen in table 4.5, are in line with the main section,
thus strengthening the argument that reverse causality is not the key problem.
4.5.7 Robustness II: Mandatory Referendums
Finally, we would prefer to focus on the eﬀect of mandatory referendums only. However,
as can be seen below in table 4.6, the low number of observations available weaken the
reliability of the results from the empirical analysis. For the purpose of transparency, it
is useful to report these results. Given the sample size of less than 20 for all models, a
meaningful analysis of these results is not possible. .
55Since the referendum in Zimbabwe was held early in 2000, the value for 1999 is base for this claim.
100
4.5. TESTING THE CLAIMS ABOUT REFERENDUMS
Table 4.5: Robustness: Eﬀect of Lagged Domestic Conﬂict on Referendum (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%]
Domestic conﬂict indicator in t-1 0.00131∗ 0.00131∗ 0.000691
(1.75) (1.83) (1.06)
Fractionalization 3.141 3.914 1.224
(0.52) (0.62) (0.21)
ln GDP per capita -5.777∗ -5.705∗ -3.344
(-1.98) (-1.87) (-1.24)
Democracy -11.44∗∗ -11.11∗ -5.651
(-2.21) (-1.92) (-1.04)
Time Dummy -0.206 -0.196 -0.108
(-1.65) (-1.24) (-0.71)
Mandatory 0.990 -3.821
(0.21) (-0.78)
Transition -0.847 -2.462
(-0.18) (-0.56)
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) in t+1 -12.73
(-1.02)
Constant 135.9∗∗∗ 134.1∗∗∗ 123.2∗∗∗
(5.93) (5.43) (6.20)
Observations 81 77 72
R2 0.269 0.254 0.237
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Eﬀect of Domestic Conﬂict on Mandatory Referendums (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%] Yes-votes [%]
Domestic conﬂict indicator 0.000200 -0.000173 -0.000174
(0.26) (-0.21) (-0.20)
Fractionalization -4.911 -9.056 -9.086
(-0.41) (-0.77) (-0.71)
ln GDP per capita -9.007∗∗ -7.264 -7.237
(-2.35) (-1.71) (-1.40)
Education -22.90∗∗ -26.33∗∗∗ -26.39∗∗
(-2.80) (-4.14) (-3.32)
Democracy 2.279 3.876 3.922
(0.31) (0.48) (0.45)
Time Dummy 1.949∗∗ 2.276∗∗∗ 2.280∗∗∗
(2.96) (4.50) (3.89)
Transition 2.851 2.779
(0.49) (0.42)
De jure property rights (Goderis/Versteeg) in t+1 -0.448
(-0.02)
Constant 208.1∗∗∗ 202.9∗∗∗ 203.2∗∗∗
(7.82) (5.61) (5.13)
Observations 18 17 17
R2 0.520 0.574 0.574
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.6 Conclusion
The results of this chapter, as they stand, are able to explain which constraints inﬂu-
ence the constitution-making process in diﬀerent settings. We have argued that eﬀective
constraints on the drafters depend on potential intra-elite conﬂicts, uncertainty’s inﬂu-
ence on expected future beneﬁts and whether or not the procedural rules require a
referendum. These variables also interact with each other, where strong uncertainty
mitigates the inﬂuence of referendums and intra-elite conﬂicts. Looking at the empirical
results, the eﬀect of uncertainty (as proxied by domestic conﬂict) on the referendum
result takes the expected positive sign and gives further indication that referendums are
least eﬀective in situations when constraining drafters is of utmost importance. While
the statistical signiﬁcance is not robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, a closer look at the
few cases of failed referendums is supportive of the claims made in the model.
One interesting result arises when combining the results from the formal model with
the arguments made about bargaining power within the constitutional assembly. When-
ever one faction is clearly stronger than the other one along the dimensions discussed
in section 4.3, the constraining eﬀect of the minority’s veto power in the assembly in-
creases. This counter-intuitive result is related to the expectations for the near future of
the two groups. The factors determining the bargaining power (e.g. the number of seats
in the constitutional assembly) are also good proxies for prospects in the ﬁrst election
under the new constitution and the minority group will be less interested in short-term
rents if they expect to be out of oﬃce. All in all, the internal constraints on the drafters
are reduced when the bargaining power of the factions in the constitutional assembly is
equal.
When rulers are uncertain about their long-term perspective, the model predicts that
they are more likely to opt for expropriationary powers. This ﬁnding illustrates that the
concept of roving and stationary bandits ﬁts quite well in an analysis of constitution-
making. Unfortunately, testing for this relationship through a large-n study suﬀers from
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data problems. While a de jure indicator of expropriationary powers in a constitution
has been constructed by Voigt and Gutmann (2013) and can be expanded with the data
gathered by Goderis and Versteeg (2014), the relative preferences of drafters for short-
term and long-term rents cannot be easily observed or proxied. To properly take these
preferences into account, a set of detailed case studies would be necessary. While those
are beyond the scope of this chapter, they oﬀer an interesting opportunity for future
research.
The key learning of this chapter has been that constitutional referendums constrain
in situations that are not typically found when one thinks about constitution-making.
This ﬁnding can be interpreted in two ways. First, constitutional referendums could be
an ineﬀective tool to constrain drafter per se. Second, the underlying cause for this lack
of constraining eﬀect could be that almost all constitutional referendums only require
a simple majority for ratiﬁcation. To shed some further light on this second possible
interpretation, the next chapter will have a closer look at the way public participation
in form of constitutional referendums is set up and discuss the optimal majority re-
quirements. While qualiﬁed majority rules are the most typical ratiﬁcation rule within
constitutional assemblies, they have to date hardly ever been used for constitutional
referendums. Especially in the light of the results of this chapter, an analysis of the
drawbacks and beneﬁts of a qualiﬁed majority rule for constitutional referendums seems
useful.
104
Chapter 5
Majority Rules in Constitutional
Referendums
5.1 Introduction56
Making a new constitution is often seen as an essential step for a new-founded country
or a regime change. While preferences and past experiences are important determinants
of the new constitution, the process of drafting and ratifying it plays a key role. For
this process, broad-based public involvement is considered beneﬁcial. This idea has been
discussed at length in the legal literature (see for example Samuels, 2006, p. 670; Banks,
2008, pp. 1048-1050; Carey, 2009, pp. 156-157) and can also be found in the concept
of constitutional moments, in which citizens are particularly attentive and which diﬀer
from times of normal law-making (Ackerman, 1991, pp. 6-7). The typical means of
public participation to ratify the document are referendums.
A number of studies argue that popular participation increases the legitimacy of a
constitution (Elster, 1993, p. 179; Samuels and Wyeth, 2006, p. 3). Besides increasing
legitimacy, participation also places constraints on the drafters (Ginsburg, Elkins, and
56This chapter is based on joint work with Ignacio N. Cofone, to whom I am very grateful for allowing
me to use this work as part of my dissertation.
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Blount, 2009, p. 206). Moreover, a participatory constitution-making process increases
the stability of a newly carved document. Empirical evidence suggests that inclusive
processes (such as referendums) have a positive impact on the lifespan of constitutions
(Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins, 2009, p. 139).
Stability is especially important for new constitutions drafted in turbulent times—
which is by no means a rare occurrence.57 When a country undergoes a political regime
change, a new constitution is one of the typical demands. A recent example of this can
be found in the process of constitution-making that followed the Arab Spring in Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya. One challenge for constitution-making, particularly in those post-
conﬂict settings, is the inclusion of all important societal groups, factions and ethnicities
into the process.
To achieve a broad public involvement in the process of writing a new constitution
or amending an existing one, two main methods of inclusive constitution-making can
be identiﬁed: making the drafting process itself more participatory and using a public
referendum to ratify the constitution.
Public referendums to ratify the constitution have grown more popular over the past
decades. This method was used to ratify 44% of all constitutions in force by 2005 (Gins-
burg, Elkins, and Blount, 2009) and the trend has become more pronounced in the last
years.58 This number is salient when compared to the negligible use of direct democracy
in other areas of politics. While most constitutional procedural rules vary substantially
across countries and depend on national characteristics, referendums for constitutional
ratiﬁcation are used across the world. This trend has led many to claim that public par-
ticipation is emerging as virtually the only international norm in constitution-making
(Hart, 2010, p. 42; Franck and Thiruvengadam, 2010, p. 14; Landau, 2013, p. 934).
Recent years have seen a wide range of papers focusing on the process of constitution-
57In the past 40 years, more than 200 constitutions have been drafted under the threat of civil conﬂict.
For a detailed discussion, see Widner (2008).
58Ten out of the eighteen constitutions that entered in force between 2005 and 2010 required a refer-
endum for ratiﬁcation.
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making (for example Banks, 2008; Tushnet, 2008; Barnett, 2009; Partlett, 2012; Landau,
2012, 2013). Given the growing popularity of referendums, the question of which major-
ity rule procedures a speciﬁc country decides to implement is relevant for policy-making.
However, scholarship has so far paid little attention to the speciﬁc decision-making rules
of referendums.59
This chapter focuses on the question which majority rules should be chosen for the
diﬀerent stages of the constitution-making process, with a particular focus on the ref-
erendum stage. Although it is common to ﬁnd qualiﬁed majority rules in place for the
constitution-making body itself,60 they are rarely used in referendums for ratiﬁcation
(Tierney, 2012, p. 274). This diﬀerential treatment of ratiﬁcation within the consti-
tutional assembly and ratiﬁcation in the referendum can be found across the world.61
A simple majority is in practice often considered suﬃcient for a constitutional draft to
pass the referendum
It is doubtful that the considerations that demand the use of qualiﬁed majorities for
ratiﬁcation within the constitutional assembly are never applicable to the referendum
stage of the ratiﬁcation process.62 We identify relevant reasons to use qualiﬁed majorities
for all stages of constitutional ratiﬁcation, including both the drafting at the constitu-
tional assembly and the subsequent referendums. Thus, if diverging majority rules are
59Throughout this chapter we abstract from the issue of quorums in the referendum. The reason
for this is that the problem we discuss is relevant with or without a quorum. As long as the relevant
groups have similar access to the voting booth, turnout requirements will not solve the legitimacy
issues discussed here. One should note, still, that under some circumstances one could approximate
supermajority rules in a referendum by requiring an absolute majority of voters, rather than just a
relative (qualiﬁed) majority. If there is a low turnout rate, an absolute majority would, in practice, work
as a qualiﬁed majority rule. If the turnout is extremely low, this rule could even be harder to obtain
than a true (relative) qualiﬁed majority
60Possible constitution-making bodies include the ordinary legislature, the executive, or a speciﬁcally
elected constitutional assembly. A report on constitution-making after the Arab Spring has shown that
the use of super-majorities in voting bodies (when they existed) has been the norm over the past few
decades (Democracy Reporting International, 2011, p. 4). 19 out of the 20 cases in their analysis used
a super-majority requirement.
61In this chapter, we take the use of the referendum itself and the reasons for using it as given. The
focus is on the diﬀerent majority requirements for the two stages and not on explaining why we see a
referendum in the ﬁrst place.
62One could also imagine a setting with simple majority at the assembly stage and a qualiﬁed majority
at the referendum stage. While interesting in theory, this setting is not found in constitution-making
and thus omitted from the analysis in this chapter.
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chosen, they would require a justiﬁcation on why the referendum stage is diﬀerent and
should not be the unreﬂective default mode of constitution-making.
This chapter is a theoretical contribution to the literature on direct democracy. While
many contributions have looked at the (economic) eﬀects of direct democracy in normal
times (see for example Bohnet and Frey, 1994; Feld and Savioz, 1997; Matsusaka, 2005;
Blume et al., 2009), the analysis of direct democracy at the constitution-making stage
has not received similar attention. The contribution of this chapter is to address this
gap in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
reasons for diﬀerent majority rules in constitution-making in general. Section 3 lays
out the criteria to choose between diﬀerent majority rules for the case of constitutional
referendums. Sections 4 and 5 draw on these criteria to present the reasons for choosing
a simple majority rule or a qualiﬁed majority rule, respectively. Section 6 oﬀers a
discussion of these reasons, applying them to a set of case studies. A ﬁnal section
concludes.
5.2 Setting Majority Rules for Constitution-Making
5.2.1 Choosing Under a Veil of Uncertainty
Rousseau (1762) was ﬁrst to address the question of what kind of voting rule would be
required for important decisions, arguing that more important decisions require higher
majorities. The question which rule should be used for the ratiﬁcation of a constitution
has been explicitly brought forward in the seminal contribution of Buchanan and Tul-
lock (1962), who argued that unanimous consent to a constitution is necessary from a
normative standpoint, even when the constitution spells out less-than-unanimous rules
for subsequent policy decisions. Their argument is based on an analysis of the costs of
the political process and the existence of a veil of uncertainty.
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Political decisions concerning the placement of a certain activity in the public sector
have two types of costs: external costs and decision-making costs (Buchanan and Tul-
lock, 1962). External costs are the costs of being on the losing side of a policy decision,
while decision-making costs relate to the cost of ﬁnding agreement. The trade-oﬀ that
majority rules present is that an increase in the required amount of votes reduces the
external costs while it increases the costs associated with decision-making.
A rational and welfare-maximizing individual would agree ex-ante (under a veil of
uncertainty) to a decision-making rule that minimizes overall cost.64 This operates at
two levels. At the level of constitutional choice, individuals know that they will face
collective decisions in the future and that they will sometimes be on the winning side and
sometimes on the losing side. As long as they face uncertainty at the constitutional stage
about their positions in these future decisions, they will agree to a lower requirement
than the unanimity rule for future decisions in order to reduce the high decision-making
costs that would result from this rule for each decision-making process.
For very fundamental choices (including the choice on the constitution itself), the
external costs are so high that the requirement of unanimity at the constitutional stage
can be justiﬁed (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). However, implementing a unanimity
rule is not without problems. A key problem with unanimity rule is that it generates
an opportunity for strategic voting. Under this rule, a single voter can stop the whole
process in order to obtain personal beneﬁts in exchange for her agreement. This creates
a holdout problem.65
This problem can explain the use of qualiﬁed majority rules in constitution-making.
Qualiﬁed majority rules are more demanding than a simple majority without requiring
unanimous consent. These rules allow for the retention of the main beneﬁts from the
64The decision might not be optimal for her from an ex-post perspective, depending on whether she
turns out to be on the winning or losing side of the policy decision.
65This problem arises when the consent of multiple right-holders is required for the completion of
a project. In this situation, each individual holds veto power for the entire project and has strategic
incentives to use this veto power to extract more beneﬁts than are proportional. This may create a
scenario in which it is impossible to complete the project. Typical examples for the holdout problem
are urban development projects such as the building of a new road, where the consent of all landowners
is required.
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unanimity rule while avoiding the holdout problem, presenting a compromise between
the appeal of unanimous consent and the necessities of a functioning voting procedure.
5.2.2 Utility Weights
The case for choosing a voting rule can also be made from an egalitarian or a utilitarian
perspective (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008, pp. 71-77). To satisfy egalitarianism, a
necessary condition (although not a suﬃcient one) is that the votes of all citizens are
equally valuable behind a veil of uncertainty. As long as each citizen has a single vote
of equal weight, voting rules should satisfy this concern independently of which quota is
chosen. For this reason, the decision between the diﬀerent majority rules relies chieﬂy
on utilitarian concerns (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008, pp. 71-77).
To evaluate these utilitarian concerns, it is necessary to introduce a further element
into the discussion (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008). If one agrees that minorities should
be given protection in a political community, then it is reasonable to consider that
one should give them special consideration at the stage of constitutional choice. It is
possible that citizens put diﬀerent utility weights on being on the winning side depending
on whether they are in favor or against a constitution. The constitution deﬁnes the basic
rules of the society and it is likely that citizens will ﬁnd it more important to prevent a
constitutional draft when they oppose it than supporting it in the contrary case. The
reason for this asymmetry lies in the status-quo. The costly process of drafting a new
constitution is often initiated in cases where the old constitution is unable to provide
the basic structure for society anymore, for example after a revolution or a civil war.66
Given that all citizens beneﬁt from the basic structure that a constitution provides for
a society, preferring the (costly) status-quo over a new constitution indicates a strong
preference against the document.67
66For minor changes, constitutions would rather be amended than completely redrafted so, in case of
amendments, the argument that those opposing an amendment will have more to lose is less likely.
67One might argue that strategic bargaining could also lead to rejecting the draft, but it is unlikely
that a suﬃciently large group of a society will engage in this to make a draft fail in case of a qualiﬁed
majority requirement.
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Under this assumption, the voting rule for ratiﬁcation should require a qualiﬁed major-
ity under utilitarian calculations, since the negative utility per capita for those opposing
a constitution would be larger in average than the gains for those favoring the constitu-
tion.68 The level of the qualiﬁed majority depends on the degree to which the members
of the opposition in the society value not living under the rules of the constitutional
draft which they oppose. In an extreme case where the disutility of the minority is very
high, these considerations could even justify unanimous consent.
5.2.3 Protecting Minorities
Even when the levels of disutility of opposition groups are low enough to support a
simple majority rule, other concerns can support the use of qualiﬁed majority rules.
One of these concerns is the protection of minorities from the so-called tyranny of the
majority.69
Using a majority rule to achieve protection of minorities is counter-intuitive, since
the protection of minorities is counter-majoritarian in nature. Minorities are typically
protected through four tools: judicial review, constitutional entrenchment, separation of
powers, and checks and balances (Elster, 1992). However, at the stage of constitution-
making, these tools are not yet in place and need to be included in the constitutional
draft in order to ensure protection.
When asked to vote in the referendum, citizens face uncertainty about their position
in future policy decisions. For some future decisions, they are not fully aware whether
they will be in the minority. Even with minority characteristics that are static, such as
race or gender, the decisive element that determines which characteristic is relevant to
68Imagine a group of 10 people who have to decide whether to vote yes or no to a constitutional
change. If the constitution passes, every one of them who is in favor of the change would win the utility
equivalent of 5 dollars, while each of the ones against would lose the utility equivalent of 9 dollars. A
benevolent dictator would specify a qualiﬁed majority rule here to make sure that no overall utility loss
occurs. Concretely, for these numbers a majority of 70% would be required.
69John Adams was the ﬁrst to use the term, while Alexis de Tocqueville popularized it. See Adams
(1787) and de Tocqueville (1835).
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categorize minorities and majorities is the issue on ballot.70
There are two reasons why a qualiﬁed majority rule is better suited to ensure the
protection of minorities in this scenario. First, consider a society where the members are
fully aware that future decisions in the areas of religion, race and sexual orientation could
suﬀer from the tyranny of the majority. If there are 12% members of a minority race, 12%
members of a minority religion and 12% members of a minority sexual orientation, they
would together be able to block a constitution without minority protection, in the form
of counter-majoritarian measures for constituted powers, or otherwise, under a qualiﬁed
majority rule of two-thirds or more. Second, one can also relax the assumption that the
relevant policy areas must be known ex-ante. If there are enough characteristics that
could turn out to be an issue of future policy-making, many will be aware that they
will occasionally be in the minority themselves. If they suﬃciently care about being
protected in these cases, they will block a constitution that does not include the tools
of minority protection.71
Since citizens at the stage of referendum are unable to add further content to the
draft, they can only rely on their blocking power to prevent drafters from excluding
minority protection from the constitution. A qualiﬁed majority rule is equivalent to a
lower blocking requirement and makes it more likely that this threat will force drafters
to include basic rights, judicial review and other counter-majoritarian tools. In this
way, qualiﬁed majorities can mitigate the tyranny of the majority problem at the level
of constitution-making. Thus, a referendum requiring a qualiﬁed majority can be seen
as an indirect counter-majoritarian device.
70For example, imagine a person of ethnicity A and religion B, and a person of ethnicity B and religion
A, in a society which consists mostly of people of ethnicity A and religion A. Both individuals will have
an interest in minority protection, even if part of a majority group, since they will be in the minority
for one of the two issues.
71Minorities might also achieve their aim through logrolling in the constitutional assembly. Logrolling
is more likely when a small group of people takes the decision Tullock (1959). Note that this kind of
logrolling protection would require the minority group to be represented at the assembly and that their
votes are needed on other areas of the draft.
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5.2.4 Tyranny of the Minority
An objection to the protection of minorities argument could be raised based on the idea
that the minority could obtain too much power under this regime. The use of a qualiﬁed
majority requirement is equivalent to giving a minority a veto power approximating the
holdout problem identiﬁed for unanimity rules. If the minority is large enough, for
example more than one-third of the votes for the typical two-third qualiﬁed majority,
they would be able to prevent the constitution from being ratiﬁed and thereby obtain
further concessions from the majority. This situation is the mirror image of a tyranny
of the majority, thus coined tyranny of the minority. The more demanding the qualiﬁed
majority requirement is, the more relevant this consideration becomes.
Two arguments can, however, be raised against using the idea of the tyranny of the
minority as a justiﬁcation for demanding simple majorities at the referendum stage.
First, a constitution-making process that includes both majority and minority groups in
society is the prime example of inclusive constitution-making which, as was mentioned,
increases the stability and legitimacy of the constitution (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount,
2009). Furthermore, individual citizens have no incentives for strategic voting at the
moment of referendums as long as the qualiﬁed majority requirements are not excessively
high, since only a substantial part of the population would be able to block the proposal.
If a sizeable part of society objects to a constitutional draft, the possibility that the
constitutional draft is unbalanced becomes more pronounced.
The second argument is based on a situation in which the constitutional assembly has
ratiﬁed the draft with a qualiﬁed majority requirement. If the members of a minority are
proportionally represented in the assembly, it is easier for them to coordinate a blockade
of the draft within the assembly than in the subsequent referendum, where they would
need to coordinate with the minority at large. If the minority is not represented in the
assembly, the drafting process can generally be considered lopsided and a referendum
with a qualiﬁed majority requirement represents an opportunity for the minority to
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make itself heard.72
What is critical in determining the optimal majority threshold is the tradeoﬀ between
better protection of minorities (higher threshold) and a reduced blocking power of those
minorities (lower threshold).73 This issue has been extensively discussed in the liter-
ature (see for example Aghion and Bolton, 2003; Aghion et al., 2004; Harstad, 2005;
Gersbach, 2011). A 64% rule, which has been brought forward by Caplin and Nalebuﬀ
(1988), is reasonably close to the typical qualiﬁed majority requirement of two-thirds
(Democracy Reporting International, 2011, p. 4).74 Another way to protect minorities
would be establishing a round table model for the entire constitution-making process
(for a detailed description, see Arato (2012)). TThe idea of the round table model is that
a multi-party instance (the round table) that includes all major groups negotiates an
interim constitution and is followed by the election of a new assembly, which then drafts
the ﬁnal constitution. This multi-stage process is also referred to as post-sovereign,
since no single ‘instance, institution or person can claim to fully embody the will of ‘the
people’.’ (Arato, 2012, p. 174). One similarity between the round table approach and
the use of a qualiﬁed majority (in referendums and constitutional assemblies) is worth
noting. A higher majority threshold in qualiﬁed majorities leads to a smaller chance of
one group dominating the process. This is, at the same time, a key strength of a round
table approach.
To sum up, the general arguments in favor of using qualiﬁed majorities for constitution-
making seem convincing. However, constitutional referendums are typically only a sec-
ond step in the ratiﬁcation process. In an eﬀort to highlight this diﬀerence, the next
section will discuss the special case of referendums for constitutional ratiﬁcation.
72However, the risk of a tyranny of the minority is hardly driven by the referendum stage.
73Constitutional amendment diﬃculty increases with the size or scale of the polity, holding the amend-
ment rule constant (Dixon and Holden, 2012). Larger polities have higher decision-making, but in case
of constitution-making the external costs are signiﬁcantly higher compared to an amendment, given
that all constitutional rules are on the table at the same time. Therefore, while being a provoking
and interesting argument for lower majority thresholds in larger polities, this case is less important for
constitution-making than for constitutional amendments.
74The argument of Caplin and Nalebuﬀ, however, does not build upon the tradeoﬀ discussed above,
but rather on the avoidance of Condorcet cycling.
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5.3 Choosing a Majority Rule for Constitutional Referen-
dums
Majority rules are one of the key channels through which a constitution can directly or
indirectly achieve popular participation. A maximally participatory process not only
requires that all relevant groups are included in the drafting process but also that the
voting rules within the constitutional assembly allow these groups to exert some inﬂu-
ence on the ﬁnal outcome.75 These considerations add to the explanation why most
constitutional assemblies do not use simple majority rules, but rather require qualiﬁed
majorities.
As we mentioned, while the use of qualiﬁed majority rules is widespread for consti-
tutional assemblies, they are rarely used in referendums for ratiﬁcation.76 However,
the general reasons for a qualiﬁed majority in constitution-making are applicable to
both stages. This divergence among majority rules runs contrary to the intuition that
procedural rules should specify the same decision rules, absent reasons to divert.
There are some ways in which the stages of constitution-making diﬀer. The costs of
failure are often higher in a referendum vote than in an assembly vote, and for voters
in a referendum it is diﬃcult to signal their support (or lack thereof) in advance, thus
leading to a higher level of uncertainty about the outcome of the referendum. When
these qualiﬁcations apply, a concrete comparison of arguments in favor of the diﬀerent
majority regimes is beneﬁcial for choosing the most appropriate majority rule.77
For the purposes of this analysis, we consider that constitution-making processes have
the objective of ensuring the legitimacy and the stability of the constitution being writ-
ten. This idea has been extensively supported by the literature (Banks, 2008; Barnett,
75In this chapter, constitutional assembly and constitution-making body are used as synonyms. Thus,
any political body that has the task of drafting and ratifying the draft of the constitution is covered by
this deﬁnition.
76There are very few exceptions. For example, the 2009 referendum of Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines required a two-thirds qualiﬁed majority and serves as a notable one.
77We discuss this in section 5.6.
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2003, 2009; Carey, 2009; Hart, 2003; Jackson, 2008; Landau, 2012, 2013; Tierney, 2009).
Constitutional stability is deﬁned as the longevity of the constitution.78 Two of the
main functions of a constitution are serving as the basis of the legal system and allowing
citizens to build stable expectations about government actions and the limits of executive
power. The constitution works as a focal point to detect government transgressions and
to solve the citizens’ coordination problem in these situations (Weingast, 1993, 1995).
A focal point as a coordination device is only helpful if citizens are aware of it. A
constitution that has been in force for a long period of time is better able to fulﬁll these
functions.
While a referendum is unable by itself to make the process of constitution-making more
(or less) lawful, a referendum is a good test for what has been called the sociological
legitimacy of a constitutional draft, which is achieved when the public thinks of the
constitution as agreeable and justiﬁed (Fallon Jr., 2012). The main concern with regard
to public participation in constitution-making is not the question of legal legitimacy, but
rather whether the people at large are suﬃciently involved in the constitution-making
process.
Legitimacy is also linked to the concepts of inclusive and participatory constitution-
making. An inclusive process is one that ensures that a broad spectrum of society
is represented in the process, whereas a participatory process involves the citizens di-
rectly.79 Both of these aims are furthered by a constitutional referendum. When people
are required to vote on the draft directly, the process is more participatory than one
without direct democracy elements. Furthermore, a popular referendum can be a sec-
ond layer of an inclusive process, which is especially relevant when the assembly is not
78For a detailed discussion of advantages and drawbacks of constitutional longevity, see Ginsburg,
Melton, and Elkins (2009, ch. 2)
79Both of these aims could be achieved by other means than a constitutional referendum as well.
Direct involvement of the citizens in the drafting is a typical way to make a process more participatory,
as for example seen in the drafting of the Brazilian constitution in 1988. Electoral rules for and the
majority rules in the constitution-making body are important for the inclusiveness. A proportional
electoral rule leads in general to a more inclusive constitution-making body than a ﬁrst-past.the-post
rule, whereas a higher majority requirement leads to the necessity to include more representatives in a
minimum winning coalition.
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suﬃciently inclusive. This eﬀect is stronger with a higher majority requirement in the
referendum.
The existence of a certain degree of political rule of law is necessary for the analysis of
this chapter to be meaningful. By political rule of law we understand that the referendum
will be fair and democratic and that campaigns in favor of the new draft as well as those
opposing it should be allowed. If these conditions are not fulﬁlled, then the diﬀerence
in majority rules will not be able to make a suﬃcient impact. An elite that is able to
tamper with the results of a referendum will not be constrained by a higher threshold
in that referendum. An autocrat aiming to increase the legitimacy of his regime might
use a referendum to give his citizens a feeling of participation. One example of a regime
potentially staging such a referendum is the 2003 constitutional referendum of Qatar,
where oﬃcial results gave nearly 97% agreement for the draft constitution supported by
the Emir.
The next sections analyze the arguments for and against simple and qualiﬁed majority
rules for the constitutional referendum.
5.4 When to Use a Simple Majority Rule
5.4.1 Swift Stability in Times of Crisis
Most referendums ask voters if they agree to the constitutional draft as a whole. While
a positive vote leads to a direct implementation of the constitution, a negative vote leads
to a continuation of the status-quo for a given amount of time while a new constitution
is drafted. If this status-quo is costly for citizens, a majority might agree to the draft
despite the fact that they actually prefer a diﬀerent constitution. This problem is
especially severe when citizens not only face a costly status-quo, but also discount future
beneﬁts more heavily because their private interest rate when making decisions is higher
compared to a situation without crisis.
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These two characteristics are typically found during the aftermath of a crisis or a vio-
lent conﬂict, which are, as mentioned before, by no means an exception for constitution-
making. In the past 40 years, more than 200 constitutions have been written while
facing the risk of an outbreak of internal violence (Widner, 2008, p. 1513).
Despite the high costs of delay, referendums have been one of the primary means
of ratiﬁcation for countries facing the risk of internal violence, where almost 45% of
these cases used a referendum as the primary method of ratiﬁcation (Widner, 2008, p.
1525). Referendums might be able to reduce the risk of ongoing violence independent
of the majority rule chosen because the idea of participation can calm citizens. Thus, a
referendum could be implemented not only to constrain drafters but also because it may
support stability by reducing the risk of a violent outburst. The minimum (reasonable)
requirement for any meaningful referendum, in turn, is a simple majority. This is the
least constraining scenario for the drafters. For this reason, a simple majority referendum
might be able to resolve the tension between the desire to create an inclusive process
and a need for swift decision-making.
There are, nevertheless, alternatives to a hurried constitution-making process in times
of crisis. One alternative is based on a two-step process: drafting an interim constitution
as a ﬁrst step and as a second step drafting a new constitution that aims to endure
(Arato, 2009, pp. 71-72). The advantage of this procedure is that the ﬁrst stage can
be completed without public ratiﬁcation, given that the issue of stability is not relevant
for an interim document. The second stage will not face the same time pressure as that
of a single-step process rendering the main argument against a more inclusive majority
requirement inapplicable. The constitution-making process implemented in Poland after
the breakdown of the communist block used an interim constitution and provides a good
example of this alternative approach. To sum up, a simple majority requirement has
advantages when swift decisions are necessary and a double-step process is inviable in
the given case.
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5.4.2 High Decision-Making Costs
A standard argument in favor of lower majority requirements in general is the presence
of high decision-making costs (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, ch. 8). This argument relies
on the intuition that the external costs of those who are on the losing side of a vote can
be justiﬁed if a higher majority requirement would make the decision much more costly
for the entire population.
It can be argued that the costs of renegotiating and redrafting are higher for a ref-
erendum than for an assembly, not only because setting up a referendum is costly and
time-intensive but also (and mainly) because a negative vote requires the whole drafting
process to start anew. In light of our evaluation criteria, this can be seen as instability.
In situations where the costs of constitution-making are very high, the risk of a negative
vote could justify the use of a simple majority requirement.80
However, three qualiﬁcations to this argument apply. First, it is unclear whether
the majority requirement has a strong eﬀect on the risk of a failed referendum. In
the period from 1925 until 2012, 84.4% of all constitutional referendums that passed
the simple majority requirement would have also passed a qualiﬁed majority of two-
thirds (Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d), 2015). These numbers include
all constitutional referendums for the speciﬁed period. One could limit the dataset to
mandatory referendums, but the general picture would hardly change. For the case of
mandatory referendums in the same time period, 79.4% of all referendums that passed
simple majority would also have passed a qualiﬁed majority of two-thirds. Given these
ﬁndings, the majority requirement would have aﬀected the result of the referendum in
a very limited number of cases.
Second, in cases where the decision-making costs are high because a failed referendum
is costly due to the status-quo, citizens will also take these costs into consideration when
80These costs include some or all of the following elements: the prolonged continuation of a status-quo
without a constitution, the increased risk of a violent solution if no return to a stable political situation is
achieved, the monetary costs of running a constitutional assembly, and the constitution-making process
in general as well as the loss in investment due to the unstable situation.
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casting their vote. A negative vote by a substantial part of the voters in situations with
a costly status-quo is a clear signal that the assembly is not representative of the society
as a whole. In this case, an additional qualiﬁed majority requirement in the referendum
would reduce external costs. Therefore, even with high decision-making costs, the result
of the interdependence calculus is by no means clear.
Third, if the drafters of a constitution know there will be a referendum after complet-
ing the draft, they will be more likely to propose a draft that they expect to pass the
referendum, hence (partly) internalizing the higher costs of redrafting in case of a neg-
ative vote. A constitutional bargain that fails to be ratiﬁed is worthless to the drafters.
Thus, to the extent that constitutional drafters are able to predict the outcome of their
draft in the referendum, the majority requirement will aﬀect the content, while the risk
of failure will remain stable. The next section deals with cases where the drafters are
uncertain about their citizens’ policy preferences.
5.4.3 Uncertainty of Drafters about Citizens’ Vote
The argument that drafters will attempt to write a constitutional draft that will pass
the referendum relies critically on the ability of politicians to correctly predict the voting
behavior of citizens. A higher majority requirement makes it more diﬃcult for drafters
to anticipate the political atmosphere correctly, since a lower veto threshold increases
the possibilities for failure and can also be viewed as instability of the process itself. This
risk is prevalent in scenarios both with normal and with high decision-making costs, since
the loss in time caused by the additional round of referendum is generally problematic.
It is, therefore, necessary to look at the factors that decrease the politicians’ ability to
properly predict electoral outcomes.
A high level of heterogeneity is one of the main factors that make an accurate pre-
diction of voters’ behavior problematic. If the electorate is divided in many diﬀerent
groups, the risk of a wrong expectation from the drafters increases. Jottier et al. (2012)
have tested this argument in a survey with Belgian politicians and found that more
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heterogeneity increases prediction error. The case of the European Constitution, where
diﬀerent nation states (and thereby also societies that diﬀer substantially) had to agree
on a shared basic set of rules, is a good example of these diﬃculties. The drafters, as well
as the local governments, were unable to predict voters’ behavior. They did not foresee
the risk of failed ratiﬁcation and expected a vote in favor that did not materialize.
Hence, a society with multiple blocking minorities faces a greater risk of incorrectly
predicting the outcome of a referendum. Since by deﬁnition a simple majority require-
ment prevents the existence of a blocking minority, drafters could choose this tool to
reduce the risk of mistaken predictions.
5.5 When to Use a Qualiﬁed Majority Rule
5.5.1 Sociological Legitimacy
It has been argued that, unlike ordinary referendums, constitutional referendums are
more than a decision-making mechanism; they allow citizens of both democratic and
non-democratic societies to feel identiﬁed with the constitution, and as a consequence
to feel identiﬁed with the state (Tierney, 2009, p. 366). The constitutional referendum
makes individual citizens feel part of the demos as deﬁned by the constitution to be ap-
proved (Tierney, 2009). It can easily be seen that a higher majority threshold increases
the minimum level of sociological legitimacy at the moment of the referendum. This
higher threshold, similarly, can be used to increase cohesion. When there is a conﬂict
looming between diﬀerent groups within society, simple majority referendums can lead
the minority groups to boycott the referendum entirely and resort to more violent mea-
sures because they know that they will not have a blocking minority in the referendum.
In the terms of Buchanan and Tullock, the external costs for these groups are likely
to be extremely high. The cases of Northern Ireland and Bosnia where conﬂicts were
exacerbated by referendums, despite being about the diﬀerent issue of independence,
are good examples of this. Although it remains unclear whether a higher requirement
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would have stopped the ensuing conﬂicts, putting a brake on the tyranny of majority
risk increases the legitimacy of a successful referendum.
Legitimacy can also arise through an inﬂuence of the citizens’ choice in the referendum
on the content of the draft. It has been claimed that qualiﬁed majorities are useless at
the stage of referendums because the decision of the voters is binary (to accept or to
reject), without the actual possibility of shaping the content of the constitution or of
encouraging compromise. This claim only holds for the direct eﬀect of the referendum
but it ignores its indirect eﬀect. Since the drafters are aware (ex-ante) that they need
(ex-post) a given level of public agreement for their draft to pass, they will adapt their
draft to this expectation. A higher majority requirement of the referendum will change
the content of the draft due to the anticipation of the drafters. The analysis of the
economic eﬀects of direct democracy institutions provides further evidence of the eﬀects
of mandatory referendums.81 Thus, the claim that qualiﬁed majorities at the referendum
stage are unable to shape the content of the constitution does not seem to hold. A higher
majority requirement thus increases the power of the citizens rather than the power of
the drafters and leads to a more legitimate outcome.
5.5.2 Abuse of Power During Times of Crisis
The possible abuse of times of crisis or their aftermath by constitutional drafters is
another relevant argument in favor of qualiﬁed majorities. As discussed above, citizens
will place a high value on a quick return to constitutional stability if a crisis is still
threatening and the costs of delay are high. High costs of remaining in the status-quo
will motivate citizens to pay less attention than normal to the constraints placed on the
government by the new constitution. If the drafters are able to formulate a constitution
that grants the future government discretionary power, citizens will be more inclined
than usually to accept a draft with such feature.
81Blume et al. show that the existence of (mandatory) referendums has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁscal
variables. Their study analyses the economic eﬀects of referendums on a global scale and this evidence
highlights that politicians will take referendums into account at the stage when content is shaped (Blume
et al., 2009).
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This venture is easier when a single party dominates the constitutional assembly, which
is another characteristic often found in post-conﬂict settings. This dominance might take
place through a democratic election with a clear winner or in a non-democratic way. One
could think, for example, about the winning side of a civil war, the successful leaders of
a revolution, or an autocratic government that wants to rewrite the constitution. In this
case, the assembly and the ratiﬁcation rules within the assembly lose their constraining
power due to the fact that one party is strong enough to withstand these rules. These
types of scenarios increase the risk of establishing a constitution with low levels of
legitimacy and stability (Landau, 2013).
In these cases, the use of a referendum with a simple majority requirement might
be insuﬃcient to deliver the level of legitimacy and stability that the new constitution
would need in order to survive future shocks. A qualiﬁed majority requirement can
mitigate this problem, since the higher threshold increases the minimum level of socio-
logical legitimacy and would also increase the expected longevity. Especially in cases of
non-democratically created assemblies, the use of qualiﬁed majority referendums could
provide the necessary boost in legitimacy to make the constitution more stable. This
layer of additional control of the drafters through the referendum is the topic of the
following subsection.
5.5.3 Additional Control of Politicians in the Assembly
The additional control of politicians is of paramount importance in instances where
the drafting body is not representative of the population. In cases of constitution-
making in times of crisis, every fourth constitution-making body can be considered
unrepresentative (Widner, 2008, p. 1524). Referendums serve as additional controls in
these cases and a qualiﬁed majority rule can further strengthen legitimacy by ensuring
that the interests of minority groups are incorporated into the considerations of the draft
as well.
The usefulness of the control function of referendums does not end there. Even if
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the assembly has been elected in a democratic process and is representative of society,
it is naïve to assume that the drafters will act in a selﬂess way purely in the interest
of their constituents. As long as they expect to hold some political oﬃce once the
constitution comes into force, drafters might aim to increase their own future beneﬁts
by adopting constitutional measures that are beneﬁcial to the political elite. Therefore,
even a democratic setting does not make the control function obsolete, and a stricter
majority requirement tightens the control over politicians.
A ﬁnal word of caution is required. In a non-democratic setting, while drafters would
face additional controls by a stricter majority requirement, it is unclear when the refer-
endums in these cases are merely shams. One can easily imagine a referendum where
the results are rigged by the ruling autocrat. Furthermore, any analysis which takes the
procedural rules of constitution-making as exogenous ignores the problem that, since
drafters are often the same people designated to create the procedural rules, they may
be motivated to create procedural rules that promote their own self-interests rather than
constitutional stability and legitimacy.
Having discussed the main reasons why simple majority or qualiﬁed majority require-
ments may be appropriate, we can turn to a more general evaluation of these arguments.
5.6 Case Studies
5.6.1 Evaluation Criterion
We have argued that it is relevant to ask which majority requirement should be chosen
for constitutional referendums instead of simply assuming that the same rule is always
optimal. An evaluation based on the arguments we presented above can answer this
question. As discussed above (section 5.2), a qualiﬁed majority requirement can be jus-
tiﬁed for constitutional ratiﬁcation in general. Starting from this base, the evaluation
for referendums assesses whether one or more of the arguments in favor of a simple
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majority referendum are applicable (section 5.4). If this is the case, the advantages of
a simple majority requirement for the referendum must be compared with the advan-
tages of a qualiﬁed majority (section 5.5). We show the way in which this evaluation
can be applied by looking at three examples of diverging majority rules in the diﬀerent
stages of ratiﬁcation and checking whether the decision to use simple majority require-
ments can be justiﬁed from the perspective of the criteria discussed in the previous
sections. More speciﬁcally, we use the cases of Poland, Bolivia and Egypt as examples
of this diverging majority rules. For diﬀerent reasons, all three countries used qualiﬁed
majorities in the constitutional assembly, but chose to use a simple majority in their
constitutional referendums. The following subsections will analyze these cases with the
proposed criteria.
5.6.2 Poland
Poland was the ﬁrst country of the three that we analyze to give itself a new constitu-
tion.82 Following the unrest and looming threat of a revolution in 1989, the communist
government and the opposition groups engaged in round table talks to prevent a violent
conﬂict (Gross, 1997, p. 65). President Walesa (previously chairman of the trade union
Solidarity, elected in 1990) and the newly elected parliament aimed to quickly install
a new constitution and replace the Soviet document of 1952. The fragmentation of
the parliament as well as a disagreement about the degree of power that the president
should wield prevented, however, a quick and complete drafting of the new constitution.
Thus, the decision-makers opted for a ‘small’ constitution in 1992 which deﬁned basic
government functions leaving the process of completing a "large" constitution for the
future.
The constitutional committee that was tasked with preparing the large constitution
consisted of 10% of the members of the two Polish houses—the Sejm and the Senate.
This setting has been criticized since the daily interests of the members of the commit-
82Garlicki and Garlicka (2010) provide an in-depth analysis of the constitution-making process in
Poland.
125
CHAPTER 5. MAJORITY RULES IN CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS
tee, who were simultaneously serving in Sejm or Senate, interfered with the drafting of
the constitution (Osiatynski, 1997, p. 66). To make sure that the interests of the diﬀer-
ent political factions (including the post-communist parties) were reﬂected in the new
constitution, the ratiﬁcation procedures required a two-third majority in the national
assembly, which is a combined assembly of all members of the Sejm and the Senate.
This qualiﬁed-majority requirement was easily fulﬁlled in the assembly vote.
A public referendum was also required. The drafters intended to use the referendum to
increase the sociological legitimacy of the constitution, not merely as window-dressing.
Since the Polish constitution was the ﬁrst one to be drafted after the collapse of the
Iron Curtain, a high degree of legitimacy was especially important given the many
rigged elections and sham constitutions that were typical for the communist regime. The
Solidarity movement (which had proposed its own draft in the course of the constitution-
making process) was campaigning heavily against the new constitution. However, the
simple majority requirement of the referendum was met when 53.5% of the participating
voters opted in favor of the draft presented by the national assembly.83 A qualiﬁed
majority requirement for the referendum would have required some sort of compromise,
since the referendum would have otherwise failed.
When considering the criterion of high decision-making costs, it should be noted that
the small constitution already deﬁned the most basic government functions and main-
taining the status-quo was thus not extremely costly to the society. Nevertheless, the
process of constitution-making itself required a long time before the ﬁnal draft was put
to ratiﬁcation and another delay through a failed referendum could have further in-
creased this cost. However, given this long time frame, it should have been possible
to reach a solution acceptable for a qualiﬁed majority of society also including the op-
83Another legitimacy issue with the Polish referendum was the turnout requirement. The initially
proposed threshold of 50% was not achieved as only 42.9% of the eligible voters casted their votes.
The low level of legitimacy that derives from this turnout has been acknowledged in the literature (cf.
Spiewack, 1997, p. 96). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the constitution could
be introduced despite failing to achieve the threshold requirement. While voter turnout is not the focus
of this chapter, this stylized fact strengthens the case for doubting the legitimizing function of a simple
majority referendum.
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posing Solidarity movement. Such a development would have increased support for the
constitution, heightening its degree of legitimacy. It is unlikely that the drafters labored
under a high level of uncertainty, but the close result is rather due to the conﬂict with
Solidarity. Altogether, the justiﬁcation for a simple majority purely based on decision-
making costs does not appear strong enough and a qualiﬁed majority requirement could
have helped to increase the legitimacy of the constitution.
5.6.3 Bolivia
A breakdown of the political order, although in a diﬀerent context, also led to the
demand for a new constitution in Bolivia when the leftist movement Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS) won the elections in 2005 and ended the enduring reign of a coalition
of the long-established parties in Bolivia.84 It has been argued that many left-wing
groups in Latin America used constitutional reforms to manifest their powers once they
have been elected (Cameron, 2009, p. 339). Despite losing the elections, the opposition
parties were still strong enough to have some bargaining power in the constitution-
making process. Both sides agreed on the need for a new constitution, although for
diﬀerent reasons. President Morales from MAS wanted a constitution that oﬀered more
social inclusion due to the fact that the indigenous groups were one of his major bases of
support, while the opposition parties aimed for more regional autonomies due to their
stronghold in the (richer) eastern regions of Bolivia (Landau, 2013, p. 952).
The electoral rule for the constitutional assembly used a district magnitude of three
giving the ﬁrst two seats to the party or movement that received the most votes and
the third seat to the party or movement with the second-most votes.85 This deviation
from a ﬁrst-past-the-post system (in which there is one winning candidate per district
deﬁned as the person receiving the most votes) allows for a better representation of
minorities at the assembly. Furthermore, the voting rules within the assembly required
84For a more detailed discussion of the constitution-making process in Bolivia, see Landau (2013)
85This election rule has some precedent in the region. For example, Argentina chose it as the way to
elect its senators in its constitutional reform of 1994.
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a two-third majority for the ratiﬁcation of the draft and a subsequent public referendum
to complete the ratiﬁcation process. Nevertheless, the referendum only required a simple
majority of votes. The conﬂict between established parties and a new movement as well
as the spatial dispersion of voter-support led to the choice of procedures (electoral rules
for electing the assembly) and voting rules (2/3 majority requirement in the assembly)
that protected minorities at every stage, except for the referendum stage.86 When the
referendum was ﬁnally held in 2009, 61.4 % of the participating voters accepted the
draft.
Bolivia is special in the sense that opposition and government parties both agreed
to a constitutional change. There is no proper justiﬁcation for the use of a simple
majority, as the absence of an immediate crisis mitigated the potential of high costs
during the process. The increased risk of a failed qualiﬁed majority referendum is by
itself insuﬃcient in this setting. Furthermore, since both factions needed to agree on
procedural rules, the referendum could have served to add further veto players as a
backup for the weaker group. Additionally, the conﬂict between rich and poor probably
could have made it easier for the drafters to be certain whether a proposed draft would
be ratiﬁed in the referendum, given that the relatively clear structure of Bolivian society
made failure easier to predict, compared to a more complex setting with more factions
and groups. Given this clear division in the society, a successful constitution-making
process should require a high degree of legitimacy so that the constitution remains
stable also in case of a regime change. This aim could have been achieved in a better
way by using a qualiﬁed majority in the referendum. Finally, the mobilized nature of the
citizens’ protests highlights that the protesters held some de-facto power. A qualiﬁed
majority requirement would have ensured that both groups of protesters agreed to the
new constitution—not only their leaders representing the groups in the assembly. To
sum up, the case of Bolivia presents strong arguments that justify the use of a qualiﬁed
majority.
86It is important to note that the procedural protections did not stop the MAS government from
violating them when Parliament accepted the draft brought forward by the MAS in February 2008. See
(Lehoucq, 2008, pp. 110-111) for a more detailed discussion.
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5.6.4 Egypt
The most recent of the cases is constitution-making in Egypt. After the Arab Spring
revolution resulting in the reign of the Muslim Brotherhood, a military take-over ensued
in July 2013 because of protests against the government of President Mursi. One of the
ﬁrst steps of the military government was to put the 2012 constitution out of force and
set up a new constitutional committee, which was formed in September. The proce-
dural rules of the assembly, whose members were selected by the interim government,
speciﬁed that a 75% majority was required in case of any disagreements on substantive
matters.87 Despite the fact that the assembly was not democratically elected, many
minority groups were, for the ﬁrst time, represented in the constitution-making process
(the representatives of Nubia and of the Disability Challengers serve as examples). In
the light of the previous conﬂict and the instability of the previous constitution, it makes
sense that the government made an eﬀort to include diﬀerent groups. These eﬀorts may,
however, have been hampered by the improper inﬂuence of the military government. It
has been argued that the constitutional committee was selected to strengthen the role
of the military (Cross and Sorens, 2015, p. 11) Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood
(and thereby a large and important part of Egyptian society) was basically excluded
from the process.
Similar to Poland and Bolivia, the ﬁnal ratiﬁcation of the new constitution lay in the
hands of the general public through a referendum. Yet again, only a simple majority
threshold was chosen for such referendum.
The case of Egypt is the most diﬃcult of the three to judge. As the constitution-
making took place after a military coup, a failed referendum could have caused further
distress and violence in the country. Furthermore, whether the military leaders really
wanted to include all parts of society through the referendum is unclear, given their
exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from the drafting process. Finally, the very het-
erogeneous makeup of Egyptian society made it extremely diﬃcult for the drafters to
87See Article 16 of the procedural rules of the constitutional committee.
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predict the voters’ behavior.
On the other hand, it is doubtful how successful a constitution that excludes a major
part of society really can be. The referendum was boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood
and only 38.6% of the citizens turned out to vote. The increase in legitimacy through
a stricter requirement could have mitigated this eﬀect by making a campaign against
the new constitution a viable option for the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, since
the assembly was selected by the military leaders, additional control through the con-
stituents is an important argument in favor of a qualiﬁed majority. Finally, the process
clearly took place during a time of crisis. Given that all arguments for both sides apply,
it is unclear from a theoretical point of view why the qualiﬁed majority that was used
in the assembly was discarded in favor of a simple majority regime for the referendum.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
The prevalence of the divergence in majority rules in constitutional referendums remains
puzzling. In many if not most cases, the same considerations that lead to the use of qual-
iﬁed majorities for constitutional assemblies also apply for constitutional referendums.
This ﬁnding is striking when one takes into account that nearly every constitutional
referendum is held under a simple majority rule. As a tentative hypothesis, the reason
behind this puzzling outcome could be found in historical path dependency, as well as
in the self-interest of those politicians that create the procedural rules of constitution-
making.
Despite this prevalence of diverging majority rules, there have been no theoretical
justiﬁcations for the diﬀerential treatment. Some justiﬁcation seems necessary to use
diﬀerent majority rules for two voting mechanisms with similar characteristics and the
same aim: ensuring constitutional stability and legitimacy. This chapter highlights the
circumstances under which each majority requirement for the referendum (simple or
qualiﬁed) is most adequate to the ends of constitution-making. This disentanglement
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of the advantages and drawbacks of diﬀerent majority requirements has so far not been
explicitly performed in the literature or in practical constitution-making. We show
that using simple majority referendums as a default rule without proper scrutiny based
on societal characteristics can lead to losses in constitutional stability and legitimacy.
Therefore, a procedure that delineates the advantages and drawbacks of the diﬀerent
options like the one we present is helpful for the ends of constitution-making.
The case made for the ratiﬁcation of a constitution in this chapter also holds for
constitutional amendments that require a referendum.88 Constitutional amendments
typically require a qualiﬁed majority of the legislative and thus resemble the drafting of
a constitution in an assembly with respect to the majority rules.
One key limitation of the tools presented in this chapter relates to the actors who make
the procedural rules. If the same politicians who will later on draft the constitution
also make the rules of constitution-making, it is unlikely that they will take steps to
establish checks and balances on the drafters. In terms of policy advice, it is therefore an
important task to ensure that the procedural rules are legitimate and politicians are not
able to make them ﬁt to their own interest. International norms and best practices, by
setting up these rules, could possibly help to overcome the risk of self-serving politicians.
The analysis of the making of procedural rules by these self-interested actors oﬀers an
interesting opportunity for further research.
These arguments have shown that the existence of some popular participation by
itself does not necessarily achieve constitutional stability and legitimacy. Under the
circumstances we identiﬁed, requiring a qualiﬁed majority rule in referendums would
perform better in terms of constraining the constitution makers as well as in producing
a more stable constitution.
While the last chapters have focused on the constitution-making process itself, the fol-
lowing chapter will focus on an outcome of the constitution-making process that substan-
88In 2010, 98 countries around the world used referendums for constitutional amendments. See See
Anckar (2014)
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tially constrains politicians in the future, namely unamendable constitutional provisions.
This additional perspective is useful to complement an analysis of the constitution-
making process and its eﬀects on the written constitution. Whereas this chapter and
the preceding ones focused on the direct eﬀect of procedural rules, unamendable provi-
sions are rather an indirect way through which drafters can take inﬂuence. The next
chapter aims to gain a better understanding why those provisions are used and whether
they should be seen as commitment devices.
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Commitment or Paternalism?
The Case of Unamendability
6.1 Introduction 89
During the Age of Enlightenment, the political and philosophical idea of democracy
gained credibility becoming the preferred political system of nation states. The rise
of constitutionalism, which has been one of the deﬁning features of modern political
systems, enjoys a similar level of acceptance. At a ﬁrst glance, constitutionalism and
democracy appear to reinforce one another, but there is one area where they stand at
a cross: unamendable provisions. By unamendable provisions, or unamendability, we
refer to explicit, formal bans of the amendment of constitutional provisions through the
normal amendment procedure as established in the constitution. Under the regime of un-
amendability, the limitless supremacy of the people’s collective action (pure democracy)
and majoritarianism’s limits through countermajoritarian devices (constitutionalism)
stand at odds (Albert, 2010, p. 664). One could also see this conﬂict as aﬀecting the
89This chapter is based on joint work with Ignacio N. Cofone, to whom I am very grateful for allowing
me to use this work as part of my dissertation. Furthermore, this chapter is forthcoming in the edited
volume "An Unconstitutional Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies", which is
part of the "Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice" series published by Springer.
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balance between constitutional rigidity, as championed by constitutionalism, and con-
stitutional ﬂexibility, which is a concept more in line with majoritarianism’s supremacy.
The importance of taking into account this balance between rigidity and ﬂexibility when
assessing a constitution has been highlighted in the literature (Roznai, 2015a). Further-
more, the amendment procedure’s ﬂexibility has served as a key design variable in studies
on constitutional longevity (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins, 2009). Unamendable provi-
sions tilt this balance towards constitutionalism, which is noteworthy given the ﬁnding
that unamendable provisions are increasingly used in constitution-making.90
From a doctrinal point of view, unamendable clauses are puzzling. According to the
general principle of lex posterior derogat priori, for all contradicting rules on the same
hierarchical level, newer rules trump older rules, and yet unamendable provisions are
constitutional clauses that can prevent the enactment of newer provisions. How can one
justify that a prior decision prevails over a new one under the same hierarchical level?
(Roznai, 2015a, p. 4)
Moreover, the power to amend a constitution does not fully ﬁt either in the category
of a constitutional power, which creates the constitutional order, or in the category of
a constituted power, which derives from such constitutional order; the constitutional
amendment power presents characteristics of both. From this perspective, amendment
power can be seen as a derived constitutional power, as opposed to an original consti-
tutional power: it holds the power to create constitutional norms, but it is still bound
(mainly regarding procedure) by those very norms (Roznai, 2015a, pp. 13-15). For this
reason, although it has been argued that "unconstitutional" constitutional amendments
seem inconceivable from the logic of legal hierarchy (Preuss, 2011, p. 431), an "uncon-
stitutional" amendment could possibly occur if the amendment breaches the rules of the
original constitutional power that allows for the existence of the derived constitutional
power.91
90More than half of all constitutions that came into force between 1989 and 2013 included provisions
which are unamendable, compared to 27% of all constitutions between 1945 and 1988. See (Roznai,
2015b, p. 8).
91An interesting application of this theory can be found when discussing the case of the German
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Unamendable provisions have been analyzed using two main perspectives. The func-
tional perspective deals with the direct eﬀects of unamendable provisions, while the
expressive perspective focuses on the eﬀects unamendable provision have through the
mere expression of this heightened attention. Recognizing that expressive functions play
a key role in explaining the use of unamendable provisions, we will focus on a functional
perspective.92
The functional perspective focuses on the drafters’ ability to use their power to amend
through the means of a written constitution and to credibly commit themselves and
future generations to the clauses. This statement is inspired by analyzing various dis-
cussions of unamendable provisions that have been presented in the literature. Una-
mendable provisions are a barrier to change the constitution (Roznai, 2015b, p. 4). As
discussed in chapter 2, constitutions are often deﬁned as being self-enforcing, since no
external party can enforce these rules. Given that constitutions are indeed self-enforcing,
any barrier to constitutional change could be seen as a credible commitment in order to
be functional.
Elster (2000b) discusses four potential reasons to use constitutional pre-commitment:
overcoming passions and self-interests, overcoming hyperbolic discounting, overcoming
strategic time-inconsistencies and ensuring eﬃciency gains . These four reasons serve
as the basis for this analysis. We introduce a new functional theory of unamendable
provisions, moving from the idea of credible commitment to the concept of (selﬁsh) pa-
ternalism. Analyzing unamendability clauses from the functional perspective described
above, in particular with regard to their feasibility and desirability to serve as commit-
ment devices, can enrich doctrinal scholarship. From the analysis that follows, it will
constitution. The addition of a right to resist by amendment into an article that is protected by
unamendability does not make the added clause unamendable as well. For a more detailed discussion of
this problem, see Köybasi (2017).
92For a detailed discussion of expressive functions of unamendable provisions, see Albert (2013).
The idea of the expressive function also relates to the concept of a constitution as a focal point. If
certain provisions are highlighted by their unamendability, it will be harder for the future government
to transgress them. Given that modern constitutions can be long and include several provisions, this
highlighting can be seen as a key condition for the ability of the citizens to coordinate their behavior
based on the provision.
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be conjectured that under the framework of Elster there are no justiﬁable reasons that
make the use of unamendability clauses desirable. However, even if they are not seen as
desirable from this perspective, they are by no means without eﬀect.
A functional approach to these clauses that relies on interpreting paternalistic or
hegemonic policies, rather than simply focusing on pre-commitment, provides a better
perspective when dealing with their direct eﬀect. Drafters cannot predict the prefer-
ences of future generations. This fact highlights the reality that unamendability clauses
are a means for drafters to impose their own preferences on future generations. The
deﬁning feature and underlying diﬀerence between paternalistic and hegemonic policies
solely depends on whether the imposition of these preferences is inherently benevolent
or selﬁsh.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section will discuss the
reasons for pre-commitment in general and constitutional pre-commitment speciﬁcally,
while the subsequent section links constitutional pre-commitment to unamendable pro-
visions. Thereafter, the question whether unamendability is a good tool for commitment
will be analyzed in detail. Section 6.5 provides alternative functional justiﬁcations for
unamendable provisions and a ﬁnal section concludes.
6.2 Reasons for Constitutional Pre-Commitment
Unamendable clauses raise the costs of future options by disallowing the amendment
channel. Modifying a constitution will always come at a lower cost than re-drafting the
document as a whole. This leads to the question of how pre-commitment is motivated in
social sciences, and whether these motivations are transferable to unamendable clauses.
At the individual level, pre-commitment is a relevant part of the everyday life of people,
and it has been the subject of legal discussions in various ﬁelds (see for example Thaler
and Sunstein, 2003; Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Camerer et al., 2003; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 2003). Contracts are a typical device to credibly commit in the area of business,
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and marriages represent commitment devices in the area of love. The concept of pre-
commitment, as one can see, is nothing new to the evaluation of legal debates.
The perspective of pre-commitment can also be used to evaluate collective decisions
that require a society as a whole to bind itself to for future choices. When considering the
concept of a contract as a commitment device, we might distinguish between contracts
made between diﬀerent collective groups and contracts made within a single collective
group. International treaties are an example of the ﬁrst type of contract. A constitution
is often likened to a social contract that commits the members of a society to follow
a speciﬁed set of rules, and in this way is an example of the second. The notion of a
constitution as a social contract goes back to the English political philosopher Thomas
Hobbes (1651). This idea of a social contract has signiﬁcantly fueled the ﬁeld of consti-
tutional economics following the seminal contribution of Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
The key diﬀerence between individual pre-commitment and collective pre-commitment
through constitutions is that constitutions, unlike most means of pre-commitment, may
bind others, or they may not bind at all (Elster, 2000b, pp. 92-96). This argument
relates back to the paternalism argument mentioned in the introduction.
Collective pre-commitment has the ability, at the same time, to do more and less than
individual pre-commitment. The prime examples are preventing a preference change in
the future (where collective pre-commitment can achieve less), and aims diﬀerent than
binding "oneself" (where collective pre-commitment can achieve more). First, since a
society is in constant change (births, deaths, migration of its members and any num-
ber of other modes of change), it undergoes constant preference changes.94 While an
individual might want to maintain a speciﬁc set of preferences regardless of changes in
experience, it seems unjust to force younger generations to maintain the preferences of
older generations.95 Second, collective pre-commitment (for example, in the form of a
94It is important to notice that this argument does not release the assumption of stable individual
preferences. Overall preferences change because the composition of individuals in society changes.
95This argument does not consider cases of "hypothetical consent" of the younger generation: pre-
commitment devices that make them better oﬀ. The focus of this argument is on pre-commitment that
is in line with the preferences of the older ones, but not with the younger ones.
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constitution) can also be abused to bind others instead of binding oneself (Elster, 2000b,
pp. 92-94). One example would be constitutional drafters who anticipate that they will
not be in the majority once an election under the new constitution takes place. They
might put excessive limits on the future government, not in order to bind themselves,
but to bind the other groups that will have the majority in the future.
The analysis of constitutions and their provisions from the viewpoint of constraint the-
ory, and in particular as pre-commitment devices, has been pioneered by Elster (1984,
2000b). His reasons for collective pre-commitment have been discussed in the intro-
duction. Before linking these reasons to unamendable provisions, it is important to
delineate the aims of unamendability in general.
6.3 Constitutional Pre-Commitment and Unamendability
The purposes of unamendable constitutional provisions have been discussed extensively
elsewhere (Breslin, 2009; Albert, 2010; Roznai, 2015b). Albert (2010, pp. 666-667)
examines these purposes distinguishing between preservative entrenchment, transfor-
mational entrenchment and reconciliatory entrenchment. Preservative entrenchment
focuses on the past and aims to prevent the change of a historical situation, irrespective
of social or cultural changes. Transformational entrenchment, on the other hand, looks
towards the future and is aimed at provisions that facilitate change. The goal of recon-
ciliatory entrenchment is to overcome past conﬂicts and limit the risk of another round
of violence.
Roznai (2015b, pp. 13-25) builds on Albert’s terminology, by creating a taxonomy
with ﬁve categories. The ﬁve categories are preservative, transformative, aspirational,
conﬂictual, and Bricolage.
Preservative provisions aim to enshrine a certain part of the constitution that has
already been established in a society. One example of this could be protecting an existing
form of government, or protecting democracy. This situation is among the most typical
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for pre-commitment and also a justiﬁcation of constitutions from the perspective of
commitment in general. Constitutions can be seen as devices to formalize certain rules
of the society to make them more stable. This argument relates to constitutions as focal
points for coordination (Weingast, 1993) and constitutions as conventions (Hardin, 1989;
Ordeshook, 1992).
Transformative provisions aim to install a new institution or a new value set. A bill
of rights in a society with a record of human rights violations would be an example of
this kind of provision (Albert, 2010, p. 685).
Roznai’s third category is aspirational provisions. Aspirational provisions are similar
to transformative provisions, but have a more demanding purpose. These provisions
look at past deﬁciencies in a society and imagine a better society to which the drafters
aspire. Both categories aim to establish new conventional norms in a society. The goal of
aspirational provisions, however, is to change existing (formal or informal) institutions
through the means of a written constitution, while the goal of transformative provisions
is to create entirely new institutions. It has been argued that the goal of aspirational
provisions it too diﬃcult since it is less likely that these provisions will be adopted given
that the very elements of the political system they want to change work against them
(Elster, 2000b).
The fourth category, conﬂictual provisions, deals with provisions that aim to manage
conﬂicts. It has been proposed elsewhere that constitutions are devices for conﬂict
resolution (Grossman, 2004). Typical provisions for this category would include gag rules
and amnesties to prevent the resurfacing of previous conﬂicts.96 In Albert’s discussion of
the similar category of reconciliatory entrenchment, he argues that amnesties resemble
credible commitments towards the loser of a constitutional struggle (Albert, 2010, p.
693).
The ﬁnal category, Bricolage, captures the increasing phenomenon of constitutional
transplants. Time is the drafters’ scarcest resource, and on occasion they reduce their
96For a discussion of unamendability as gag rules, see Roznai (2015b, p. 20).
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own drafting costs and use what is at hands. Thus, unamendable provisions are able
to spread via this mechanism from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and be included for no
deeper reason other than expediency. What is common among all of these categories
(except for this last category, Bricolage) is that they require the unamendable provision
to be a credible commitment to be able to fulﬁll the declared function.
Interestingly, Roznai’s ﬁrst four categories map neatly onto the four reasons for con-
stitutional pre-commitment described by Elster. Preservative provisions are mainly
employed to thwart self-interest and prevent passionate moments from destroying the
fundamental framework of the constitution. Transformative and aspirational provisions
are put in place to ensure eﬃciency gains through the new clause as well as overcoming
hyperbolic discounting problems of implementation and strategic time-inconsistencies.
Finally, conﬂict management through amnesties is a typical example of preventing strate-
gic time-inconsistencies. If, for example, continued conﬂict is still a serious threat, an
autocratic elite might be afraid that the majority promise of amnesty could be rescinded
once they step down from power. In this sense, conﬂict management can work through
unamendable provisions.
Since Roznai’s categories harmonize well with Elster’s reasons, it might be useful
to go through the four categories again with a speciﬁc focus on how one might use
this harmony to justify the use of unamendable provisions. The desire to overcome
passions and interests rests on the assumption that a society might make rushed decisions
during a time of chaos when passions tend to be exacerbated. In a democracy, it would
be diﬃcult to prevent a majority from making decisions in these passionate moments.
Constitutional devices can be useful here by oﬀering the means to eliminate options or
create delays in the decision-making process allowing for a cooler, more rational decision
after the moment of crisis has passed (Elster, 2000b, pp. 124-125). Furthermore, a
qualiﬁed majority requirement and a separation of powers are instruments to prevent
rushed decisions as well as to limit interest groups’ ability to monopolize the decision-
making process. Unamendable provisions can be seen as devices to (1) generate delays in
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the sense that drafting a new constitution takes a longer time than simply amending an
existing one, and to (2) eliminate options from a possible set of actions that politicians
might take. One example would be protecting basic rights against the passions and
interests of a majority through an unamendable provision that guarantees those rights.
This device is, for example, used in the German Basic Law, where Article 1, guaranteeing
basic rights, is made unamendable by Article 79 paragraph (3).
The second reason Elster discusses is hyperbolic discounting.97 A typical illustration of
hyperbolic discounting might be the introduction of a costly educational reform, which
is delayed to a later point in time due to short-term considerations even though the
government knows it will be advantageous in the long-run. Once the later point arrives,
new short-term considerations might again hinder implementation. A constitution can
be used to commit to these long-term aims by including positive rights. Elster (2000b,
p. 142) goes as far as proposing ". . . perhaps even to entrench them as unamendable
rights." However, to our knowledge, no country has explicitly entrenched healthcare or
education through an unamendable provision.
The issue of strategic time-inconsistency deals with the credibility of promises made
by the future government. Whenever the state has a monopoly of violence, the question
arises of how governments can be prevented from abusing this monopoly in the future
without losing the ability to act as impartial enforcers. This argument goes back to
Hobbes (1651). More recently, this point was brought into focus in a contribution
analyzing the Glorious Revolution (North and Weingast, 1989). The situation has been
coined the "Dilemma of the Strong State" by Dreher and Voigt (2011). A typical solution
for this dilemma is establishing a separation of powers to generate checks and balances.
Choosing a form of government and a political setup to ensure a separation of powers is
a key area in which a constitution can serve as a commitment device against the future
abuse of governmental powers. Establishing an appropriate form of government and
delineating a political system’s structure are typical cases where unamendable provisions
97Hyperbolic discounting is an increasing rate of time preference over time so that the distant future
is more heavily discounted than the near future.
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are used (Roznai, 2015b, pp. 10-11).
Finally, another reason for constitutional pre-commitment is to ensure the political
process can be carried out more eﬃciently. A more stable political regime enables a
longer time horizon and improves the ability of citizens to engage in long-term activities,
such as growth-generating investments. One example for this would be the requirement
of qualiﬁed majorities to change constitutional provisions. As long as no coalition obtains
a large majority, citizens can build expectations based on rules that are protected by a
supermajority requirement. It is typically the case that some form of qualiﬁed majority
requirement governs the amendment process, either through the percentage of votes in
a single chamber or through a form of bicameralism. In Germany, both chambers need
to approve a constitutional change with a two-thirds majority according to Article 79 of
the Basic Law.98 An unamendable provision would be an example of preventing cyclic
changes with the hope of increasing stability.
Following the discussion of how unamendable provisions can be linked to the reasons
for collective pre-commitment, the next section goes through the four reasons again and
analyzes whether unamendable provisions are useful as devices to achieve these aims
of constitutional pre-commitment or whether they have major drawbacks of their own.
Furthermore, the question whether unamendable provisions should be used to commit
to a core set of values (in other words, the spirit of a constitution) is discussed.
6.4 Desirability of Unamendable Provisions
Recall that the ﬁrst potential reason to make provisions unamendable is to protect them
from the personal interest of subsequent legislatures, as well as from passionate decisions
that would be regretted later on. Constitutional pre-commitment can be justiﬁed to
overcome passions and interests that arise in times of normal politics. Following this
98There is a diﬀerence, however, since the article demands an absolute two-third majority of the
Bundestag and a simple two-third majority of the Bundesrat. Of course, the amendment rule does not
include the parts of the Basic Law which are included in the eternity clause.
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reasoning, a majority should not be able to pursue their interest against the minority
with regard to some especially important provisions. The protection of basic rights and
democracy are typical examples for this case. This argument is key to understanding the
choice of several countries to make certain provisions unamendable in their post-World
War II constitutions.
However, the use of unamendable clauses for this purpose is problematic. First, if
we consider the use of unamendable provisions to provide protection from self-interest,
one would need impartial drafters to achieve impartial provisions in the ﬁrst place.
While many authors argue that drafters are less self-interested then politicians in normal
times (see for example Ackerman, 1991; Elster, 1995), this by no means implies that
constitutional drafters do not pursue their personal aims while drafting a constitution.
It can be assumed that drafters of constitutions are also, at least partially, motivated
by their private interests and thus cannot be expected to impose selﬂess clauses. While
it is easy to see that this problem is more likely in non-democratic settings with an
unelected constitutional assembly, the case for selﬁsh drafters does not disappear in a
representative, elected assembly. Constitution-making is a rare event, which reduces
the possibility for citizens to hold drafters accountable, since there is no option to vote
them out of oﬃce.99 More generally, the notion that politicians are rational and self-
interested is not novel, it is the main foundation for the research ﬁeld of public choice
and political economy. From our perspective, there is no good reason to think that
drafters are diﬀerent.
Historical evidence tends to support the view that drafters are selﬁsh. Personal mo-
tives have played a key role, for example, in the drafting of the US constitution.100
Furthermore, few countries have a political elite that is large enough to prevent drafters
99Referendums as part of the constitution-making process can be seen as one mitigation for this
problem. However, the use of simple majority referendums might not be suﬃcient to constrain drafters,
especially in times of crisis. This issue has been extensively discussed in chapter 5.
100A detailed discussion of the focus on economic motives of drafters goes back to Beard (1913), which
spawned a series of econometric tests of his claims that personal, economic motives of drafters are the key
to understanding the US constitution. Several contributions have found robust evidence for the key role
of personal motives of delegates (McGuire and Ohsfeldt, 1984, 1986, 1989; Heckelman and Dougherty,
2013).
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from subsequently entering the political arena. Selﬁsh drafters might attempt to improve
their future status by using unamendable provisions to raise the future cost of changing
provisions. This is particularly problematic if an elite in power abuses an unamendable
provision in order to protect itself against the opposition in conﬂicts with high stakes
(Preuss, 2011, p. 447). It has been argued that an unamendable provision is a tool
that allows selﬁsh constitution-makers to install a preferred power asymmetry for the
majority (Roznai, 2015b, p. 5).101 In this light, it is doubtful whether the availability
of unamendable provisions will make self-interested decisions of politicians more or less
likely, taking the drafters’ own interests into account.
With regard to passions, times of constitution-making are rarely times of calm and
rational reasoning. Moments of constitution-making, in fact, are at an increased risk of
being times of heightened passions. In the past 40 years, more than 200 constitutions
have been made in times of crisis (Widner, 2008, p. 1513). This implies that drafters
are unlikely to be particularly cool-headed in their decision-making during the drafting
process. Therefore, since the process itself is likely to be passionate, it seems incongruous
that the moment of drafting is the optimal time to install a device against passions. In
the words of Elster (2000b, p. 173), "[i]t is mainly if the framers are impartial and know
that impartiality may be lacking on future occasions that they will have an incentive
to pre-commit themselves. Although this case cannot be excluded, I have argued that
there is no reason to think that it is typical or frequent". Combining the two arguments
presented, one can conclude that drafters are unlikely to act without self-interest and,
even if they do so, their passion would be another obstacle to create unamendable
provisions that protect from these same passions and interests. It seems doubtful, for
these reasons, that drafters can use unamendability as a rational means to control either
passion or self-interest.
The second reason to motivate the use of unamendable provisions for pre-commitment
101In a similar vein, it has been argued that the informal unamendability of the Jewish character of
Israel and its dominance over other constitutional clauses is used to establish a hierarchy of citizens
(Masri, 2017).
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is non-strategic time-inconsistency. Discounting payoﬀs over time means that individuals
often obtain less utility or disutility from distant consequences than from consequences
in present times. One relevant reason for this is that waiting is costly, and another
relevant reason is that, over time, payoﬀs present the risk of either disappearing or de-
preciating. When either of these two eﬀects is strong, they can lead to non-strategic
time-inconsistency, which produces a switch in choice among varying delays while main-
taining stable preferences.
Regarding the ﬁrst reason to discount, a large number of studies have shown that
people often display self-control problems which lead them to choices favoring immediate
gratiﬁcation over welfare-enhancing alternatives (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). This
is the classic problem of the dieter. While a person trying to lose weight is perfectly
aware that the long-term eﬀects of a salad are welfare-enhancing, the direct gratiﬁcation
of eating the French fries is too tempting to resist. For these cases, pre-commitment is
welfare-enhancing, since it eliminates temptation problems hence allowing the agent to
choose the welfare-enhancing option, by disallowing him or her to choose the tempting
but welfare-decreasing option.
Regarding the second reason to discount, it has been shown that agents who do not face
behavioral biases will reverse their choice when the probability of the payoﬀ disappearing
is uncertain (see for example Sozou, 1998). For these agents, the welfare-enhancing
mechanism, as opposed to pre-commitment, is an increase in ﬂexibility that allows them
to update their choice upon the availability of new information (Casari, 2009).
From this perspective, a pre-commitment device would be useful to solve non-strategic
time inconsistencies in constitutional choice if and only if these inconsistencies are driven
by behavioral biases and not by the uncertainty of the future. If changes in social
choices are driven by societal preferences that change over time, a pre-commitment
device will be welfare-decreasing. This is especially so in the framework of constitu-
tional choice, where commitments are not really self-binding but rather other-binding,
given that a constitution’s aim is also to commit future generations; the phenomenon of
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pre-commitment does not easily translate from individual choice to social choice when
considering inter-generational concerns.102 Moreover, future-generation binding seems
especially problematic for strong substantive provisions (Elster, 2000b, p. 170). In con-
trast to abstract provisions, the preferences for substantive provisions are those that are
more likely to change over time.
From a practical perspective, it has been argued that the risk of binding future gener-
ations is only of limited importance given the fact that a constitution’s average lifespan
is 19 years, which is roughly one generation (Roznai, 2015a, p. 45). Following this line
of reasoning, unamendable clause is a more ﬁtting name than eternity clause, since the
average lifespan of a constitution is nowhere near eternal. The problem with this argu-
mentation stems from the eﬀect unamendable clauses have on a constitution’s lifespan.
If we turn the argument around, the question becomes whether unamendable provi-
sions have an eﬀect on a constitution’s lifespan? Looking at the empirical evidence at
hand, the closest proxy for a direct eﬀect of unamendability is the eﬀect of the ease of
amendment. Empirically, ease of amendment has an inverse U-shaped eﬀect on the con-
stitutional lifespan (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins, 2009, p. 140). Since unamendable
provisions tend to take the ease of amendment to one extreme end of this variable, the
evidence at least hints at a negative eﬀect of unamendable provisions on constitutional
longevity.
The third reason to use unamendability is to overcome the problem of strategic
time-inconsistencies, which could potentially be mitigated through the existence of pre-
commitment devices. Two main issues to motivate this use can be identiﬁed, namely
mitigating the dilemma of the strong state and providing credible commitment for regime
changes in conﬂict situations. The dilemma of the strong state, was mentioned in the
previous section. By binding its own hands through the deliberate creation of a sep-
aration of powers, the government can credibly commit not to abuse its own powers.
102Even if societal preferences remained stable, which is unlikely, pre-commitment would still be welfare-
decreasing as a device to tackle time-inconsistencies if they were driven not by temptation but by
uncertainty.
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Separation of powers can be instituted in two classical ways; either horizontally (between
the executive, legislative and judicial branches), or vertically (through a federal system).
Making either an independent judiciary, a presidential or parliamentarian form of gov-
ernment, or a federal system, unamendable, can strengthen the separation of powers
and increase the credibility of the commitment. Thus, unamendable provisions would
have an indirect commitment function. Separation of power is a ﬁrst-level device to
design the machinery of government, while making them unamendable is a higher level
constraint to the machinery of amending, which reinforces the ﬁrst-level device (Elster,
2000b, pp. 117-118).
In other words, unamendable provisions can be seen as a separation of powers done
over time. When a certain clause is made unamendable, parts of the political power,
namely the power to amend, remains with the original drafters and prevents future
governments from using it. This separation of powers over time has the advantage
that the commitment is credible, assuming the constitution is enforced and no new
constitution comes into action.103 Using the case of the Weimar Republic in Germany
as a negative example (which had very low requirements for amendment),104 it becomes
clear how this commitment can add to constitutional stability. However, this separation
over time has a problem: its eﬀect in times of crisis or in case of substantial changes.
While an “orthodox” separation of powers still allows for all powers to act in unison
if circumstances require it, a separation of powers over time such as the one generated
by unamendable clauses is unable to allow for uniﬁed action in times of crisis. It has
been argued that unamendability acts like a lock on the door, which is eﬀective in
normal times but cannot withstand extraordinary force (Roznai, 2015a, p. 47). While
vertical and horizontal separation of powers resembles locking a door with more than one
key and dividing them among people with diﬀerent interests, making certain provisions
unamendable can be seen as locking the door and throwing the key away.
103Although to a certain extent, the ﬁrst assumption could be considered suﬃcient given that if the
constitution is enforced then it is substantially more diﬃcult to deviate from the indicated path.
104In the Weimar Republic, constitutional amendments could be done by ordinary law-making, which
might have motivated the German use of eternity clauses (Preuss, 2011, p. 436).
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The second issue is using unamendable provisions to make constitutional agreements
intended to end conﬂicts more credibly. Typical examples of this issue are amnesty
clauses protecting the former government from prosecution after a regime change and
gag rules to prevent existing disputes from worsening. Amnesties are a case where a
strategic time-inconsistency arises because the opposition to the old government has
incentives to agree to an amnesty clause when the threat of conﬂict still exists, and
then renegotiate on their promise once they are in power (Sutter, 1995).105 Being
aware of this risk, the incumbent government might prefer a violent conﬂict as opposed
to stepping down and facing prosecution despite the promise of an amnesty. In this
situation, making the promise as an unamendable constitutional provision can increase
the promise’s credibility and thereby tip the scales to prevent violent conﬂict. However,
this argument only deals with the case of amnesties which are in the interest of all
parties. The ﬂipside of making amnesties unamendable is the risk that an autocratic
government will use amnesties to absolve themselves from crimes committed during their
reign.106 In this way, they protect themselves in case of a transition by having raised
the costs of removing the amnesty, since rewriting a whole constitution is always more
costly than amending a single provision.
Even in the abovementioned case where the opposition agrees to provide amnesty,
the victims of the crimes may not be represented by either of the two groups. One can
imagine a scenario where two elite groups struggle for power and use an unamendable
amnesty despite the fact that victims in the general population are strongly opposed.
Recognition of these types of risks is one of the reasons why international law tends
to disallow amnesties. As an example, the Oﬃce of the United Nations High Com-
105This renegotiation threat was the case in the aftermath of the democratization of several countries in
Latin America after military dictatorships, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. The amnesties
lead later on to public unrest and repeated requests from the Interamerican Court of Human Rights
and the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights to declare them void retroactively. In Brazil, Chile
and Uruguay the provisions are still valid and the renegotiation threat did not materialize, while in
Argentina they were declared void by a Supreme Court ruling in 2005. See Legarre (2006) for more
details.
106These self-amendments were once again seen in most dictatorships during the second half of the
twentieth century in Latin America. Had these controversial amnesties been made unamendable, the
polemic and social unrest that they caused might have been more severe.
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misioner for Human Rights (2009) has stated: "Under various sources of international
law and under United Nations policy, amnesties are impermissible if they: (a) Prevent
prosecution of individuals who may be criminally responsible for war crimes, genocide,
crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights, including gender-speciﬁc
violations; (b) Interfere with victims’ right to an eﬀective remedy, including reparation;
or (c) Restrict victims’ and societies’ right to know the truth about violations of human
rights and humanitarian law. Moreover, amnesties that seek to restore human rights
must be designed with a view to ensuring that they do not restrict the rights restored
or in some respects perpetuate the original violations.”
The rationale for gag rules is to turn compromises between conﬂicting groups more
credible by protecting them with unamendability and thereby also silencing future mo-
tions to re-negotiate them. An interesting example of a gag rule in a diﬀerent context
can be found in the status quo rule from 1852 of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in
Jerusalem. The diﬀerent Christian groups sharing the church would resort to violence
in an attempt to obtain more exclusive rights for the use of speciﬁc areas of the church.
The Ottoman ruler at the time ﬁxed the status quo and decided that the rule would
never be changed in the future, thereby making it eﬀectively unamendable.
The problem with the use of gag rules is twofold. First, both necessary compromises as
well as issues where one can ﬁnd clear winners and losers can be gagged. Using the gag
rule in this way might ﬁx a temporary power diﬀerence between groups in society and
prevent renegotiation, but it might also lead to dangerous diﬀerences between de jure
and de facto power in the future. Second, silencing an issue does not necessarily help to
solve its underlying problems and may even exacerbate it. In the example of the Holy
Sepulchre, violent outbreaks due to the underlying conﬂict have not completely stopped
this day despite more than 150 years of having the gag rule in place. Altogether, both
examples of conﬂict-solving mechanisms show that they are problematic as commitment
devices to overcome strategic time-inconsistency.
Finally, unamendable provisions could be used to ensure eﬃciency gains. This would
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be done by expanding the time horizon and by preventing the cyclic amending of consti-
tutional provisions following changes in political power. Cyclic amendment would only
be a problem if the shifts in the majorities were large enough to fulﬁll the amendment
requirement in the ﬁrst place, which is typically a two-third majority requirement. Even
if a society has big swings in its majorities, making provisions unamendable in the con-
stitutional drafting process would either require selﬂess drafters, which seems to be an
unlikely assumption as discussed above, or simply establish a "ﬁrst-mover advantage" to
the faction which is enjoying the majority during the constitution’s drafting, which is
not necessarily a more desirable alternative.
It has been shown that the eﬀect of the ﬂexibility of the amendment process on a
constitution’s longevity follows an inverted U-shape (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins,
2009, p. 140). In other words, constitutions that are very easy or very diﬃcult to
amend are more likely to have a shorter lifespan. This empirical observation ﬁts with
the prediction that qualiﬁed majorities provide a middle ground for the amendment
process between simple majority rules and unamendability, giving greater stability to
a constitution. Therefore, choosing the most extreme version of a diﬃcult amendment
procedure, namely unamendability, seems to be a suboptimal measure to increase the
time horizon, all other things being equal.107
Beyond these potential reasons for commitment outlined by Elster, protection of the
constitution’s core is yet another motive discussed in the literature about unamendable
constitutions. In other words, unamendable provisions might be considered a credible
commitment to a particular set of values. While amendment powers are argued to be
implicitly unable to dismantle a democracy (Roznai, 2015a, p. 27), it is unclear how
this implicit ban would be enforced and how to distinguish which amendments would
constitute a destruction of democracy and which would not. Unamendable provisions
might be used to protect the spirit of a constitution and thus democracy in an explicit
107One can argue that constitutions that otherwise have a lax amendment procedure could proﬁt from
the additional stability through unamendability. Which eﬀect prevails is an empirical question and
outside the scope of this contribution.
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way.
The core or spirit of the document is not necessarily at risk from any of the four reasons
discussed previously, but might nevertheless be a value that drafters want to commit to.
It has even been argued that the main reason to use unamendability is to protect the
founding myth of the constitution from change. In other words, unamendability is the
guardian of the constitution’s identity (Roznai, 2015b, p. 26). Once this protection fails
and the relevant provisions are changed, the society might veer into chaos and possibly
civil war (Preuss, 2011, p. 445)
The upside of protecting a set of core values is that the risk of abusing the amendment
process to destroy constitutionalism or democracy is mitigated, assuming that the con-
stitution is set in a way that these values are included and protected by unamendable
provisions. From the perspective of normative individualism, this approach leads to
problems. The constitution in itself has no inherent value besides the eﬀect it has on
the individuals who are living under its rules. It is important that a society is not seen
as just a larger individual, but as an aggregation of the individuals living in it (Elster,
2000b, p. 92). Therefore, protecting the constitution’s spirit or integrity is only valuable
if it has a positive overall impact on aggregated welfare in the society and is not a good
or bad thing, per se.
There are, however, two potential downsides when considering the overall impact on
the aggregate welfare of a society. The ﬁrst downside becomes immediately clear, namely
that the tool of unamendability can also be used to protect autocratic values. As an
example, a dictatorship oppressing a minority can enshrine constitutional provisions
that will perpetually limit the minority’s power. This not only justiﬁes the dictatorship
oppression the minority group, but also makes it harder for the minority group to ﬁnd
legal channels to challenge the oppression. Constitutions are a part of many diﬀerent
forms of government. It is unclear how to determine which constitutions incorporate a
"good" founding spirit and which ones are more on the side of "evil". Autocracies might
create constitutions that protect their core values and the sources of their power simply
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to increase the cost of transitions in case of an uprising against them. It is diﬃcult to see
how a government formed by selﬁsh actors can be stopped from using unamendability
simply for their own beneﬁt.
Another dangerous downside of using unamendability to protect the core or spirit of
a constitution relates to the fact that constitutional bargaining is costly. It is argued
that protecting the core set of values is not a big problem as long as the citizens still
have the constitutive power to replace the old constitution with a new one (Roznai,
2017, 5). Now, assume a scenario where most provisions of the old constitution are
acceptable to the society, but a change in preferences has made one or more of the "core"
provisions unpopular. All citizens would like to change this provision, but to do so they
must draft a new constitution. Even if everyone is satisﬁed with the other parts of the
constitution as they are, placing them back on the negotiation table by redrafting the
whole constitution opens the door for strategic bargaining.108 This cost arises because
choosing among constitutions can be likened to a game called Battle of the Sexes in game
theory (McAdams, 2009, pp. 239-241). Even when all members of society are better oﬀ
with any possible constitution, each member still ranks the diﬀerent options in diﬀerent
ways. For example, assume that the old constitution did not include a positive right to
work. While left-wing as well as right-wing groups would prefer to have a constitution,
the left-wing group would like to include such a provisions and the right-wing would
prefer to keep the old setting. In this way, costly negotiations due to strategic options
would arise. If these negotiating costs are high enough, a society will refrain from
drafting a new constitution even if all of its members dislike certain unamendable core
values of the current constitution. This argument presents additional support for the
classical critique of “dead-hand” constitutionalism and casts some doubts on whether
the protection of the constitution’s spirit is something beneﬁcial for the society. An
example for the problems of dead-hand constitutionalism can be found in the case of
108A good example of the high costs of bargaining in constitution-making is presented by the failed
attempt to draft a new constitution in Turkey. For a more detailed examination of the process, see
Yegen (2017).
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Bangladesh.109
6.5 An Expressive Device with a Functional Eﬀect
The previous section oﬀers arguments that give reasonable doubt that it is desirable
to use unamendable provisions simply for what the functional perspective would call
credible pre-commitment. It would seem then that the expressive function of unamend-
ability is the main driver of its increased use. However, the lack of desirability as a
commitment device should not be given to mean that an unamendable provision has no
eﬀect other than its expressive use In this respect, the ﬁrst relevant issue to evaluate is
whether unamendable clauses have an eﬀect besides pre-commitment, and the second is
why they are put into use.
We have already pointed out that the entrenchment unamendable provisions oﬀer is
not absolute, since citizens can always decide to draft a new constitution (Albert, 2010,
p. 684). One might argue that whenever a substantial majority agrees to dispose an un-
amendable provision, they will do so by writing a new constitution; this argument seems
to reduce the potency of unamendable provisions. However, this reasoning ignores the
costs of renegotiation as discussed in the previous section. In this scenario unamendable
provisions have a strong functional eﬀect. This ﬁnding leads to the question of why
drafters would put them in the constitution in the ﬁrst place, given that they are not
desirable as commitment devices.
We assume that drafters not only care about the expressive eﬀects of unamendable
provisions, but have a functional aim in mind. Even if one argues that they are mainly in
place for their expressive use, looking at the functional eﬀects of these expressive clauses
can help gain a better understanding of potential underlying reasons for the visible
increase in the use of unamendable provisions. To evaluate this functional purpose, one
has two options: to consider that the drafters are benevolent when writing the clauses,
109For details on this case, see Hoque (2017).
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and to consider that they are not.
If the drafters are benevolent we can infer that they will use unamendable provi-
sions paternalistically to improve the welfare of future generations. Using constitutional
constraints can be seen as a self-binding act only if the drafters anticipate that future po-
litical agents will prefer to be restricted for the same reasons that motivate the drafters
to install the unamendable provision in the ﬁrst place. This argument is particularly
relevant for provisions that fall under preservative entrenchment. It has been argued
that preservative entrenchment can be compared to an originalist interpretation of the
constitution, at least in spirit (Albert, 2010, p. 687). Originalism can be argued to in-
corporate certain paternalistic traits, which also establishes a link between paternalistic
policies and preservative entrenchment. In both cases, the will of the drafters dominates
the subsequent generations, supposedly for their own good.
Transformative entrenchment is another area in which this paternalistic behavior ﬁts
well. In this area, drafters may aim to improve the lot for future generations, for
example after bad experiences, and move society into a better direction. Germany and
Italy with their post-World War II constitutions are good examples for this argument.
Looking back at the failure of their respective authoritarian central states, and in order
to transform their respective societies, Germany drafted a constitution that entrenched
federalism (among other provisions), while Italy entrenched republicanism.
However, this behavior might be seen as myopic or at least naïve, since it shows a
lack of concern for the changing preferences of future generations. If preferences are
changing, the use of unamendability could generate problems.110 Even in the cases of
Germany and Italy, it is possible that future generations would ﬁnd diﬀerent structures
of government to be more suitable, even though they would like to maintain other parts
of the existing constitution. Failure to change unamendable clauses, resulting from the
110The idea that social norms and preferences change over time, even substantially so, is hardly con-
testable. A salient example of this would be slavery, which was considered normal less than two centuries
ago, and now is unthinkable in most of the world. Abortion could be considered another example in
many countries, and so could marriage between people from diﬀerent religions, diﬀerent ethnicities, or
the same sex.
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prohibitive bargaining costs of redrafting the whole constitution as argued above, could
exacerbate tensions within the society. The ﬁnding that an amendment procedure that
is too rigid reduces the expected lifespans of constitutions is further support for this
tentative claim (Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins, 2009, p. 140).
A diﬀerent explanation does not require the assumption that drafters are myopic,
but rather questions their motives for using unamendable provisions. Assuming that
drafters are rational and act strategically, the explanation provided in an earlier para-
graph supporting the notion that the drafters are paternalistic falls apart. Under this
assumption of rational behavior, drafters will only make provisions unamendable if they
expect to beneﬁt from it.
We have argued that the standard credible commitment explanations do not suﬃ-
ciently explain the functional use of unamendable provisions, and therefore another
strategic motive must be used to explain drafters’ behavior. Using the analogy of hege-
monic preservation with regard to the judiciary’s increasing power through judicial re-
view in constitutional issues may shed some light on the issue (Hirschl, 2004, p. 90).
Following this argument, the political elites give power to the judiciary to fortify their
current political power and limit the power of standard democratic policy mechanisms
to overturn the current political hegemony. In the case of unamendable provisions,
the drafters, who can be seen as the current political elite threatened by subsequent
changes in political power, aim to secure their preferences by making certain provisions
unamendable. Similar to the hegemonic preferences argument, the key explanatory fac-
tor is protection from the threat of losing political power. Pursuing this argument a bit
further, and assuming that drafters want to maintain their preferred provisions for as
long as possible, one can also explain the seemingly myopic ignorance of a new genera-
tion’s preference shift. Instead of assuming the drafters are myopic about the shift, this
preference shift can be seen as the motivation for them to use unamendable provisions.
The discussion of constitutional theories versus constitutional interests (Vanberg and
Buchanan, 1989) might shed some light on the two arguments oﬀered above. In one case,
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the drafters are seen as using a device which, in their own understanding, will be bene-
ﬁcial for posterity. The problem is not constitutional interest, but rather constitutional
theories which are not aligned with the real workings of the device that they are using.
The second case is an example of constitutional interests at work. The drafters in this
case are fully aware of the way in which the unamendable provision will aﬀect future
generations, but their own interests and the beneﬁt they gain from either its expressive
or its functional value, supersedes their concern for future generations.
We have argued that unamendable provisions are not useful as pre-commitment de-
vices but they might be desirable as paternalistic devices for the drafters. In order to
analyze speciﬁc unamendable provisions, it appears to be more fruitful to analyze the
motives for using unamendable provisions from this paternalistic perspective rather than
through the perspective of credible commitment. When analyzing from the paternalis-
tic perspective, pessimistic assumptions about the motives of the drafters appear to be
more consistent with reality. While the self-interest of drafters seems to be a natural
part of the drafting process, their naivety and myopia appear to be rather constructed
to ﬁt a preferred story about impartiality and selﬂessness which is otherwise rare in
politics. The empirical result of Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009, p. 205) indicates
that executive power was involved in the constitution-making process in more than 50%
of all constitutions promulgated between 1789 and 2005. This ﬁnding seems to support
the idea that drafters use unamendable provisions to extend their inﬂuence and power
to the time after the end of their drafting duties, and goes against the idea that drafters
are benevolently paternalistic and selﬂess.
6.6 Conclusion
Using a functional perspective, this chapter has shown than unamendable provisions
are more easily understood when thought of as paternalistic devices rather than as
pre-commitment devices. An analysis from this perspective highlights the problems un-
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amendable provisions face. Speciﬁcally, changes in societal preferences over time, con-
stitutional drafters with hegemonic preferences, and abuse by actors who seek impunity
for their crimes. From the paternalistic perspective, the drafters’ intentions are the key
to assess the eﬀects of unamendable provisions. The analysis suggests the more realistic
view is focusing on the dangerous case of selﬁsh drafters rather than the often-employed
view of the selﬂess drafter.
These results imply that the key problems that lessen the desirability of unamendable
provisions from a functional perspective relate to the change of preferences over time and
the risk of abuse by selﬁsh drafters. These problems can be more generally seen as the
risks of strong entrenchment and would also apply, to a limited degree, to alternatives
such as the entrenchment simulator proposed by Albert (2010, pp. 706-711). However,
limiting the potentially damaging impact of unamendability should not be considered a
negligible feature. Sunset clauses with a duration of less than a generation, as proposed
in the entrenchment simulator, and limits on the ability of drafters to hold political
oﬃce after the drafting, oﬀer further mitigation.
Given that unamendable provisions are still strong in our constitutional reality, the
question of how to mitigate the potential damage from the problematic aspects men-
tioned arises. It has been argued that constitutional courts play a crucial role in this
setting. On the one hand, they need to protect the constitution and prevent extra-
constitutional actions by the citizens, but at the same time they should arguably protect
the right of self-determination (Preuss, 2011, p. 443). To protect this right, courts could
stop enforcing problematic unamendable provisions thereby bringing them into desue-
tude.111 However, this behavior would give enormous power to an unelected body. In
addition, there are no clearly established criteria to determine if an unamendable provi-
sion is problematic enough for the courts to interfere. A ﬁnal determination concerning
the degree to which courts might limit the risks we have discussed, and if that beneﬁt is
worth the cost of giving (informal) amendment powers to an unelected group of individ-
111For a more detailed discussion about the theory and implications of constitutional desuetude, see
Albert (2014)
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uals, goes beyond the scope of this discussion. It can be said, however, that the courts
are one of the key actors when it comes to the (non-) enforcement of unamendability.
This analysis is the ﬁnal step of the analysis of the constitution-making process as
laid out in the discussion of the scope of this dissertation. We argue that the process of
constitution-making has important eﬀects on the outcome. A closer look at referendums
as one example of procedural rules highlights the transmission channels of procedural
rules as well as the limits to their functionality. A normative discussion of the major-
ity rules for referendums built upon this argument and shows that qualiﬁed majority
requirements can strengthen the eﬃcacy of referendums with regards to legitimacy and
stability of constitutions. This chapter has ﬁnished the analysis by taking a diﬀerent
perspective, namely how drafters can use unamendable provisions to prolong their in-
ﬂuence on the written constitution and the reasons for them doing so. The next chapter
will put this ﬁndings in context and highlight relevance as well as limitations of the
approach taken here.
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Concluding Remarks
7.1 Summary
Besides the introductory chapter and the overview of the key literature, this dissertation
is comprised of four content chapters. Chapter 3 focuses on the factors driving the choice
of the form of government. So far, it had been argued that higher income inequality
makes a parliamentarian system less likely. Using a rational-choice model and focusing
on a set of assumptions that ﬁts well with unstable democracies, this chapter ﬁnds that
the composition of the constitutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of
form of government. Especially when the policy conﬂict within the society (measured
by income inequality in the model presented here) is high, a change in the majorities in
the constitutional assembly has a strong eﬀect on the choice of form of government.
Chapter 4 looks closer at the eﬀect of procedural rules on government constraints.
One of the main conﬂicts in constitution-making is between the drafters and the citi-
zens with regard to the level of future government constraints. The use of referendums
for ratiﬁcation has been proposed as a tool to constrain drafters and increase the inclu-
siveness of constitution-making. The model presented here highlights that referendums
for ratiﬁcation can successfully constrain drafters, but do fail in exactly those situations
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characterized by uncertainty when they are most needed. To support this theoretical
result, a domestic conﬂict indicator as a proxy for uncertainty is regressed on constitu-
tional referendum results. While most regression results are statistically insigniﬁcant, a
closer look at the few cases of failed referendums supports the predictions of the model.
In the four cases of Uruguay, Albania, Kenya and Zimbabwe, the citizens voted against
a constitution with few government constraints during times of low uncertainty. These
cases highlight the eﬀectiveness of referendums in normal situations.
Chapter 5 addresses the divergence in majority rules at the moment of creating or
reforming constitutions. While constitutions require, in most cases, qualiﬁed majorities
in order to be approved at the constitutional assembly, they normally require only simple
majorities to be ratiﬁed at the referendum. We analyze the set of conditions under
which each majority rule is preferable for constitutional referendums. We argue that
the simple majority requirement for referendums in constitution-making, which is nearly
universally used, lacks a clear theoretical justiﬁcation. Qualiﬁed majority rules increase
legitimacy and provide additional checks on the drafters. We further highlight when
simple majority rules have advantages: when decision-making costs in the referendum
are high. Thereafter, we present an evaluation mechanism to identify the cases in which
each majority rule should be used to increase stability and legitimacy. We then apply
this evaluation mechanism to the constitution-making processes in Poland, Bolivia and
Egypt, which are three examples of diverging majority rules..
Chapter 6 looks at the functional value of unamendable provisions as commitment
devices and presents a new functional theory based on drafters’ paternalism. Unamend-
able provisions are found to be problematic as commitment devices. The key problems
that limit the unamendable provisions’ desirability relate to changing preferences over
time and the risk of abuse by selﬁsh drafters. A better functional perspective of una-
mendable provisions can be given by reference to paternalistic policies. In this sense,
an incentive-based perspective of the drafters is taken, which stands in stark contrast
to the assumption of drafters losing their self-interest during constitutional moments.
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7.2 Relevance of Findings
Given these ﬁndings, it is useful to return to the arguments made in the introduction
why economists, legal scholar and policymakers should consider reading this dissertation
and evaluate the relevance of the ﬁndings.
Chapter 3 uses an abstract model of choice of form of government and modiﬁes the
way in which the institutional framework of constitutional choice has been modeled
previously in the literature. The results highlight that the eﬀect of income inequality on
the choice of form of government depends on the institutional setting. In this case, the
composition of the constitutional assembly forms a transmission channel through which
the eﬀect of income inequality operates. More generally, this ﬁnding supports the claim
that institutions matter.
Not only the institutional details matter, but also the circumstances under which
institutions operate. Chapter 4 shows that the eﬀect of a required referendum depends
on the level of uncertainty faced by politicians and citizens. Referendums are needed the
most when uncertainty is high to constrain drafters, yet ironically they are least eﬃcient
in situations of high uncertainty. This ﬁnding highlights that institutional rules such
as the referendum requirement should not be judged outside the environment in which
they operate. This argument supports the case made for the importance of informal
institutions (see Williamson, 2009, for an overview article).
Finally, property rights are among the most important legal rules from an economic
perspective. The model in chapter 4 highlights that drafters with a short-term perspec-
tive will place less emphasis on property rights protection. In cases where uncertainty
is low or where citizens put very high emphasis on government constraints, including a
required referendum as part of the procedural rules of constitution-making strengthens
de jure property rights as one part of executive constraints.
This dissertation repeatedly focused on self-interested drafters to analyze constitution-
making. Instead of focusing on constitutional moments and selﬂess drafters (Ackerman,
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1991), we highlighted that constitution-making is often as riddled by personal interests
of the drafters as are ordinary politics. While the constitutional rules are more general
than ordinary legislation, the drafters are aware that they are likely to belong to the
political elite under the new constitution. Thus, they have an interest in tailoring the
rules in their own favor. This ﬁnding should be taken into account when discussing
procedural rules of constitution-making.
Chapter 6 highlights that the idea of unamendable provisions as a credible commit-
ment towards future generations is ﬂawed. A better functional theory of their use is
provided through the lens of paternalistic drafters. Especially when dealing with the
legal interpretation of unamendable provisions, legal scholars should take the potential
self-interest of drafters into account.
The rules of this process do not fall from heaven and policymakers can use some of
the ﬁndings from this dissertation. Chapter 4 highlights that simply requiring a referen-
dum is no panacea to constrain the drafters. A democratically elected assembly, which
typically has more than one party with veto powers, in combination with a referendum
oﬀers a better chance to constrain drafters in times of crisis.
Chapter 5 delves deeper into one speciﬁc procedural rule, namely the majority re-
quirement in constitutional referendums. The key recommendation from this chapter
is to use the same majority requirement for all steps of ratiﬁcation, namely a qualiﬁed
majority requirement. We also discuss the reasons to deviate from this rule of thumb,
namely the need for a swift decision or high decision-making costs in case of a failed
referendum.
Finally, chapter 6 highlights why unamendable provisions are not desirable as commit-
ment devices when drafters aim to increase stability or legitimacy of the constitution.
Other tools should be used to strengthen certain constitutional provisions, such as un-
amendability for a ﬁxed time or higher amendment requirements.
While this dissertation has looked at the process of constitution-making from the
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perspective of diﬀerent academic disciplines, some limitations to the approaches taken
need to be discussed.
7.3 Limitations
Chapter 3 looks at the choice of form of government and not at other constitutional
features. In constitution-making, the whole bundle of features is normally chosen at
the same moment in time. This bundling opens the door for logrolling solutions, where
the diﬀerent groups involved in the constitution-making compromise on one feature to
get their preferred solution in another area. This limitation is the cost of maintaining
analytic tractability in the model. The conﬂict about the choice of one feature is a
simpliﬁcation of the more ﬁne-grained bargaining process, but is useful to highlight the
tensions involved.
This constitutional bargaining process links to a limitation of chapter 4. Since the
focus of this chapter lies on the citizen-politician conﬂict, the intra-group conﬂict of
politicians is not explicitly modeled. Instead, a more simple minority group power
coeﬃcient is used. The chapter gives a non-formal introduction into constitutional
bargaining to mitigate this limitation. The empirical analysis deals only with parts
of the transmission channels proposed in the theoretical model. This limitation can
be explained by the problem to identify the short-term and long-term preferences of
drafters. Without a good proxy for these preferences, it is diﬃcult to test the eﬀect of
uncertainty on the content of the draft.
Throughout the dissertation, we have assumed that there is no conﬂict within the
respective groups. However, the groups in the real world are more heterogeneous than
this assumption. This simpliﬁed view of the world allows for a sharper analysis of the
intra-group conﬂicts, but is another limitation of this dissertation.
The normative focus of chapter 5 leads to a limitation of the approach. The key
question is whether the aims of legitimacy and stability are congruent with the aims
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of the drafters. Throughout the thesis, we argue that self-interest of drafters plays a
key role to understand the process of constitution-making. In this case, the normative
results of this chapter would be more relevant for third parties who can set standards
or put pressure on the elites who choose the rules.
One general problem when dealing with the eﬀects of procedural rules is the question
who makes those rules for constitution-making. While chapter 4 touches on the issue
when discussing referendum majority rules, more general issues such as whether or not
a referendum is required for ratiﬁcation are assumed exogenous throughout this disser-
tation. This dissertation has been limited to understanding the eﬀects of procedural
rules, but explaining why they are chosen is a logical next step.
7.4 Opportunities for Future Research
The ﬁrst step to understand why procedural rules are chosen is to clearly identify who
makes the procedural rules for constitution-making. This issue has received no scholarly
attention and can form a ﬁrst step to understand the choice of procedural rules. Once the
actors have been identiﬁed, one needs to highlight the constraints faced by the "agenda-
setters" for a clear understanding of the making of procedural rules. To gain a full
picture of the process of constitution-making, taking these step would be an important
area for future research.
Behavioral economics is another avenue for future research on the process of constitution-
making. Especially when analyzing bargaining situations in constitutional assemblies,
loosening the rationality assumptions can lead to a more realistic picture. The research
in behavioral political economy is one example in a closely related area where behavioral
models are used to deepen the understanding of political processes (see Schnellenbach
and Schubert, 2015, for an overview of the emerging literature).
In the context of chapter 4, whether a constitutional assembly is dominated by a single
group or not is very important. To test the theoretical claims in the chapter, we would
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need better information on the assemblies in the constitution-making processes around
the world. Creating an indicator whether an assembly had one or more groups with veto
power is a starting point. However, especially in one-party systems, intra-group conﬂict
might play a key role to understand the dynamics within the assembly. To detect the
inter-group conﬂicts, detailed case studies are necessary for the respective assemblies. A
deeper look into the potential eﬀect of inter-group conﬂict presents a fruitful opportunity
for future research.
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Executive Summary
This dissertation analyzes the overarching question of how the process of constitution-
making aﬀects the written constitution. To shed more light on this issue from a broad
perspective, positive and normative research questions are dealt with. Besides an intro-
ductory chapter, which sets the stage for the dissertation and an overview of the key
literature in chapter 2, this dissertation consists of four content chapters and a short
concluding chapter.
Chapter 3 deals with the question whether the process of constitution-making aﬀects
the choice of constitutional features. A rational-choice model shows how the introduc-
tion of a stage of constitution-making inﬂuences the constitutional choice of form of
government. The set of assumptions used for this model ﬁts particularly well for new
and unstable democracies, which are at the same time the kind of countries that of-
ten change their constitution. So far, income inequality has been argued to be a key
determinant for the choice of form of government (Robinson and Torvik, 2016). This
chapter arrives at a diﬀerent conclusion and shows that the eﬀect of income inequality
is determined by the composition of the constitutional assembly.
Chapter 4 looks further into the details of the constitution-making process and dis-
cusses which procedural rules can eﬀectively constrain the drafters. To analyze this
question, we use a theoretical model as well as a regression analysis. The model high-
lights that drafters are willing to constrain themselves even without external rules when
long-term rents are important to them. In situations with high uncertainty, these rents
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become less important and procedural rules are needed to constrain drafters. Ironi-
cally, the model shows that referendums work best as a tool to constrain drafters when
uncertainty is low and worst when uncertainty is high. Thus, referendums alone are
insuﬃcient to properly constrain drafters.
Following this positive analysis, chapter 5 and chapter 6 deal with more normative
issues. Chapter 5 follows up on the issue referendums for the ratiﬁcation of constitu-
tions and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of simple and qualiﬁed majority
requirements. We argue that the nearly universal use of simple majority requirements
cannot be normatively justiﬁed, especially given that most ratiﬁcation procedures in
constitutional assemblies require a qualiﬁed majority. We argue that path dependency
and self-interest of drafters are the likely reasons for this double-standard of ratiﬁcation.
Chapter 6 focuses on one speciﬁc channel through which drafters can inﬂuence the
constitutional development in the future, namely unamendable provisions. The function
of these provisions is often described as a commitment device. We argue that a better
way to understand their use is the view of paternalism, while their desirability for
commitment purposes is questionable.
A ﬁnal chapter summarizes the ﬁndings in light of the limitations of this dissertation
and discusses paths for future research.
xviii
Samenvating
Dit proefschrift bevat een analyse van de overkoepelende vraag hoe het grondwetgevende
proces van invloed is op de geschreven grondwet. Om vanuit een breed perspectief
meer licht op deze kwestie te werpen worden positieve en normatieve onderzoeksvragen
behandeld. Naast een inleidend hoofdstuk, waarin de opzet van het proefschrift wordt
geschetst, en een overzicht van de belangrijkste literatuur in hoofdstuk 2 bestaat dit
proefschrift uit vier inhoudelijke hoofdstukken en een kort hoofdstuk met de conclusie.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt stilgestaan bij de vraag of het grondwetgevende proces van
invloed is op de keuze van grondwettelijke kenmerken. Aan de hand van een ra-
tionelekeuzemodel wordt getoond hoe de invoering van een bepaald stadium van grond-
wetsvorming van invloed is op de grondwettelijke keuze van de staatsvorm. De reeks aan-
names die in dit model wordt gehanteerd, is met name van toepassing op nieuwe en in-
stabiele democratieën; dit betreft tegelijkertijd het soort landen waar vaak grondwetswi-
jzigingen plaatsvinden. Tot op heden wordt vaak aangevoerd dat inkomensongelijkheid
een bepalende factor is voor de keuze van de staatsvorm (Robinson en Torvik, 2016). In
dit hoofdstuk wordt een andere conclusie getrokken en wordt aangetoond dat het eﬀect
van inkomensongelijkheid wordt bepaald door de samenstelling van de grondwetgevende
vergadering.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt dieper ingegaan op de bijzonderheden van het grondwetgevende
proces en wordt besproken door middel van welke procedurele voorschriften de opstellers
eﬀectief kunnen worden bedwongen. Om deze vraag te kunnen analyseren maken we
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gebruik van een theoretisch model en van een regressieanalyse. Uit het model komt naar
voren dat opstellers zelfs zonder externe regels bereid zijn zichzelf te bedwingen wanneer
zij belang hechten aan de opbrengsten op lange termijn. In situaties waarbij sprake is
van grote onzekerheid worden deze opbrengsten minder belangrijk en zijn procedurele
regels nodig om opstellers te bedwingen. Ironisch genoeg komt uit het model naar voren
dat referenda als instrument om opstellers te bedwingen het eﬀectiefst zijn bij weinig
onzekerheid en het minst eﬀectief wanneer er sprake is van grote onzekerheid. Referenda
alleen zijn niet voldoende om opstellers te bedwingen.
Na deze positieve analyse komen in hoofdstuk 5 en 6 meer normatieve kwesties aan
de orde. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt ingegaan op de kwestie referenda voor de ratiﬁcatie van
grondwetten en worden de voor- en nadelen van vereisten inzake gewone meerderheid en
gekwaliﬁceerde meerderheid behandeld. We stellen dat het nagenoeg universele gebruik
van vereisten inzake gewone meerderheid normatief gezien niet kan worden gerecht-
vaardigd, vooral gezien het feit dat de meeste ratiﬁcatieprocedures in grondwetgevende
vergaderingen een gekwaliﬁceerde meerderheid voorschrijven. Er wordt gesteld dat pad-
afhankelijkheid en eigenbelang van opstellers de vermoedelijke oorzaken zijn van deze
dubbele moraal ten aanzien van ratiﬁcatie.
Hoofdstuk 6 handelt over één speciﬁek kanaal waarmee opstellers de grondwettelijke
ontwikkeling in de toekomst kunnen beïnvloeden, namelijk bepalingen die niet kunnen
worden gewijzigd. Er wordt vaak gezegd dat deze bepalingen de functie van een ver-
plichtingsmiddel hebben. Wij stellen dat het gebruik van dergelijke bepalingen beter
kan worden verklaard vanuit het oogpunt van paternalisme en dat de wenselijkheid van
deze bepalingen als verplichtingsmiddel discutabel is.
In het slothoofdstuk worden de bevindingen samengevat in het licht van de beperkin-
gen van dit proefschrift en worden wegen voor verder onderzoek besproken.
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